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Everyday Authoritarianism, Teachers, and 
the Decoupling of Nation and State
Assab, May 2000
Teacher Ezekiel woke up and found that his head was resting on a pile of Kalashnikovs. He could feel the rocking motion of the boat and the sun beating down on him, his body soaked in sweat. Squinting, 
he opened his eyes and scanned his belongings; everything he owned of any 
worth was in a pile around him. Next to his head, two feet, wearing shida, 
the black plastic sandals emblematic of Eritrean fighters, were anchored on 
top of his radio. Opening his eyes a little wider in the bright sunlight, he 
looked up at the fighter who was scanning the crowded boat, calling for 
someone. The fighter waved, having found his friend, and then stepped 
down from the radio and moved on, never even noticing Ezekiel waking up 
from much-needed sleep. Ezekiel put his head back down on his Kalash-
nikov pillow and closed his eyes.
Three days earlier, it had been a typical blazing hot day in late May in 
Eritrea’s port town of Assab. Having finished marking exams, Ezekiel and 
his friend had been on their way to the cinema to have a drink and watch a 
movie to celebrate the end of the school year. “Where are you going?” People 
they passed asked them.
“To the cinema,” Ezekiel and his friend answered.
“You can go, but there won’t be any movies. Everyone is leaving.”
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The presence of the war had loomed over the residents of Assab since 
the border war with Ethiopia broke out two years earlier in 1998, but this 
was the first time civilians were evacuated. The front was some sixty kilome-
ters away. The port, which had served as Ethiopia’s main access to the sea, 
closed when the war began, and many of the town’s residents returned to 
the Ethiopian or Eritrean highlands, leaving shops, restaurants, and homes 
shuttered and empty. The town filled with soldiers. Several times, Ethiopia 
had unsuccessfully attempted to bomb Assab’s airport and the village of 
Harsile, the area’s water source. The school had become a hospital during 
the first offensive in 1998.
After being told about the evacuation, Ezekiel rushed home to pack. On 
the way, he ran into his school director, who was heading to the port. In a 
panic, she ordered him to remain behind to hand back report cards to any 
students who showed up. He refused, telling her he was going to the same 
place she was, the same place everyone was going.
Ezekiel and the town’s residents had no reason to think the government 
would not safely and successfully evacuate them. Amid chaos and fear of 
imminent violence, the residents of Assab hoped and, indeed, assumed that 
the government would protect them, evacuate them, and provide for them 
when they were displaced. While these events were occurring in Assab, 
towns in the western lowlands of the country were also being evacuated, 
with residents relocated to camps for Internally Displaced People as the 
fighting forces engaged in a strategic withdrawal in the face of oncoming 
Ethiopian forces. However, once in the port, where Ezekiel and most of the 
town remained for several days while the boats were prepared for the evacu-
ation, it was unclear whether anyone was in charge. There was little food. 
Shops were closed down, and everyone was left to fend for him- or herself. 
Rumors circulated that the town’s top officials had begun to evacuate their 
own family members and property days before they announced the evacua-
tion to the population at large. At one point, one of the Ministry of Educa-
tion supervisors showed up with crates of beer that would have been sold at 
the teachers’ club, handing them out to teachers for free while saying, “This 
is our beer.” The implication was that they’d better drink it now, because 
it would be looted when they left. At one point, while sleeping on the hard 
concrete surface of the port, Ezekiel and the other teachers woke up to see a 
military truck suspended overhead from a large crane. The electricity in the 
port went off while the boats were being loaded by crane, halting the evacu-
ation process. The technicians who worked for the electric company were in 
a bus, fleeing the town by road, leaving no one to keep the power running.
After the evacuation, when teachers and others arrived in Massawa, 
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Eritrea’s northern port, hungry and exhausted, they were told almost imme-
diately to report for National Service. The government was calling up every-
one from around the country for military training and possible combat. 
Conditions in military training were harsh; trainees were required to engage 
in extreme physical labor in 120°F desert conditions and to work and sleep 
outside. They were given limited water and little to eat. Most significantly, 
they were under the absolute control of commanding officers, all of whom 
utilized various forms of corporal punishment to discipline trainees, and 
some of whom believed it was within their rights to beat trainees or tie them 
in stress positions in the desert sun for hours to punish them for deviation 
from the strict rules. In the years following these events, conscription into 
the military would extend well beyond the eighteen months of service out-
lined in Eritrean law and well beyond the period of actual fighting in the 
border war. Indeed, the time limits on service, a term that includes both 
national and military service, have become indefinite for many Eritreans 
who have been “in service” for well over a decade.
Wartime highlights what Begoña Aretxaga (2003) calls the “madden-
ing” nature of the state as people hope that those in charge will take care 
of them, fear that those in power will hurt them, and experience govern-
ment institutions unraveling, ultimately muddling the way people imagine 
the state. During the evacuation of Assab, the state receded. Its institu-
tions and representatives lost the capacity to act “as the state” in the face of 
chaos and disorder and instead just took care of themselves. Teachers fled 
before marking their exams. The school director had to abandon her duties. 
Subsequently, the state, which people thought of as protective during the 
evacuation, enabled its agents to use force against its people to recruit and 
train them to be soldiers. A de facto state of emergency was enacted, giving 
state actors powers of control, coercion, and capacity for violence. Violence 
and force were used to turn civilians, who thought of themselves as needing 
protection, into soldiers who would protect the nation. In the process, these 
civilians were also turned into what I call coerced subjects—citizens forced 
to defend, use, and experience violence for the state.
This book is about how citizens imagine their state and nation when 
they experience the state as turning against them. It is now common among 
scholars to view nations as imagined communities, but national imagi- 
naries do not simply arise spontaneously, nor are they solely the machinations 
of governing elites’ national projects. The way citizens imagine the nation 
and their identity as nationals is always a combination of non-national (eth-
nic, regional, religious) solidarities, lived experiences, and nation-making 
projects that attempt to bundle these into a neat, unified package. States, 
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meanwhile, are thought of as a totality that has sovereignty over national 
territories and people, including the power to nationalize them, but states 
are seldom as coherent or cohesive as they seem to be in our imaginations. 
In reality, states are a configuration of actors, agents, policies, and processes 
and are only a totality in the imaginations of their citizens, employees, and 
others who tend to characterize them as such. State actors struggle with 
each other and with citizens to influence the ways both the nation and state 
are imagined. When we examine the ways imaginaries of state and nation 
mutually shape each other, we see that the production of the nation and 
state is the result of a complex and unwieldy process, particularly when 
states use force against citizens.
Using the case of Eritrea, I show how citizens’ often-coercive encounters 
with state actors shape their imaginaries of the state, the nation, and the 
linkage between them. The ideological and imaginative glue that binds 
nation to state—the hyphen in nation-state—can’t be taken for granted, 
particularly amid conditions of authoritarian rule.1 National imaginaries are 
radically altered by state coercion; however, the complex processes through 
which coercion decouples the nation from the state are understudied. Even 
when people experience the state as incompetent or dangerous, they hold 
out hope that the state still cares and has the capacity to care (Aretxaga 
2003). These contradictory experiences of the state become even clearer 
when we understand that even when the state is coercing its subjects, “it” 
is not a monolith but rather a plurality of actions, actors, and imaginaries, 
constantly being made and remade in interactions between those who rep-
resent the state and those to whom they represent the state.2
Most importantly, government employees, who give the state its insti-
tutional coherence and materiality, also feel coerced by the state and are 
responsive to the shifting imaginaries shaped by these experiences. My focus 
here is on teachers, who are the government employees (state actors) most 
directly responsible for shaping the nation’s young. Teachers and schools 
provide a unique vantage point through which to understand the dialectic 
of how national imaginaries get produced in response to feelings that the 
state is turning against its people, in large part because teachers are situated 
to do the work of hyphenating, or gluing, nation to state. Those same teach-
ers who experienced the botched evacuation and were subsequently con-
scripted into a grueling summer of military training in 2000 were released 
from the military and back in the classroom the following fall, charged, as 
all teachers are, with inculcating national values and identities into their 
students, many of whom were also evacuated and had relatives serving in 
the armed forces. Even as teachers confronted their own maddeningly con-
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flicted imaginaries of the state, they produced the nation for and with their 
students in schools and classrooms. In doing this, teachers navigated the 
tension between their charge to educate the nation and their discontent with 
the party-government program of mass militarization. This book exam-
ines this tension at a moment when imaginaries of the coercive state were 
eroding, unraveling, and changing sentiments about what it meant to be 
national in Eritrea as a whole.
Education, Nationalism, and  
the Struggling State in Eritrea
Understanding the relationship between nation and state is essential to 
understanding Eritrean political and social life and is central to scholar-
ship on Eritrea (Connell 2011; Dorman 2006; Hepner 2009b; Hirt and 
Mohammad 2013; Müller 2008, 2012b; Riggan 2013b). Indeed, much of 
the scholarship on Eritrea notes that it is difficult to distinguish between 
nation and state in large part because the ruling party has worked very 
hard to synthesize the two (Dorman 2006; Müller 2008, 2012b). Mean-
while, ethnographic work tends to emphasize often quiet, but widespread, 
grassroots discontent with these efforts at synthesizing the nation with the 
state (Hepner 2009b; Hirt and Mohammed 2013; Mahrt 2009; O’Kane 
2012; Poole 2009; Riggan 2013b; Treiber 2009; Tronvoll 1996, 1998). The 
predominant version of Eritrean nationalism was carefully crafted and con-
structed by the ruling (and liberating) party, the Eritrean People’s Liberation 
Front (EPLF), during the country’s thirty-year war for independence from 
Ethiopia, which is referred to as “The Struggle.” The EPLF intentionally 
oriented the Eritrean nation around the revolutionary values of The Strug-
gle: self-sufficiency, an orientation toward “progress” and development, an 
absolute willingness to sacrifice, and a warrior ethos. The EPLF, which 
was renamed the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) when 
independence was won in 1991, embodied both the state and the nation. It 
enjoyed widespread support during the post-independence years, a moment 
in history that is described as effervescent for people’s widespread emotional 
coalescence around the party and independence itself (Hepner 2009b).3 But 
since the border war with Ethiopia broke out in 1998, the euphoric tone 
that marked the years between independence and the onset of the border 
war has been replaced with a sense among many that the government can 
only bring about a hopeless future. An iconic popular expression, coined 
by Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afewerki, during Eritrea’s thirty-year struggle 
for liberation, describes the country’s “warrior ethos”: Eritrea is a nation of 
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soldiers. However, for teachers, students, and others, mass conscription has 
given new meaning to that common expression.
Eritrea’s national/military service program, which became controversial 
at the end of the border war, is central to sentiments that “the govern-
ment” (mengisti), a catch-all phrase that references a wide range of politi-
cal, bureaucratic, and military policies, practices, and personnel, is turning 
against, and indeed punishing, its people. National/military service is effec-
tively indefinite for the majority of conscripts. By law, National Service in 
Eritrea requires citizens, male and female, to undergo six months of mili-
tary training and twelve months of unpaid, voluntary service, typically in 
the military, but for educated people, often in a civil capacity. During the 
border war with Ethiopia (1998–2000), the government mobilized as many 
citizens as possible; however, despite the fact that there has been no fighting 
since 2000, those serving in the military have not been demobilized and, 
at the time of my fieldwork (2003–2005), even those assigned to serve in 
a civil capacity typically served much longer than the requisite eighteen 
months. In 2002, the government introduced the Warsai Yikaalo Develop-
ment Campaign, which allocated the labor of those serving in the military 
to development projects and extended the term of National Service indefi-
nitely for most conscripts. Following the war, the government began to rely 
on increasingly coercive measures, such as gifa, or mass round-ups, to ensure 
that Eritreans did not escape from service. Detentions without cause or due 
process became more frequent, and it was effectively impossible for almost 
all Eritreans to leave the country. In light of these circumstances, during 
the course of my fieldwork, Eritreans often referred to their country as a 
“prison” and depicted the state as punishing. For example, when teachers 
recounted stories of military training to me, they described it as a punitive 
experience, telling stories about enduring harsh conditions, sleeping outside, 
eating watered-down lentils and stale flatbread. They described their fear 
of commanders who controlled their every moment and movement and 
could punish them for any failure to follow strict orders at all times of the 
day, even if they did not know they had done something wrong. Few men-
tioned the need to defend the nation, despite the fact that a war was going 
on at the time. This suggests that when the state is imagined as coercive, 
imaginaries of the nation and national duty also change. The experience 
of being a soldier became an experience of state violence. Imagining mili-
tary service as punitive rather than as one’s duty to the nation reflected a 
shifting affective stance toward the nation or, more specifically, toward the 
government-constructed image of the nation as oriented toward defense, 
sacrifice, and militarization. Official versions of nationalism were hollowed 
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of effervescence by the government’s own policies and practices, which were 
intended to perpetuate the very sentiments of patriotism that they eroded.
Education in Eritrea is central to the PFDJ’s militarized nation-build-
ing agenda and to the erosion of populist support for that agenda (Mül-
ler 2012b; Riggan 2011). At the time of my longest period of fieldwork 
in Eritrea (2003–2005), educational institutions were directly implicated 
in the making of soldiers through the auspices of a dramatic educational 
reform. In 2003, as part of a comprehensive educational reform package, 
the Ministry of Education announced that the education system would be 
expanded from grade 11 to grade 12, but all grade 12 students from the 
whole country would have to attend school in one boarding facility located 
in Sawa—the nation’s military training center. Military training would 
begin in the summer before grade 12. Additionally, as part of the same pack-
age of reforms, the government announced a shift from a system of highly 
selective promotion in Senior Secondary Schools (grades 9–12) to a system 
of mass promotion. Thus, the same year in which it was announced that 
everyone would attend grade 12 in Sawa, it was also announced that every-
one would pass. Although there was a complex rationale for this change in 
promotion policies, which I discuss in Chapter 3, what this policy signaled 
to teachers and students was that the government no longer “cared about” 
education, as many of my interlocutors frequently commented. Rather than 
being rewarded for educational accomplishments, students believed that 
they were being promoted en masse and, furthermore, punished by being 
sent to military training. Educational policies thus provide a particularly 
salient example of government programs, which were intended to socialize 
Eritreans into the party’s vision of national duty, being reinterpreted as the 
government turning against the people.
A state like Eritrea that prohibits citizens from leaving, engages in mass 
round-ups, detains arbitrarily, permanently conscripts a large swathe of its 
population into the military, and utilizes schools as a conduit for military 
conscription might seem like a “strong” state in the sense that it has the 
capacity to implement policies and enact sovereignty over its people. Such 
a state might not seem to be “struggling,” yet I argue that states in Eritrea 
and elsewhere struggle in a variety of ways.4 States struggle to legitimately 
enact their own nation-building projects. Authoritarianism and state coer-
cion, in particular, reveal weaknesses in the hyphen between nation and 
state, weaknesses that are present in all states, even those that we might not 
label as authoritarian or coercive. The case of Eritrea highlights these state 
struggles in several ways.
Specific to Eritrea, the term “The Struggle” refers to Eritrea’s thirty-year 
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war for liberation from Ethiopia, which resulted in Eritrea’s independence in 
1991. The PFDJ affixes itself to the legacy of The Struggle, a legacy that has 
fused the creation of a sovereign state, the defense of those sovereign borders, 
the development of that sovereign nation, and a notion of Eritrean citizen-
ship oriented toward willingness to sacrifice for the nation (Bernal 2014). I 
explore this legacy in more detail in Chapter 1. The PFDJ envisioned a form 
of nationalism in which individual citizens in the post-independence nation 
would willingly struggle for the development and defense of the indepen-
dent nation, but the party eventually had to force its citizens to participate 
in the nation-building project oriented toward these goals. However, as the 
party turned toward force, it struggled in a different way—to maintain the 
legitimacy of revolutionary nationalism. As Eritreans came to view the state 
as punishing, sentiments of national duty and loyalty to the revolutionary 
legacy were eroded. In this process, as I detail in Chapter 2, the party’s 
rather monolithic definition of what it meant to be Eritrean was challenged. 
Thus, the second form of struggle illuminated here is the struggle of the 
party to maintain the legitimacy of its nation-making project.
These challenges to the legitimacy of the party’s nation-making project 
occurred subtly and ambiguously but persistently in the realm of the quotid-
ian, particularly in schools. This brings us to the third manifestation of state 
struggle. Individuals, including state employees, struggled with their feel-
ings about the state, the nation, and their responsibilities to it. The strug-
gles of state employees, particularly teachers, were especially paradoxical 
because their struggles occurred in their encounters with students and, thus, 
constituted and altered the state itself. These everyday struggles in schools 
are important to explore not only because schools were where divergent 
meanings of what it meant to be Eritrean clashed but also because teachers’ 
struggles reflected and resulted in a diminished capacity to discipline edu-
cated citizens. Schools were alternately spaces of institutional disintegration, 
the subject of Chapter 4, and spaces of coercion, discipline, and violence, 
which is examined in Chapter 5. When teachers struggled, the nature and 
coherence of a key state institution—schools—were at stake.
In short, the Eritrean state struggled to be legitimate, to produce loyal 
national subjects, to reproduce and reify itself, and to achieve institutional 
coherence. These struggles are certainly not unique to Eritrea; indeed, all 
states struggle to produce these effects. But the conditions in Eritrea pro-
duced by mass militarization, the party’s orthodox adherence to its revo-
lutionary nationalist agenda, and the government’s increased reliance on 
coercion amplify these struggles and expose the paradoxes of state legiti-
macy and control.
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Emergent Authoritarianism and  
the Imagination of Nation and State
When I first visited Eritrea as a Peace Corps volunteer in 1995, the official 
National Service program had just begun. Each evening, adults and chil-
dren from the neighborhood where my host family lived crowded into their 
small living room to watch footage of National Service recruits completing 
their military training in Sawa. Extra chairs were brought in for adults, 
while teenagers stood at the back of the room and young children filled in 
the floor space between chairs and table. The same scene was repeated in the 
living rooms of anyone who had a television as well as in many restaurants, 
hotels, and shops throughout the town. The recruits performed elaborate 
military drills while the national anthem and patriotic songs played cheer-
fully. Interspersed with scenes of military unity, interviews with soldiers of 
both genders and from all nine Eritrean ethnic groups espoused the success 
of National Service in meeting both of its goals—to develop the nation and 
to create a sense of national oneness. Meanwhile, that summer, mandatory 
summer service programs for high school and university students (ma’atot) 
were in full swing. Tent camps had popped up along the sides of roads, and 
groups of young people were planting trees or building terraces. While there 
was some debate about these programs, in general Eritreans enthusiastically 
supported the idea of service (Hepner 2009b; Müller 2008; Reid 2009). It 
seemed to me that every family had at least one (or more) member involved 
in National Service or summer service.
In the years prior to and immediately following independence, the 
Eritrean government engaged its population in a highly effective nation-
building program. During the war for independence, the party created a 
national ideology and a state apparatus to disseminate it, which together 
effectively galvanized and unified the population (Hepner 2009b; Pool 
2001; see also Connell [1993] 1997 and Iyob 1995). Eritrea is a country 
where the party leadership has been engaged in a long effort, one that pre-
dates independence by well over a decade, to produce institutions to govern, 
educate, and generally manage and look after the welfare of Eritreans. These 
institutions of governance were also intent on instilling a particular sense of 
Eritrean-ness in the population. Given the effectiveness of a nation-building 
project that fused nation to state, Eritrea might appear to be a strange place 
to interrogate the weakening relationship between the two.
Eritrea was quite different from most other African states at indepen-
dence (and, indeed, states in Africa and elsewhere today), where societal 
forces and relationships are often densely intertwined with state institutions, 
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leading to what Goran Hyden (2006) has called “politics in people” and 
what others often gloss as “clientilism” or “patrimonialism.” In contrast, in 
Eritrea “the state” is quite strong and well emancipated from society (Chabal 
and Daloz 1999). Eritrea is also interesting because, unlike many countries 
in Africa where attempts at fusing nation and state fell apart because of 
either the institutional weakness of the state apparatus or because of the 
lack of coherent, populist nationalism, in Eritrea the PFDJ/EPLF adeptly 
hyphenated them. Eritrea’s leadership quite intentionally created institutions 
of governance to produce and promote a version of nationalism that enabled 
Eritreans to imagine their national community and situate the party-run 
state apparatus at its center. This project of making the nation-state enabled 
the state and the nation to reify each other, leading to what appeared to be 
a strong state that at least initially produced strong attachments between its 
people and the nation.
However, the state is not the only entity with the capacity to produce 
imaginaries of the nation; the ways in which citizens think and feel about 
the state directly affect the ways in which they imagine the nation, and vice 
versa (Appadurai 1996; Gupta 2012; Herzfeld 1997; Wedeen 2008). Imagi-
nation is a social process that gives us a profound and powerful collective 
capacity to think through our interconnections with other people, times, 
and spaces that are unknown to us and spread across a national territory 
and, at times, the globe (Appadurai 1996). One example of this is Benedict 
Anderson’s (1991) famous assertion that nations are imagined communi-
ties, but imagining the national community is difficult without placing an 
imaginary of the state at the center of what the nation is. The understanding 
of a territorial entity called the nation, a community of people attached to 
that territory, and the sovereignty of a state over that community and terri-
tory (even if it is not the state all the people want) is central to defining the 
nation (Wedeen 2008). The state, thus, plays a critical role in nationalizing 
the nation, but when the state is not imagined as benevolent, it loses its 
hold over how people imagine the nation, leaving nationalism fragmented, 
conflicted, and susceptible to skirmishes over the meanings of the nation 
and national belonging.
In the years following Eritrea’s 1991 independence, Eritreans tended to 
imagine the state as benevolent despite initial evidence of authoritarianism. 
The ruling party argued that it was inventing its own form of governance, 
which would be uniquely suited to Eritrea’s own historical circumstances. 
Indeed, Eritrea’s leaders rather self-assuredly asserted that they were not 
going to repeat the mistakes of other newly independent African nations (an 
assertion the government used and continues to use to give license to many of 
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its coercive and authoritarian tendencies). In the years between independence 
and the border war, the government announced a date for elections; engaged 
Eritreans in a grassroots, collaborative process of constitution making; and 
implemented a number of highly progressive policies to promote gender and 
ethnic equality (Müller 2005). During these years, education and health 
care were expanded into rural areas, and the National Service program was 
implemented. Party leaders, along with many foreign diplomats and Eritre-
ans themselves, saw tendencies toward authoritarian consolidation of power 
at that time as actions of a regime that was “in transition.”
Up to and through the border war, this bond between nation and state 
in Eritrea remained strong; it only began to disintegrate in the year after 
the border war ended (roughly 2000–2001). In fall 2001, prominent party 
insiders wrote an open letter critiquing the government’s management of 
the war and the country. They were subsequently arrested. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the private presses were closed, and several journalists were arrested as 
well. This trend began to delegitimize the party’s governing strategies and 
nation-making project. The 2002 implementation of the Warsai Yikaalo 
Development Campaign, which effectively extended national-military ser-
vice indefinitely, and the mass round-ups (gifa) that followed further chal-
lenged people’s loyalties toward and trust in the state.
By the time I began fieldwork in 2003, it had become quite clear that 
many Eritreans inside Eritrea did not believe that the government would 
transition to democracy. Indeed, people commented that the government no 
longer cared for the people, only for itself. Elections were postponed again 
and again. Gifa, which made it clear that the government had the capacity 
to detain without cause, was enacted with a new ferocity (as I discuss in 
Chapter 2). A form of extensive but low-tech surveillance became common 
(Bozzini 2011), and there was increased paranoia about internal opposition, 
especially within the ruling party (Hepner 2009b). People felt constrained 
and forced by the state. Coercion, or the sense of being forced, is one of 
the key modalities through which the state is encountered in authoritarian 
regimes.
The idea that states have a legitimate capacity to use force (against their 
own citizens, if need be) is central to conventional understandings of what 
the state is, yet anthropological work on the state pays surprisingly little 
attention to the nuances, complexities, and paradoxes of coercion. The way 
coercion reworks citizens’ national identities and imaginaries of the state is 
seldom examined. (Additionally, we know little about how and why state 
actors choose to utilize force and violence. I address this below.) With some 
very notable exceptions, the trend toward examining the state through the 
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lens of poststructuralist or Foucauldian approaches has tended to illuminate 
forms of discipline that do not use physical force, on the one hand, but 
emphasize the disciplinary capacity of physical force to create docile subjects 
on the other.5 Coercion does not simply produce docile, disciplined subjects, 
however, but subjects who are simultaneously docile, discontented, unruly, 
and disorderly. Coercion is a form of productive power—in other words, a 
state effect, but one that produces effects that are hard to control. 
Many authoritarian regimes have power over the bodies of their sub-
jects, including the power to relocate, detain, harm, and kill; however, this 
power creates conditions in which state subjects imagine themselves indi-
vidually and collectively as coerced subjects, or subjects who can be forced.6 
Conversely, they imagine the state as not only able but willing to use force. 
The state imagined in this manner becomes illegitimate precisely because 
it is experienced as turning against its people. At the same time, coerced 
subjects develop a set of strategies to avoid coercion, and solidarities form 
around evading the state. An affective climate in which fear intermingles 
with humor and ridicule of authorities emerges. Furthermore, the humor, 
ridicule, fear, and evasion that emerge to cope with state coercion under-
mine and unravel the national projects that states often enlist to legitimize 
their use of force. The coercive state, thus, cannibalizes the legitimacy of its 
own national project.
Over time, fewer and fewer Eritreans regarded the state as legitimate, 
and yet lingering and maddening desires for a benevolent state have argu-
ably prevented people from engaging in broader resistance to such repressive 
conditions. This condition is reminiscent of what Achille Mbembe (2001) 
calls “impotence.” According to Mbembe, when subjects perceive the state 
as having the capacity to absolutely command them—to tell them when, 
how, and where to walk, stand, dance, talk, work, fight, and so on—they 
will comply, but only to the extent that they are forced. Mbembe notes that 
as these state commands are enacted, symbolic and disciplinary realms join 
to produce docility and obedience, but they never quite produce complete 
compliance among citizens, and thus the seeds of transgression may emerge 
in subtle ways as symbols are transformed, rituals subverted, and narratives 
quietly rewritten. Citizens evade state commands and ridicule those in power 
with all sorts of humorous and vulgar forms that delegitimize their power. 
According to Mbembe, ridicule, ribaldry, and other subtle but powerful ways 
of symbolically diminishing the grandeur of the state render both the state 
and its subjects impotent. Rather than undoing official power, this situation 
results in what he calls “mutual zombification” (2001: 111). Ruler and ruled 
are caught in a sort of bizarre, grotesque dance that leaves them both sapped.
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Coercion produces what I think of as a vicious cycle of impotence. 
When a regime must rely on force to govern, it strips itself of legitimacy, 
thereby further necessitating its reliance on force and further undermining 
its legitimacy. As Eritrea’s leaders became more and more reliant on force, 
particularly to conscript Eritreans into National Service, but more generally 
to command Eritreans to do their “duty” as national subjects through ongo-
ing National Service, they made the very concept of the state impotent. As 
the Eritrean leadership became more reliant on forcing its citizens to defend 
and sacrifice for the nation, Eritreans quietly ridiculed the state and devel-
oped evasive tactics to avoid and escape from its demands.
Attempting to consolidate power over state institutions while building 
coherent national identities is a delicate balancing act under the best of cir-
cumstances, but authoritarian regimes face particular challenges in doing 
so precisely because their subjects believe they are forced to perform “as 
if” they are compliantly patriotic (Wedeen 1999: 15–16). For this reason, 
authoritarian regimes often produce hollow nationalisms that are performed 
but not felt and thus never achieve emotional resonance or legitimacy. Fear-
ing disloyalty or disunity, authoritarian governments may actually turn 
on their nations, violently cleansing and attacking parts of their popula-
tions and, in doing so, cannibalizing the nations by symbolically stripping 
away the capacity for their populations to imagine themselves as part of 
the national communities (Appadurai 1996; Aretxaga 2003). Additionally, 
coercive practices designed to force citizen bodies to comply with perfor-
mances of obedience can backfire, producing an empty performance, an 
illusion of compliance, and an imaginary of an illegitimate state (Mbembe 
2001; Wedeen 1999). It is precisely because of their power to coerce citizen 
bodies that authoritarian regimes undermine national loyalties.
Authoritarian regimes, like any regime, want to appear legitimate and 
thus must “manage the symbolic world”—in other words, they must control 
not only the symbols of the nation but also what these symbols signify to 
citizens and how nationals feel about these symbols. These regimes do so 
by exerting disciplinary, coercive, and symbolic power (Wedeen 1999: 32), 
but what the Eritrean case shows us is that often the efforts to exert dis-
ciplinary power are overly reliant on coercion and result in delegitimating 
the symbolic world of the nation. Authoritarian regimes are adept at com-
manding citizens to perform in and observe national rituals but often fail 
to be perceived as legitimate representatives of the nation (Mbembe 2001; 
Wedeen 1999). They produce a display of power, docility, and obedience, 
but the fact that coercion is necessary in the first place reveals the limita-
tions of coercion—it produces empty displays of loyalty (Mbembe 2001: 
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110). Coercion of the body and the production of national ideology thus 
coexist in a mutually constitutive but troubled relationship.
To understand the complex and nuanced process of how once-efferves-
cent Eritrean nationalism began to cool in the face of coercion, one must 
step away from the official project of nation-state formation and examine 
the informal spaces in which people transgress these disciplinary-symbol-
ic systems of (state) power to produce alternative imaginaries of state and 
nation (Wedeen 1999: 151). Powerful, but not entirely coherent, national 
imaginaries circulate outside the official national project. Alternatives to the 
official national project always exist, but they take on a new salience when 
citizens come to imagine the state as increasingly incompetent or dangerous, 
as the state in Eritrea came to be imagined. But even more interestingly, in 
Eritrea, I found that these alternatives to the state project could be and were 
produced within state institutions themselves, most remarkably in schools.
Teachers in the Middle
In late summer 2000, teachers were released from military training. One 
evening around that time, I was in a small nondescript bar on one of the 
back streets of Asmara where teachers from the South Red Sea region tended 
to congregate at all times of day for cappuccino, tea, soft drinks, or beer. 
I was with several teachers and other civil servants from the region and 
noticed a teacher who often sat with us but on this night was sitting across 
the room with a man I did not know. He was talking intently with this 
man, huddled over their beer bottles. Half an hour or so later, the teacher 
joined us and said, “That was our commander when we were in military 
training. I saw him here and I wanted to buy him a beer. To just talk to 
him as a person.”
He paused, and I let the significance of what he had just said sink in. 
Military training varied in its level of harshness, with some trainers using 
relatively little force and violence while others used a great deal. Military 
training, which involved intimidation and hierarchical authority, was an 
intense encounter with the coercive state, particularly for teachers, who were 
more accustomed to being the authority figure than to having authority 
wielded against them.
“I am very happy tonight,” the teacher noted. “Now I know this man as 
a person. Military was very hard. They don’t treat you like a person. I was 
happy to talk to him and know who he is.”
This brief anecdote, a unique occurrence, gives us a rare insight into the 
state that is coercive, authoritarian, and often violent but also intimate and 
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personal. Exploring the motivations of this civil servant and former military 
trainee buying a beer for his former military commander, who had wielded 
authority over him and had used force and possibly violence against him, 
allows us to disentangle the state as people from The State writ large. The 
teacher’s desire to know the person who had caused him pain on behalf of 
the state illuminates the fact that the state, ultimately, comprises people, 
albeit people who are imagined as part of a much larger totality.
The language commonly used to talk about the state in Eritrea illus-
trates a similar interplay between the state and the people who constitute 
it. The word mengisti, which translates as “government,” is typically used 
to describe the state and more often than not refers to a realm of official-
dom—the president, the leaders of the party, and mandates, practices, or 
policies that were passed down from the top. For example, various forms 
of service, gifa, and educational reforms were all attributed to “the govern-
ment,” and, indeed, these policies and practices did emanate from on high. 
Mengisti typically was not a word used to describe intimate encounters with 
the state but rather a term to depict a form of higher power—The State. 
This is an important distinction because it suggests that Eritreans made 
scalar distinctions regarding how they thought about where and what The 
State was; however, these scalar distinctions broke down and became blurry 
in practice. I recall a conversation I had with several teachers and lower-level 
Ministry of Education bureaucrats about what and, more precisely, who 
constituted mengisti. Everyone agreed that the head of the South Red Sea 
branch of the Ministry of Education was the government, but aside from 
agreement that the head was “government,” there was great disagreement 
about where the government ended and the people began. A lively debate 
ensued as some contended that the lower-level bureaucrats around the table 
were also mengisti, while these bureaucrats themselves strongly disagreed. 
(Indeed, my argument throughout this book is that teachers are the state 
because of their particular positioning and the role they play, but most 
teachers would disagree with this viewpoint.) Although Eritreans drew a 
clear distinction between mengisti, which was clearly thought of as existing 
at a higher level, and their own encounters with those endowed with state 
power, these distinctions were in reality very blurry, in large part because 
very little in Eritrea was the result of clear “policy.” Blurriness around what 
was and what was not mengisti came, in part, from the lack of rule of law 
in Eritrea, which manifested itself at all levels and made it impossible to 
know who or which entity was responsible for how people were treated. 
This ambiguity contributed to the sense of arbitrariness surrounding being 
coerced and punished. Eritreans talked about mengisti as “out there” or “up 
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there,” but mengisti also had very direct effects on people’s lives because 
it forced them to do things. At the same time, there was uncertainty and 
debate as to where/who/what mengisti was. It was simultaneously intimate 
and transcendent.
When the state is coercive or violent, we seldom examine its ambigu-
ity or explore the complex agency of actors carrying out violence. Instead 
we reify an imaginary of a powerful state that is violent. In material terms, 
The State does not act on bodies; rather, individual state agents do.7 But 
through state agents’ interactions with the bodies of state subjects, everyone 
involved—agents and subjects alike—come to imagine the state and their 
relationship to it.8 For this reason, it is crucial to understand the state as the 
people who act on its behalf and to explore the belief systems and contradic-
tory experiences that shape these people’s actions.
I refer to these actors, who are in the employ of but not necessarily 
empowered by the state, as middle actors. Middle actors may be military 
commanders or police, but they may also include bureaucrats, civil servants, 
or teachers. They are in the middle by virtue of being both powerful and 
disempowered. They are influenced by the same quotidian social, political, 
and economic processes as the broader citizenry, but they also have power 
to shape this citizenry’s actions, beliefs, and imaginaries of the state. They 
often hail from dominant groups in terms of ethnicity, race, religion, class, 
region, or gender, but their position as frontline state agents means that they 
are typically not among the elite of these groups.
I look at teachers as a particularly important type of middle actor, 
for they are situated in the middle in some particularly paradoxical ways. 
Teachers produce and reproduce both state and nation. Teachers are often 
students’ first encounters with the state (Luykx 1999; F. Wilson 2001). They 
inculcate national identities and a sense of citizenship duties in students 
but are often critical of the very state that they help constitute. In Eritrea, 
teachers were caught in the middle as they tried to navigate between their 
desires to help the nation develop while contending with the state’s project 
of mass militarization and its assumption, which they were highly critical 
of, that both students and teachers were soldiers. Teachers had their own 
educational nation-building project but were pressed to comply with gov-
ernment policies. They tried to negotiate the de facto merger of educational 
and militarized identities but were affected by state coercion and, in turn, 
coerced students on behalf of the state.
A variety of types of state actors could be analyzed to understand this 
dialectic of being coerced/coercing. Other ethnographies of the everyday 
state focus on other types of middle actors, such as members of the military 
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(Bickford 2011; Glaeser 2011; Kanaaneh 2009; Macleish 2013), customs 
agents (Chalfin 2010), bureaucrats and civil servants (Gupta 2012; Herzfeld 
1992), and artists (Adams 2010; Frederik 2012). Additionally, a series of 
studies of vigilantes shows how those outside the state do the work of the 
state but also respond to state incompetence and impotence in an attempt 
to make society more moral (Goldstein 2003; Hellweg 2011; Smith 2004). 
These studies and others all recognize the importance of understanding 
how states are imagined and experienced by examining the actors situated 
ambiguously in the middle—citizens experience these actors as represent-
ing a state, but the actors themselves may be disillusioned with the state or 
have motivations that differ significantly from government policy. All of 
these middle actors constitute an arm of the state, but their social positions 
are also often ambiguous. For quite some time, anthropologists have been 
studying up, focusing on the beliefs, cultures, and practices through which 
the upper echelons of power become manifest (Nader 1972); however, the 
mandate to study up in many ways sets up a false dichotomy between those 
who are empowered and those who are disempowered, between the elite 
and the subaltern. More often, state actors who engage with the popula-
tion are simultaneously powerful and lacking in power. For this reason, I 
suggest that a framework that emphasizes the ambiguity of power among 
those situated liminally between the state and the people is important, yet 
few theoretical frameworks are explicitly designed to allow us to do so. A 
study of teachers, like other middle actors, is neither a study up of those with 
power nor a study down of those who are disempowered, but a study of the 
intersections of both.
Eritrean teachers have an elite status because they predominantly come 
from the dominant gender (male) and ethno-religious group (Tigrinya); 
however, teachers do not consider themselves to be elite members of society 
for a variety of reasons, and many Eritrean teachers argued compellingly 
that they were disrespected by society in large part because of the way they 
were treated by the government. Eritrean teachers are predominantly male 
and from the dominant Tigrinya ethnic group. Tigrinya people comprise 50 
percent of the Eritrean population, reside primarily in the central highlands 
of the country, and are mostly Christian. The other eight ethnic groups are 
predominantly Muslim and are scattered around the coastal and western 
lowlands as well as the more remote northern highlands. Teachers are also 
elite by virtue of being educated in a country where higher education has 
been a rarity. Thus, they have a good deal of power and stature in Eritrean 
society. Teachers are role models for many Eritreans because they have suc-
ceeded educationally. However, teachers also believe that their social status 
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is much lower compared to that of other educated people and argue that 
they are paid less and treated worse than other comparable civil servants. 
They are thought to be noble by virtue of their education but also in a lower-
status profession, constantly under the thumb of the state. Teachers often 
feel maligned by the government, often comparing themselves to police and 
soldiers—other groups of state employees thought to be even more poorly 
treated and regarded.
For Eritrean teachers, the experience of mass militarism, the recent war, 
and the coerciveness of the government in general played significant roles 
in shaping how they acted as the state, but in different ways for different 
teachers. There were two categories of Eritrean teachers in Assab during the 
two years I conducted fieldwork—“service teachers” and professional teach-
ers.9 The distinction between service and professional teachers was blurry. 
The Ministry of Education had hired the older generation of professional 
teachers in the early 1990s. This generation was conscripted into National 
Service at the end of the border war in 2000, and their demobilization 
was finalized in spring 2004. They were, first and foremost, teachers and 
considered themselves professionals. In contrast, a younger generation of 
teachers, referred to as “service teachers,” had been recruited as part of their 
National Service obligation following completion of university or teacher 
training. Members of this group were not demobilized during my time in 
Eritrea, although they had been released from active military duty to teach. 
While all teachers were unhappy about their extended National Service, 
service teachers, who did not know whether they would ever be demobi-
lized, were particularly discouraged. In reality, the distinction between a 
professional teacher doing National Service and a National Service conscript 
serving as a teacher (service teacher) was a blurry one, and quite a few teach-
ers fell between the two categories. Nonetheless, the categories determined 
how quickly one was demobilized and, as I discuss in more detail below, 
teachers’ attitudes toward the government.
In Assab, most teachers came from elsewhere. As I discuss in more detail 
below, Assab was a somewhat transient place. So, too, was teaching a tran-
sient profession. Eritrea’s National Service program and civil service jobs 
displaced and relocated many people. Transfers of civil servants were not 
limited to a few isolated cases but were widespread, particularly within the 
Ministry of Education. As of 2003, when I began fieldwork, all teachers in 
the South Red Sea region had already experienced a transfer at some point 
or expected to be transferred in the future. To be a teacher meant not count-
ing on being able to settle, put down roots, or imagine a future independent 
of a state that could relocate you. Although in many respects moving people 
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around the country, particularly under the auspices of service projects, was 
a strategy of nation building, because teachers felt coerced into moving, it 
actually undermined their ability to imagine the state as benevolent.
Thus, teachers were in an ambivalent position—relatively elite and 
privileged compared to Eritrea’s population as a whole, but thwarted in 
their aspirations compared to other educated people in Eritrea. As sym-
bols, teachers simultaneously represent the lived embodiment of people’s 
hopes for a good future and their disappointments in the actual future. 
For this reason, studying teachers allows us to understand the contradic-
tions of state power as it is imagined as oppressive to teachers while being 
enacted by them. This complex social status shapes teachers’ beliefs, which 
in turn influence how they act “as” the state. Michael Lipsky’s ([1980] 2010) 
sociological study of “street-level bureaucrats” documents the beliefs and 
prejudices that certain state employees bring to their work on the street. On 
top of all this, they bring their own prejudices and belief systems to bear 
on their work as the state in a process that Michael Herzfeld (1992, 1997) 
has called “cultural intimacy.” As both Akhil Gupta (2012) and Herzfeld 
(1992) note, bureaucrats often use the power they are allocated not to help 
but to produce indifference. Extending these arguments, I suggest that the 
“social production of indifference” (Herzfeld 1992) emerges not because 
state actors are bad people who want to hurt others but because they are 
responding to a combination of their own beliefs about what is right and 
moral, their disillusionment with the state that they are unwittingly and 
inadvertently a part of, and the structural/institutional constraints of their 
job. But, ironically, middle actors themselves are often not happy about the 
roles they play for one reason or another. They are keenly aware of the limits 
of their power and, at times, of the injustices around them. They often feel 
alienated, disenfranchised, and victimized by the state that they represent.
Middle actors are also often empowered to utilize force in the name 
of the state, but their decisions about whether to do so are framed by their 
ambiguous status. Under conditions that are violent and coercive, it is 
important to ask how and why state actors behave coercively and violently. 
Drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) work on the state of exception, 
which itself is derived from Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 2005: 1) assertion that 
“sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” scholars have focused on the 
devolution of sovereignty and, specifically, the devolution of decision mak-
ing about the use of force and violence to state actors (Das and Poole 2004; 
Hansen and Stepputat 2005). Middle actors are often in a position to decide 
on the exception and, thus, be sovereign, particularly under conditions in 
which the state is impotent and incompetent. The violence that results is 
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often seen as a necessary means to produce moral communities, often bring-
ing together public actors and institutions with private relationships (Buur 
2003; Lyons 2008; Peteet 1994). In this vein, forms of violence can be seen 
as attempts to retain order, justice, and morality in times of anxiety. Teach-
ers at times seek to reinscribe morality by using violence, through corporal 
punishment in particular.
Teachers are also complex and interesting because even when they dis-
agree with government-mandated educational policies, they must comply 
with them, because resistance to these policies might undermine the qual-
ity of education. Teachers may abhor government policies that are largely 
imposed on them, but they believe in education and schools as a moral 
good, even if a tainted one, and, ultimately, have to make a choice between 
resisting distasteful policies and doing their best to maintain the school as 
a good, moral space. Teachers in Eritrea and elsewhere thus simultaneously 
resist and do work in a way that they think is morally correct and in the 
best interests of the students (Downey 2007) or in the best interest of the 
nation (Silver 2007; Wilson 2001). In Eritrea, they had what they regarded 
as a moral mandate to produce educated citizens for the nation despite con-
ditions that were out of control, even though these same teachers, in some 
cases, contributed to the chaotic and out-of-control atmosphere.
Studying middle actors requires examining how structures constrain 
and produce certain actions but also exploring alternative structures and 
variegated ways in which middle actors respond to structures. The move to 
merge military training with secondary education was one such structural 
constraint that teachers had to contend with. The government command 
that education should shuttle students into military service, which was 
enacted through both National Service and educational policy, certainly 
placed structural constraints on how teachers could educate. But at the same 
time, teachers’ beliefs about what their work was for—to produce national 
subjects—also profoundly shaped what they were willing and not willing 
to do in classrooms. Teachers responded to these various structures in what 
were often contradictory ways. At one extreme, some teachers resisted every-
thing associated with being a teacher, showing up for the school year late, 
arriving late and leaving early almost every day, not disciplining students, 
and not planning lessons. At another extreme, some teachers appropriated 
and tried to understand the new policies and help students understand why 
being sent to the military did not preclude their working hard to have a 
bright future. Most teachers’ responses were far more complex and con-
tradictory. On many days, the same teacher would drag his feet and show 
up late for class but then afterward express anxiety about how disorderly 
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the school had become and think of ways to create order and improve the 
quality of education. Times of moral crisis, flux, or change highlight the 
paradoxes of middle actors by showing how they wield power, how they are 
disempowered, and how the tensions between their empowerment and dis-
empowerment mutually constitute each other. The government’s merging 
of secondary education with processes of military training produced such a 
crisis, ultimately revealing that teachers and the government had radically 
different notions of what an educated national subject should be.
The Paradoxes of the Making of  
Educated Military Subjects
In light of the 2003 educational policies that embedded educational institu-
tions into broader processes of militarization, we might assume that schools 
would become somehow like the military in the sense that they would dis-
cipline and produce soldier-students. Indeed, had this merger of education 
and the military been more seamless, this result might have been the case. 
However, what was striking in Eritrea was that the opposite happened, in 
large part because teachers refused to take on the role of making students 
into military subjects. Instead, these policies produced a moral crisis, because 
there were substantial differences in how Eritreans imagined the future and 
national duties of educated people and the way they imagined the future 
and duties of soldiers. While educational institutions are teleologically and 
developmentally oriented, military institutions are oriented toward sacrifice 
and the absence of a future. Education cultivates and nurtures subjects to 
work hard for both self-improvement and, by virtue of self-improvement, 
national development. In contrast, military institutions produce and rely 
on disciplined subjects oriented toward sacrificing the self for the defense 
of the nation. While educated citizens are encouraged to imagine pathways 
to a hopeful and bright future and to situate themselves on these pathways, 
those in the military, ever ready to sacrifice themselves for the nation, can-
not really imagine a future at all.
Despite these key differences, schools and the military forge attach-
ments to the nation in a variety of similar ways in Eritrea and elsewhere.10 
School curricula legitimate Eritrea’s military history and normalize the cre-
ation of a militarized citizen. The goal of national curricula everywhere is 
to directly and indirectly produce a common historical memory, to cat-
egorize particular types of (ethnic, gendered, religious) national subjects, 
and to delineate the rights and duties of citizens (Kaplan 2006). Eritrea’s 
curricula recount military exploits, craft narratives that glorify past vio-
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lence, and legitimate the need for future military exploits as well as teach 
students what their roles in the militarized nation might be. In schools, 
students learn a version of national history that legitimates the military and 
develops a particular subject position for the fighting citizen. Additionally, 
both schools and the military train subjects to behave in particular ways, 
thereby learning to adopt the behavior of a particular type of person—be it 
a student or a soldier. As Michel Foucault (1995) has noted, subjects in both 
the school and the military are subject to a microphysics of temporal and 
spatial discipline as they are trained to move their bodies in particular ways, 
think in particular ways, adapt to a very specific timetable, and organize 
their learning in particular ways that are specific to being educated. Finally, 
education and the military also produce an experience of simultaneity that 
is profoundly nationalizing. Anderson (1991) notes that nationalist senti-
ments arise from a sense of simultaneity and commonality as citizens move 
to different parts of the country, encountering other types of nationals with 
whom they discover they have had a common experience. Students move 
“up” to higher levels of education and different parts of the country, and 
as they do so, they become aware that others from other parts of the coun-
try have had remarkably similar experiences of schooling and share very 
similar life trajectories and aspirations. Soldiers are trained and mixed up 
with others from around the country and become aware of their common 
experience of being a national soldier.11 In Eritrea, creating a sense of simul-
taneity through collectively developing the nation is quite intentionally part 
of the nation-building strategy. Its National Service project, summer work 
projects for students, and the move to set up the final year of high school in 
the military training center are all means to draw together Eritreans from 
diverse religions, ethnic groups, and regions and provide them with a com-
mon nationalizing experience.
The ruling party in Eritrea has long seen education and militarism as 
paired. Militarism12 and developmentalism (an orientation toward develop-
ing the country, of which education is a key component) compose the twin 
core of Eritrean nationalism (O’Kane and Hepner 2009). Eritrea has been 
oriented toward military goals (first liberating the country and later defend-
ing its borders) since The Struggle for independence began, but defense and 
development have long been fused. The PFDJ liberated territory and then 
set up schools, clinics, and other developmentally oriented programs in the 
liberated areas. The government continues to pair defense and development 
through the goals and work of National Service conscripts. Through the 
auspices of the National Service program, military experiences are infused 
into the lives of all Eritreans.
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In Eritrea, education has always been central to the PFDJ/EPLF’s devel-
opmentalist project, but tension has also always existed between “fighters” 
(tegadelti) and educated people. The EPLF prioritized literacy campaigns 
and education for civilians and fighters alike, and immediately following 
independence, the PFDJ continued these programs and rapidly expand-
ed formal education into the remote corners of the country (Gottesman 
1998; Müller 2005). Following independence, the PFDJ created massive 
weekend and summer work projects that all students were required to par-
ticipate in, thus utilizing educated people as part of its mass of labor for 
development projects, such as terracing hillsides and planting trees. This 
requirement signaled to students that physical labor to develop the coun-
try was also part of their duty as educated people. In doing this, the party 
was trying to disseminate the idea that educated and uneducated people 
were equal and that everyone had a part to play in developing the nation. 
Another way the party operationalized this ideal of egalitarianism was by 
promoting fighters, who had been educated in the field during the war, 
to supervisory positions following independence. Many educated people 
chafed at this assertion of egalitarianism between the educated and the 
uneducated. Some teachers complained about “uneducated” fighters being 
placed in positions of authority over them and also believed that these 
fighters might mistreat them out of jealousy or bad feelings for those who 
were not fighters. Teachers’ and students’ anxieties and complaints about 
the government incorporating high school into National Service drew 
on their beliefs that that educated and uneducated people were distinctly 
different.
Through National Service, militarism and developmentalism are not 
only tightly intertwined but also promulgated biopolitically (O’Kane and 
Hepner 2009). Biopolitics refers to strategies of governance oriented around 
mass management of the population as a whole (Foucault 1997). As David 
O’Kane and Tricia Redeker Hepner (2009) note, the Eritrean government 
organizes and manages the “broad masses” to defend and develop the 
nation. This version of state-sponsored defense/developmentalism is top-
down, requiring a mass of obedient conscripts whose labor is rigorously 
managed. With the policies introduced in 2003, the government thought 
that schools could be incorporated into this project of biopolitically man-
aging, militarizing, and educating the population, but schools proved to 
have a very different orientation from that of biopolitical developmental-
ism/defense, in large part because of Eritrean teachers’ beliefs about what 
it meant to be an educated person. This discrepancy largely explains why 
schools failed to work effectively in service of this biopolitical project.
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Teachers navigated these contradictions between producing educated, 
aspirational subjects and sending students off to the military to become 
sacrificial subjects in paradoxical ways. Teachers evaded and demonized a 
state that was thought of as punitive toward its citizens and then utilized 
remarkably similar forms of punishment on students. They also tacitly and 
subtly joined with students in mocking the government’s national military 
project and then helped students debate alternative ways of being national. 
Each of these strategies resisted the government’s version of what it meant 
to be Eritrean but simultaneously reproduced forms of state power and, 
specifically, encounters with a state imagined to be punitive and unfair to 
their students.
As I make clear throughout this book, teachers themselves understood 
the ambivalent position they were in. They were clearly positioned to carry 
out the government’s program of mass militarization by preparing students 
to be sent to Sawa, but teachers also had a deeply held sense of how they 
were supposed to produce educated national subjects. For Eritrean teachers, 
these two roles were diametrically opposed. Although many teachers did 
resist new educational policies, resistance had its limits because teacher resis-
tance erodes teaching, learning, and other components of the educational 
process that teachers believe in deeply. Thus, teachers could not completely 
resist policies of mass militarization without schools entirely falling apart, 
so resistance was always partial, stunted and held in check by teachers’ own 
sense of their moral mandate to educate the nation.
Studying the Nation-State from Its Margins
The vast majority of literature on Eritrea has focused on fighters, The Strug-
gle for liberation, and its legacy.13 When I set out to conduct research in 
Eritrea, the literature was almost entirely dominated by a preoccupation 
with the war for liberation; the unique qualities of the liberating, and later 
ruling, party; and Eritrea’s near miraculous capacity for self-liberation and 
self-sufficient and tremendously organized rule. Scholars expressed fasci-
nation with sentiments of nationalism that emerged from The Struggle, 
which were notable for their powerful capacity to draw people together and 
often described as “effervescent,” and the capacity of the leadership to cul-
tivate and nurture that sense of nationalism (Hepner 2009b).14 Now many 
scholars are raising questions in an emerging body of work about why what 
initially seemed to be such an effective project of nation-state formation is 
unraveling so dramatically (for examples of this work, see Hepner 2009b; 
O’Kane and Hepner 2009; Woldemikael 2013). Studies that look at nation-
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state making within Eritrea itself (rather than from the vantage point of the 
diaspora) but outside the party’s project of nation-state making are largely 
missing from the literature. Examining nation-state making from this van-
tage point helps us understand how an increased reliance on coercion unrav-
eled the party’s nation-state making strategy in Eritrea.
My entry point into the study of Eritrea was quite different from that 
of most scholars. I entered Eritrea from its margins, the town of Assab. I 
also first came to Eritrea not as a researcher but as a teacher myself (and 
a Peace Corps volunteer) and later as a girlfriend, fiancée, and wife of an 
Eritrean teacher. When I arrived in Eritrea, it was not fighters who came to 
be emblematic of the country for me but educational administrators, teach-
ers, students, and their families. I set out to do a study that did not place the 
fighters or the liberation war at its center but instead showed the ordinary 
experiences of Eritreans who aspired to educate the country and become 
educated for the country. This, from its outset, was a study of the nation 
from the vantage point of a group (teachers) often regarded by scholars of 
both Eritrea and nationalism as marginal to the process of nation-state mak-
ing. I suggest that this marginal population, in hindsight, has proven to be 
remarkably predictive of the changing nature of Eritrean nationalism and 
needs to be thought of as central to these changes. However, because of the 
focus in the literature on the processes by which Eritrea became indepen-
dent, initially I found little literature that could frame my understanding 
of this new, emergent Eritrean nationalism, a nationalism that engaged the 
powerful sentiments emergent from The Struggle for liberation and the 
architecture of nation building put in place by the leadership, but in unpre-
dictable ways.
I was a Peace Corps volunteer from 1995 to 1997, serving as an English 
teacher in the Senior Secondary School where I later conducted my research. 
I returned to Eritrea eight times between summer 1997, when my Peace 
Corps service ended, and summer 2003, when I moved back for an extended 
period of fieldwork from 2003 to 2005. I married an Eritrean teacher in 
2000, the same year I started graduate school. My research thus emerged out 
of a ten-year relationship with the country and the town of Assab and with 
the Eritrean educators in it.
Throughout the course of my fieldwork, in answering a question or 
explaining something to me, research subjects would say, “Well, you are 
like an Eritrean, you understand.” Usually they said this when making a 
point about the political conditions or about the conditions of the schools. 
What they meant by this statement was that I had been around long enough 
to have an intuitive understanding of the macropolitics of the country 
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and the micropolitics of the schools and the Ministry of Education. I also 
understood the ways in which teachers made sense of the problems facing 
the schools, and, in a sense, felt teachers’ pain, frustration, and disillusion 
because my own life was being disrupted by the same factors. Throughout 
the war, I was in and out of Eritrea, often traveling to the country when 
other nonessential foreign personnel had evacuated. And after the war, as 
the noose of National Service tightened, I was bound to the country because 
my husband was stuck in the country, like so many others. Knowing that I 
had experienced the recent turbulence in Eritrea and that my life was deeply 
affected by the war built a sense of solidarity with my research participants.
At the same time, I clearly am not Eritrean. Throughout the war and 
the years following, I could leave and return to the country (although my 
husband could not). At some level, I chose to be there. Even more signifi-
cantly, I was not dependent on the Eritrean government for my livelihood, 
my future, or my education, but instead could secure research funding and 
work toward a degree elsewhere. Most significantly, I was not required to do 
National Service, pay taxes to the Eritrean government, or remain bound to 
the Eritrean state in any way.
My conversations and interviews were conducted in English, the medi-
um of instruction of Eritrean schools. Students and teachers were far more 
fluent in English than I was in Tigrinya and Amharic, and given the com-
plexity of issues involved, I, and, more importantly, teachers and admin-
istrators, preferred to use English. The language issue also marked me as 
non-Eritrean. I did often listen in on informal conversations in Tigrinya 
and Amharic.
My research itself consisted of three components. First, in Asmara, I 
conducted interviews with officials and staff in the curriculum office and 
the Department of General Education who were involved in the creation 
of new curricula and the logistics of implementing new policies in schools. 
I also collected policy documents and attended training sessions for teach-
ers and directors related to the 2003 curricula and policy changes. Second, 
in Assab, I conducted in-depth life-history interviews with teachers and 
directors in the Senior Secondary School and Junior Secondary School. 
During these interviews, I asked about teachers’ own education and train-
ing, how teachers came to be teachers in Assab, their experiences moving to 
and settling in Assab, and their current experiences as teachers. Inevitably, 
what came across in these interviews was, on the one hand, a sense of what 
education ideally could and should accomplish and, on the other hand, a 
deep sense of discontent with current conditions that prevented teachers 
and the education system from accomplishing as much as it could. The 
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new policies, the political climate, and, above all else, the National Service 
program were deeply implicated in what teachers perceived as the problems 
with education.
Finally, the most important component of my research consisted of par-
ticipant observation in and out of schools with teachers throughout the two 
years of my fieldwork. I observed and participated in the daily life in these 
two schools by regularly observing and occasionally teaching classes; watch-
ing ceremonies, such as the flag ceremony; and participating in and noting 
informal interactions among teachers and between teachers and students. I 
also noted the routines and rituals that occurred at particular times in the 
school year and the ways in which the current educational and political con-
ditions seemed to be altering the annual rhythm of school life. Additionally, 
I spent a good deal of time socializing with teachers outside the school both 
in Assab and during summer vacation in Asmara. In addition to casually 
socializing with teachers, I attended their weddings, mourning gatherings, 
holiday celebrations, and children’s baptisms and birthday parties.
The background to teachers’ lives, their hopes, dreams, and disappoint-
ments, was the presence of war and dictatorship. Teachers remembered the 
struggle for liberation and life under Mengistu Haile Mariam’s communist 
dictatorship (known as the Derg regime), from which they had been liber-
ated. This background both did and did not contextualize the way they 
narrated their lives and the meaning of education. Independence and the on- 
set of the border war were clearly significant events, yet at the same time, 
the value of education often loomed, disembodied and hopeful, above and 
apart from the war—which is part of the reason why it was so bitterly dis-
appointing when the government merged military training and education 
in 2003.
Assab was not only an ideal site in which to examine this profound 
rethinking of Eritrean nationalism but also the place that very much shaped 
my thinking on the subject. Indubitably an Eritrean city, yet close to the 
Ethiopian border and, prior to the border war, full of Ethiopians who had 
lived in Eritrea all their lives and Eritreans who had lived in Ethiopia most 
of their lives, Assab was a place where the dominant, state-produced form 
of nationalism was in question long before it was elsewhere in Eritrea. Yet it 
was also a profoundly nationalistic place that was important to the nation. 
It was here that the Italians first arrived in 1869, and it was the place from 
which they launched their colonial takeover of Eritrea, working their way 
up the coast and eventually colonizing all of Eritrea by 1890. Many suggest-
ed that Assab, separated from the Eritrean capital by six hundred kilometers 
of coastal desert and, until 1998, barely accessible by road, “felt” more like 
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an Ethiopian town than an Eritrean one prior to the start of the border 
war. The town of approximately fifty thousand was then linked economi-
cally and socially to both Eritrea and Ethiopia. The border war, however, 
changed this arrangement significantly.
At independence, when relations between the newly independent nation 
of Eritrea and the new government of Ethiopia were amicable, Eritrea grant-
ed Ethiopia free use of the Assab port. This seemed a logical arrangement 
at the time, considering that the two liberating parties had fought side by 
side for the dual purpose of gaining Eritrea’s independence and overthrow-
ing the Derg regime in Ethiopia. Assab had long served as Ethiopia’s main 
port, having been developed into a modern port largely with Soviet funding 
as a result of Ethiopia’s close relations with the Soviet Union. Additionally, 
Eritrea’s northern port of Massawa had always been sufficient in meeting 
the needs of Eritrea’s small population. Furthermore, the “road” from Assab 
to Eritrea’s northern coast and the highlands was little more than a series 
of shifting, dry riverbeds until Eritrea began constructing a better road in 
1998, after the border war cut off travel from Assab to Ethiopia.
The border war transformed Assab. The wide tree-lined streets in the 
port section of the town changed from an area full of thriving businesses, 
bars, and restaurants into a ghost quarter. The squawking of crows replaced 
the formerly incessant rumble of trucks heading to and from the road to 
Ethiopia. In 1998, when the border war began, the hinterland between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia was transformed from a bustling transportation route 
to a front line. The port was closed. Lacking jobs in the port, the first 
wave of Assab’s Ethiopian residents left in 1998. Thousands of soldiers soon 
replaced them, leaving the town feeling quieter but not quite empty.
Assab was a town that few residents “came from.” As I noted above, 
teachers in Assab were an ethnically homogenous group who were trans-
ferred there from the mostly Christian and Tigrinya highlands. But while 
the Eritrean teachers in Assab were an ethnically homogeneous group, the 
student body was increasingly diverse. The demographics of Assab’s Senior 
Secondary School began changing in 2000. Many of the Tigrinya, high-
land residents in Assab, left the town due to the closure of the port. At the 
same time, the government expanded access to schooling in the region and 
strongly encouraged Afar children—who were indigenous to the area but 
underrepresented in educational institutions—to go to school. Whereas in 
1998 approximately 10 percent of students in Assab’s schools were Afar, by 
2005 Afar students composed more than 50 percent of the school popu-
lation. Assab’s Senior Secondary School was the only Senior Secondary 
School in the region, and thus any Afar student wishing to attend Senior 
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Secondary School had to travel to Assab. Some Afar secondary school stu-
dents lived in a boarding home run by the Ministry of Education, but many 
lived with relatives.
Although Assab, with its close links to Ethiopia, was culturally periph-
eral to Eritrea, it was symbolically and politically important. There is no 
doubt that Eritreans viewed Assab as an integral part of Eritrea, but it was 
a hybridized place formed at the intersection of nations and cultures by 
people who came there from different places, different countries, largely for 
economic reasons. It was a place, as one of my research subjects told me, 
where people felt “free” of the constraints of “culture” and the expectations 
of family and more traditional communities. It was a place at the border-
lands, in the margins of Eritrea, where a new way of being Eritrean could 
be imagined, but it was also a place where the reach of the Eritrean state 
could increasingly be felt.
Before I continue, it is important that I provide a couple of qualifica-
tions and disclaimers. First, some readers may be critical that this study has 
so much to say about mass militarization in Eritrea and yet is not a study of 
the military per se. The lack of explicit focus on those in active military units 
and on military installations is in part a problem of access (I tried several 
times to visit Sawa and was not given permission). But even more impor-
tantly, my emphasis on mass militarization is a result of the entire country 
being overtaken by these processes. I did not set off to study militarization, 
yet it was such an all-pervasive component of everyday life in Eritrea that 
I would be remiss if I failed to make it a central focus of my ethnographic 
examination of schooling and nationalism in this context. In a place like 
Eritrea, one can study a form of militarization without studying the military 
itself or focusing exclusively on soldiers because the militarization of the 
country is so pervasive. Indeed, it is impossible not to.
My second disclaimer is that it is not possible to take up every issue 
related to nationalism and the state in a book of any reasonable length, 
and so there are a few concepts, some of which have been central to other 
studies of nationalism and the state, that I address but do not give a central 
role in this book. Gender, ethnicity, and religion, while addressed periodi-
cally throughout the book, are not central to my discussion. Several other 
scholars of Eritrean nationalism have begun to examine questions of gender, 
ethnicity, and religion in Eritrean nationalism (see, for example, Bernal 
2014 and Müller 2005). These perspectives on nationalism are essential 
to understanding nationalism in Eritrea and elsewhere and are certainly 
worthy of more in-depth discussion in their own right, but, given my focus 
on the relationship between nation and state, between teachers and mili-
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tarization, they are beyond the scope of what I can cover in depth in this 
particular book.
Finally, it is also important to note that when researching in a place like 
Eritrea, extra care needs to be taken to protect identities of human subjects, 
given that one is never entirely sure what the surveillance capacity of the 
government is. At times, it appears to have extensive reach and capacity to 
gather information about its subjects, keep records about whom they talk 
to and why, and enact consequences against them should they speak too 
freely. At other times, the government appears to be unconcerned with what 
ordinary citizens say privately; indeed, I found Eritreans spoke quite openly 
about their feelings about their country. But because of this uncertainty, 
in addition to the typical measures taken in keeping with human subjects’ 
protocols (using pseudonyms for interlocutors), I have also blurred other 
characteristics that would personally identify these individuals. For this rea-
son, I do not note dates and places of my interviews or attach quotations to 
any other information that would be identifiable.
Overview of the Book
Taken together, Chapters 1 and 2 look at how coercive state effects in the 
post–border war years eroded the government’s own national project, result-
ing in a need for more coercion but also mass evasion. The first chapter pro-
vides an overview of the genesis of Eritrea’s revolutionary nationalist project, 
which was the creation of Eritrea’s ruling party during The Struggle for 
independence. During the early years of independence, as I noted above, the 
party’s efforts to forge a unified national ideology were tremendously effec-
tive, resulting in a populist nationalism. As I show in Chapter 1, one of the 
problems with the party’s national project was the way in which the ruling 
party sought to make all Eritreans be like the fighters and punish anyone 
who resisted. As a result, this populist effervescence began to erode in the 
face of increased state coercion, violence, and crackdowns on political dis-
sent. All of this led to a reimagining of the state, its revolutionary leadership, 
and the fighters in power as dangerous and punishing, a topic that I take up 
in Chapter 2. The second chapter examines everyday coercive encounters 
with the state and the constellations of rumors and commentary on these 
encounters through which Eritreans tried to reconcile their earlier popular 
and powerfully emotional support for those who liberated the country with 
their experiences with the punishing state.
The second half of the book looks at the interplay of coercion and eva-
sion in schools. Schools, in some respects, were a microcosm of the nation 
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as a whole in the sense that as students were forced to enter the military 
through schools, a culture of evasiveness ensued. However, because teachers 
still championed the role of schools in producing educated national subjects, 
distinct from soldier-subjects, and because students still aspired to become 
these educated subjects, the interplay of coercion and evasion in schools 
was complex. Chapter 3 explores the clashing versions of what the nation 
and its citizens should be—educated or militarized? Here I show how and 
why teachers found the two choices incompatible and provide an overview 
of the complexities of the new educational policies introduced in 2003. 
This chapter also illustrates the disconnect between the disciplinary work of 
teachers in shaping and cultivating individual students to be highly trained, 
knowledgeable, and morally superior educated people and the biopolitical 
efforts of the government to produce a mass of student-soldiers. Teachers 
chafed not only at the idea that students should be soldiers but also at the 
new techniques they were directed to use to mass-promote (and, theoreti-
cally, to mass-educate) their students. The subsequent chapters look at how 
this incompatibility between being a soldier and being a student played out 
in schools, resulting in divergent responses among teachers to new poli-
cies. On the one hand, the educational state became coercive but impotent; 
on the other hand, schools turned into sites where the meaning of being 
national could be debated.
Chapter 4 shows how a climate of evasion took hold in schools. This 
climate was marked by not only disorder and mockery of all forms of offi-
cialdom but also an increased informality and a blurring of the lines of 
authority between students and teachers as both teachers and students 
began to believe that they would never “grow up” and achieve the status 
and stature appropriate to successful, educated people. Here my focus is 
on how teachers’ authority was subverted in part as a result of perceptions 
that everyone—teachers and students—was leveled by the National Service 
mechanism. School-based rituals and routines changed as a result of tacit 
student and teacher resistance, resulting in changing relationships of author-
ity between teachers and students.
Chapter 5, in contrast, looks at teachers’ responses to conditions of 
disorder. Here I show how teachers behaved coercively and claimed their 
authority as the state to rectify what they saw as the moral crisis of students 
not acting like students. The chapter raises questions about how and why 
teachers came to act as everyday sovereigns under Eritrea’s state of excep-
tion. Here I also explore the dialectical relationship between teachers’ beliefs 
about what was good for students, how teachers imagined the state (and 
imagined it as inhibiting their ability to do what was good for the students), 
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and, finally, how they were imagined as the state. Teachers took control, 
often in violent ways, over schools that they thought had become out of 
control. While they thought they were acting in the good, moral interest 
of their students and the nation, students and parents often imagined this 
teacher state quite differently.
As a whole, the book explores the tenuous hyphen between nation and 
state under lived conditions of everyday authoritarianism. Chapters 2 and 
5 look at how encounters with often-violent state actors reshaped imagi-
naries of the state. Chapter 1 provides an overview of official nationalism, 
while Chapter 4 looks at the bottom-up reworking of that official version 
of the meaning of the nation. Taken together, the chapters comment on 
how imaginaries of the state altered imaginaries of the nation and raised 
questions about the legitimacy of the official version of the nation pro-
duced by its leadership. Meanwhile, the book examines how middle actors, 
such as teachers, remain in an awkward position. They have the power to 
shape the way in which the Eritrean nation-state, and the nation in par-
ticular, is imagined. Their power and their legitimacy come from the fact 
that they are close to their students and their communities and, in many 
respects, regarded as being part of those communities. In this regard they 
are, arguably, more powerful than the country’s leaders, who have lost their 
legitimacy. But teachers’ power is always partial and intimate; they do not 
have the biopolitical machinery that the government possesses to produce a 
national population en masse.
1
Struggling for the Nation
Contradictions of Revolutionary Nationalism
In the middle of Sema’atat Square in Asmara is an unusual sculpture. The size of a small car, surrounded by flowering hedges, made of metal, is the shida—a tribute to the commonly worn plastic sandals. Bicycles, taxis, 
cars, buses, even the occasional donkey cart pass by this heavily trafficked 
circle at a major intersection in Asmara. Pedestrians walk past hurrying on 
their way to somewhere else, many of them wearing shida. The shida—an 
object common to every household and everyday life—is at once a symbol of 
the Eritrean everyman and everywoman and a glorification of Eritrea’s teg-
adelti, or fighters, who liberated the country during the thirty-year struggle 
for independence. During The Struggle, many fighters wore them instead 
of military boots; they enabled the fighters to move quickly, lithely, and 
stealthily through the rough mountainous terrain where much of the war 
was fought. Shida are tough, versatile, and inexpensive. Fighters could eas-
ily repair torn shida by melting down the plastic and reattaching it, mean-
ing they often wore the same pair for long periods of time. In the 1980s, 
the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) began manufacturing shida 
themselves in the liberated areas of the country along with other necessities. 
The party and many Eritreans are proud of these factories, which indicated 
the EPLF’s capacity to govern, fight, and liberate itself without any signifi-
cant support from the outside world. The history of plastic sandals, worn 
by fighters, repaired, recycled, and eventually manufactured behind the 
front lines during The Struggle for independence, references the national 
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ethos of self-sufficiency and sacrifice, while shida themselves are a symbol of 
fighters’ stealth, resilience, and ability to win the war against great obstacles. 
The shida statue, thus, transforms a quotidian object into a symbol of the 
nation that embodies the core values of The Struggle. It is literally and 
metaphorically larger than life but also reflected in everyday life. The shida 
is a military symbol but also an ordinary one, and, most importantly, it is 
ubiquitous throughout the country.
The shida statue is but one example of what we might think of as the 
quotidian nature of Eritrean nationalism. Quotidian nationalism fuses sym-
bols, narratives, and performances that reference the legacy of The Strug-
gle for independence with the lives of ordinary Eritreans. This quotidian 
nationalism has enabled the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice 
party (PFDJ) to forge a particular sense of personhood, creating Eritrean 
subjects who are supposed to think of themselves as willing to sacrifice (and 
kill and die, if need be) to not only defend their nation but also develop it 
(Bernal 2014; Hepner 2009b). Processes through which Eritrean men and 
women are socialized into becoming this ideal national subject are also sup-
posed to ensure that the nation is a central part of Eritreans’ everyday lives. 
To do this, the party drew on the lived experiences of Eritreans during The 
Struggle, validated and valorized experiences of suffering, gave meaning 
to sacrifice, and nationalized that meaning. To further make the nation 
part of citizens’ everyday lives, the party created service programs that were 
intended to inculcate the values of The Struggle in Eritrean youth by loosely 
(and sometimes directly) simulating the experiences of the fighters in the 
war for liberation. However, the party’s revolutionary nation-making pro-
gram not only drew on past experiences of The Struggle but also set out to 
craft a sense of the future and an ideology of how society would change in 
its aftermath. This included promoting egalitarian gender and class norms 
and also an idea of a multicultural, multireligious, unified national whole. 
As with many other revolutions, liberation was but the first step of social 
transformation.
The PFDJ, previously known as the EPLF, emerged as the liberators of 
the country at the end of the thirty-year struggle for liberation. One of the 
EPLF’s key accomplishments was to construct a cohering sense of Eritrean 
nationalism and to bind that to state institutions even before the country 
was liberated (Pool 2001). A good deal of literature has detailed the nature 
of the Eritrean revolution, and my objective here is not to repeat the con-
tributions that this literature has made, although I draw substantially from 
it (see, for example, Connell [1993] 1997; Hepner 2009b; Pool 2001; Reid 
2005). Rather, I hope to highlight a few key points about the strengths and 
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shortcomings of Eritrean revolutionary nationalism to lay the groundwork 
for my exploration of the unraveling of effervescent support for the EPLF/
PFDJ national project in subsequent chapters.
Eritrea is one of a handful of revolutionary movements that emerged 
out of a later phase of liberation and anticolonial struggle (Dorman 2006). 
Sarah Dorman (2006) states that while resistance was common in colonies, 
prolonged violent conflict was not the norm out of which nations were 
born in most African anticolonial struggles. The majority of the first-wave 
anticolonial struggles were relatively nonviolent. In contrast, a second wave 
of independence movements through the 1980s and 1990s was the result 
of far more prolonged struggle when colonies or settler states refused to 
give up power, such as in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, or when 
countries fought to liberate themselves from a second colonizer, such as was 
the case in Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Rwanda. In these later indepen-
dence movements, the goal was not just wresting the state from oppressive 
rule but transforming society. During these protracted struggles, Dorman 
(2006) notes, these regimes acquired ideological legitimacy, a detailed vision 
of what society would look like, a developmentalist mentality, mass fol-
lowings, and control of the state. Protracted revolutions thus enabled state 
building, the development of national identities, and the fusion of the two 
(Herbst 2000). These revolutionary and postliberation states were quite dif-
ferent from countries that were liberated in the mid-1900s (Dorman 2006). 
Unlike other African states, these states were relatively emancipated from 
society and “hard” in the sense that they were able to maintain control over 
borders and economies (Herbst 2000).
Eritrean official nationalism is revolutionary in the sense that the co-
optation of the instruments of governance, the taking over of the state, 
often through the auspices of the military, was but the first step in the 
longer process of social transformation (Müller 2005). Both Eritrean revo-
lutionary fronts (the EPLF and its rival and predecessor, the Eritrean Lib-
eration Front, which are discussed below) had the goal of liberating the 
country, and socialist notions of progress and equality influenced both. 
But the EPLF was perhaps distinct in its recognition of the importance of 
crafting a cohering national ideology and creating an organizational infra-
structure to promote it. The EPLF did a very effective job of both forging 
a sense of nationalism and crafting the beginnings of a preliberation state 
that would later be transformed into a sovereign, internationally recognized 
state following independence. The EPLF’s nation-state formation project 
was oriented around strong organization; strict discipline within the front; 
the value of development through self-sufficiency; progressive notions of 
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class, gender, and ethnic equality; and, above all, a willingness not only to 
sacrifice for the nation but also to do so as the party leadership saw fit.
Ultimately, many of the strategies that were so effective for the revolu-
tionary front that liberated the country were far less effective for a govern-
ment seeking to work with a diverse and varied civilian population. But the 
EPLF forged ahead in using these strategies. Utilizing its coherent organi-
zational structure, drawing staunchly on the goals and values forged in The 
Struggle, and insisting that people continue to promote those goals even 
in the absence of widespread support for them, the EPLF moved forward 
with its nation-building agenda. The leadership continued to promote and 
enforce the party’s ideological goals and to try to transform the national 
subject into a new kind of person, often utilizing the same militarized, 
disciplinary tactics that it initially used to liberate the national territory. 
Unfortunately, party leaders found themselves increasingly reliant on force 
to do this, thus unraveling the gains of their nationalist project. Below, I 
provide a brief history of the genesis of Eritrean nationalism and the emer-
gence of the EPLF’s particular national program from that history. I then 
give some examples of the quotidian nature of Eritrean nationalism to show 
the ways in which nationalism tied in with personal and communal effer-
vescence prior to and immediately after independence. I conclude by raising 
some questions about why revolutionary nationalism is increasingly failing 
in Eritrea, a theme that I take up in more detail in the following chapter 
about the state.
The Genesis of the Eritrean Nation and Nationalism
Although much of what we think of as Eritrean nationalism derives from 
the EPLF/PFDJ’s nationalist project, Eritrean nationalism has a robust and 
multifaceted history that is important to recognize in order to understand 
the difference between the national narrative produced and promoted by 
the ruling party and sentiments of nationalism felt by Eritreans. Like many 
African nations, the formation of the nation-state in Eritrea emerged from 
late-nineteenth-century colonialism. Italy began its conquest of Eritrea with 
the purchase of the territory around Assab from the sultan at Aussa in 1869 
and then expanded its control, establishing the colony of Eritrea in 1882. 
Italy planned to take over Ethiopia and therefore unify Eritrea, Somalia, 
and Ethiopia into greater Italian East Africa, but after Italy lost the battle 
of Adwa to Menelik II in 1889, the Treaty of Wuchale gave Ethiopia its 
independence and awarded the territory that later became Eritrea to Italy. 
Despite Ethiopia’s claims that Eritrea has always been an integral part of 
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the Ethiopian empire, this claim is true for only the Eritrean highlands. It 
was not until Italian colonization that Eritrea as a territorial entity came 
into existence.
Italy gave Eritrea its territorial shape and a colonial state to govern that 
territory, but the diverse ethnic, regional, and religious groups in Eritrea had 
varied histories prior to colonization. Eritrea is approximately 50 percent 
Muslim and 50 percent Christian. The Christian population is predomi-
nantly Abyssinian Orthodox, a form of Christianity encompassing Ethiopia 
and Eritrea and linked to the Coptic Church in Egypt. Eritrean Chris-
tians mainly reside in the central and southern highlands of Eritrea where 
the capital, Asmara, is located and are traditionally settled agriculturalists. 
This part of the country has been historically attached to the Abyssinian 
Orthodox Church as well as successive Ethiopian empires and kingdoms at 
various times, although these villages have always had strong local forms of 
governance and, in many respects, have remained quite autonomous from 
Ethiopian empires. Christian highlanders typically hail from the Tigrinya-
speaking ethnic group, also approximately 50 percent of the population and 
roughly equivalent to the Orthodox Christian population, although some 
Tigrinya are Muslim, Catholic, and, increasingly, evangelical Christians. 
The predominantly Muslim Tigre ethnic group resides for the most part 
in the northern highlands, northeastern lowlands, and western lowlands 
of Eritrea and comprises approximately 30 percent of the population. The 
remaining 20 percent of the population is made up of seven other ethnic 
groups—Afar, Saho, Nara, Kunama, Rashaida, Bilen, and Hedareb. With 
the exception of the Kunama, who are Christian and Animists, and the 
Bilen and Saho, some of whom are Christian, these groups are Muslim and 
reside in the coastal and western lowlands as well as the northern highlands. 
Geographic, religious, and ethnic differences frame different experiences 
of nationalism and the state among different populations. When the EPLF 
gained power in the middle of The Struggle for independence, its supporters 
took it upon themselves to create a synthetic form of nationalism that would 
subsume these varied identities to a common Eritrean identity; however, 
prior to this event, a variety of other ways of imagining the nation were 
available to Eritreans, and in many ways, the post-Italian politics of Eritrea 
revolved around the interplay of varied understandings of what Eritrea was.
The period at the end of World War II was a particularly interesting 
moment during which an array of Eritrean nationalisms circulated. During 
this interim period, from 1941 to 1952, Great Britain administered Eritrea. 
The British Military Administration (BMA) was a complex political time; 
arguably, political divisions that emerged from this period were responsible 
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for the form that the early liberation movements in Eritrea took (Pool 2001). 
Ethiopia, then under the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie, thought of Eritrea 
as one of its own provinces, thus equating Eritrean nationalism with Ethio-
pian nationalism. Ethiopia began negotiating for “reunion” with Eritrea 
almost immediately, citing deep historical ties with Eritrea’s Christian high-
lands and giving rise to the Unionist Party in Eritrea. Meanwhile, Great 
Britain favored partitioning Eritrea, giving the Christian highlands to Ethi-
opia and the lowlands and northern highlands to Sudan, a plan that drew 
on thinking that Muslim, lowland populations had more in common cul-
turally with ethnic groups in Sudan than they did with Christian highland-
ers and therefore would be more easily incorporated into the neighboring 
country. That plan ultimately failed but had the effect of making residents 
of the lowlands think about which nation they belonged to (Gebremedhin 
1989; Markakis 1987; Pool 2001). As a result, an entity called the Muslim 
League emerged in the western lowlands to challenge the Unionist Party. 
Meanwhile, a burgeoning independence movement in Eritrea advocated 
for independent statehood and argued that a distinct Eritrean identity was 
mapped on to the Eritrean colonial territory (Makki 2011a, 2011b; Pool 
2001; Taddia 1994; Trevaskis 1960).1
This time period is key because Eritrea’s political elites, across ethnic 
groups and regions, became conscious of the importance of the state and 
came to understand that even if there was no agreement on what Eritrea was 
(an independent nation, several nations, or part of Ethiopia), control over 
the mechanisms of governance was of critical importance (Trevaskis 1960). 
The question of nationhood and control of the national state brought on 
religious/regional cleavages that had not previously existed, and competing 
international interests in control over Eritrea exacerbated these cleavages 
(Pool 2001). While a cognizance of the nation began to emerge in the BMA 
period, it did so in different ways among different strata of the population, 
and few mechanisms existed to spread this sense of nationalism uniformly 
across the entire geographical territory (Makki 2011b). Eritrean national-
ism was emerging through this time period, but doing so unevenly. Still, 
this time period is key to understanding how disparate movements that 
began among an urbanized middle stratum in the highlands and among 
disenfranchised agro-pastoralists in the lowlands eventually came together 
to frame a movement for independence (Makki 2011b).
These early nationalist sentiments were not simply reflections of reli-
gious, ethnic, or regional cleavages, however, but were merged with ongoing 
class sentiments (Gebremedhin 1989; Markakis 1987). This is important 
to note because both the EPLF and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF; 
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the liberation front that preceded the EPLF) were deeply concerned with 
elements of class and inequality in Eritrea and would eventually galvanize 
class-based grievances into armed insurgencies. The Muslim League actu-
ally evolved out of an ongoing serf-emancipation movement in the western 
lowlands (Gebremedhin 1989). Serfs, who had recently made great strides in 
achieving greater social equality, believed that union with feudal, imperial 
Ethiopia would diminish gains that they had made and exacerbate inequali-
ties (Pool 2001). All of this is key because The Struggle for independence 
initially started in Eritrea’s predominantly Muslim western lowlands and, 
for this reason, is often depicted as stemming from Muslim fear of being 
federated with Christian Ethiopia. However, as the scholars cited above have 
compellingly argued, the beginnings of The Struggle not only constituted a 
religious/regional revolt but also built on ongoing class concerns that related 
to Eritrea as a whole.
Following the BMA period, despite growing sentiments that Eritrea 
should be independent, the United Nations agreed to federate Ethiopia 
and Eritrea, allowing Eritrea to retain its autonomy while incorporated into 
Ethiopia. It quickly became clear that Ethiopia did not intend to honor 
the spirit of the loose federation with Eritrea. Ethiopia almost immediately 
began to undermine the federal agreement and ultimately disbanded the 
federation and formally annexed Eritrea. While there were initially com-
peting ideas about what Eritrea should be in the BMA period, Eritreans’ 
concerns about being dominated by the Ethiopian empire would ultimately 
galvanize popular support for Eritrean independence; however, what it 
meant to be Eritrean would take much longer to work out.
Sentiments that Eritrea should be independent emerged from differ-
ent sectors in Eritrea and gained strength as Ethiopia began undermin-
ing Eritrea’s autonomy. Early opposition efforts began in 1958, when the 
Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), which consisted of mainly urban 
intellectuals, was formed (Pool 2001). As David Pool (2001) details, by the 
time the Ethiopian government officially annexed Eritrea in 1962, it had 
put down the ELM’s efforts, but meanwhile another opposition group, the 
ELF, was forming out of the remnants of the Muslim League in the west-
ern lowlands. Thus, liberation movements in Eritrea have roots in both the 
urban intelligentsia and the disenfranchised in the western lowlands, among 
the elite and among the periphery.
The ELF began The Struggle in Eritrea’s western lowlands, and for 
many years the western lowlands and northern highlands, which were the 
regions most disenfranchised by Ethiopian annexation, were the parts of 
the country that most staunchly supported the ELF. Thus, in the early 
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years of The Struggle, Eritrean nationalism was often seen as a religiously 
based nationalism. However, as Ethiopian repression in Eritrea increased, 
larger and larger numbers of urbanized Christians, mainly students, from 
the central highlands started joining the ELF in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. In 1966, new recruits were sent to China, Cuba, and Syria for fur-
ther training. The group that went to China, which included the current 
Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki, proved to be particularly influenced by 
Maoist thought (Pool 2001). Ideas gleaned from the training in China were 
largely responsible for proposed changes to the ELF that would eventually 
result in the development of the EPLF and its split from its parent move-
ment. The trip to China was particularly influential in terms of helping the 
leadership formulate a vision for a more unified national ideology as well 
as an organizational structure that would allow them to promote this revo-
lutionary form of Eritrean nationalism (Pool 2001). Infighting led to the 
dissolution of the ELF in the 1980s, leaving the EPLF/PFDJ to eventually 
win Eritrea’s thirty-year struggle for liberation (Hepner 2009b; Pool 2001). 
Although there were numerous reasons for the EPLF/ELF split, diverging 
understandings of Eritrean nationalism were significant.
Differences between EPLF and ELF variants of Eritrean nationalism 
reveal different understandings of the relationship between collective iden-
tity, individual subjectivity, the nation, and the state. The ELF is often 
mistakenly associated with narrow Muslim, lowland concerns, but this asso-
ciation ignores the fact that many Christian, Tigrinya highlanders joined 
the ELF and that many who joined The Struggle chose which front to join 
for pragmatic reasons rather than ideological ones (Hepner 2009b; Pool 
2001). Both the ELF and the EPLF initially built class-based concerns into 
their national ethos, the same concerns that had previously sparked the rise 
of the Muslim League, but the EPLF took up the challenge of forging an 
explicit national ideology that emphasized unity, equality, and revolution-
ary thought (Pool 2001). In contrast, the ELF focused more exclusively on 
liberation and not on the broader task of nation building. Literature on dis-
tinctions between the ELF and the EPLF emphasize the exclusionary nature 
of the ELF, suggesting that this front, with its origins in the western low-
lands and support from Arab countries, failed to craft a coherent national 
identity that would include all of Eritrea’s diverse peoples and religions and 
instead focused narrowly around the goal of independence (Hepner 2009b). 
However, scholars have noted that another way to understand the ELF’s 
ideological and organizational approach is that it tried to build Eritrean 
identity around existing social groupings and networks rather than produce 
statelike structures to promote, disseminate, and subsume state subjects to 
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hegemonic national ideology, as the EPLF did; the organizational structure 
of the ELF itself reflected the notion of a nationalism oriented around a 
common goal of liberation rather than a common national identity (Hepner 
2009b; Pool 2001). As the ELF developed, it came to be structured along 
the lines of the Algerian liberation movement, with discrete and homoge-
neous geographic zones. These zones largely utilized kin, ethnic, regional, 
and other patronage ties to recruit new fighters, and their organizational 
structure was rather informal (Hepner 2009b; Markakis 1987; Pool 2001). 
At times there was even rivalry and conflict between and within the dif-
ferent zones. In contrast, the EPLF prioritized the creation of a nationalist 
orthodoxy and statelike structures to organize the population and inculcate 
this ideology in them.
Tricia Redeker Hepner (2009b) makes a compelling argument that the 
ELF’s nationalism was pluralist in the sense that it was able to accommo-
date a variety of understandings of what it meant to be Eritrean and was, 
therefore, more flexible and “open-minded” than the form of nationalism 
ultimately propagated by the EPLF. The ELF’s nationalism was less inclined 
to promote a specific definition of what it meant to be Eritrean, leaving it 
open for people to be Eritrean in multiple ways. In contrast, what Hepner 
(2009b: 44) terms the EPLF’s “synthetic nationalism” required strict alle-
giance to a very specific notion of what it meant to be Eritrean that was 
developed by the party leadership itself. She notes that the ELF’s focus on 
loose unification around the goal of independence left open the possibility 
of dialogue about what it meant to be Eritrean, an openness not found in 
the EPLF’s expectation of adherence to ideological orthodoxy. The ben-
efit of this more fluid and open-minded form of nationalism was that it 
accommodated difference. The down side was that it remained open to the 
influence of sub- or pre-national allegiances, loyalties, and commitments 
and thus remained unemancipated from society in key ways that ultimately 
proved problematic for the ELF.
Perhaps it is no surprise that the EPLF has been preoccupied with devel-
oping a sense of national unity, given both the challenges and importance 
of doing so elsewhere in Africa, one of the last regions of the world to be 
parceled out into discrete nation-states. African states were built on top of 
strong colonial states, but not states that were designed to unify or repre-
sent a national polity (Mamdani 1996). Meanwhile most African nations 
comprised diverse, varied, fluid cultural groups that often spanned nation-
al boundaries and resisted identification with the nations or, conversely, 
sought to co-opt the states by defining the nations based on their own par-
ticular ethnic, religious, or geographic affiliations (Dorman, Hammett, and 
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Nugent 2007).2 Although the same could be said about many nations, par-
ticularly postcolonial nations, processes of nation-state formation in Africa 
have been particularly befuddled by the combination of strong, coherent 
non-national identities (for example, ethnic and religious identities) com-
bined with the weakness of state institutions (Bayart 2009). Following a 
fleeting moment of patriotic, independence-era nationalism in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the process of creating a coherent sense of nationalism and viable 
states in most African countries floundered (Herbst 2000). New govern-
ments inherited state institutions from colonialism that were designed to 
consolidate political, economic, and military control in the hands of an elite 
ruling group (Rodney 1974). They also inherited little coherence, legitima-
cy, or loyalty around the idea of a nation among would-be national citizens 
(Davidson 1993). Elites in African nations often attempted to build legiti-
macy for these nations by creating national mythologies, origin stories, and 
sets of national heroes and symbols to fill this void and shore up the idea 
of these nations, but given the diversity of their populations, these symbols 
and myths often excluded and disenfranchised groups of citizens, galvaniz-
ing resistance to the governing elites and their ideas about the nations more 
than legitimizing them (Davidson 1993).
The EPLF thought of itself as trying to rectify the errors of both the ELF 
and other African nations by forging a unified nation and a strong state. 
The EPLF’s nationalism, emerging as it did through war and defense of its 
sovereignty, has arguably required that Eritreans become a particular kind 
of national subject, one oriented toward sacrifice and service for the nation, 
one who will subsume other identities (religion, region, ethnicity) to nation-
alism. Despite the fact that the EPLF’s notion of what an Eritrean should 
be is rather extreme—and, arguably, unsustainable now that The Struggle 
for independence is over—it has clung to this strict notion of Eritrean-ness. 
Because this is the form of official nationalism that has predominated in 
Eritrea until today, I now turn to a fuller discussion of the EPLF’s version 
of nationalism and later evaluate the pitfalls inherent in promoting this type 
of national orthodoxy.
“Our Struggle and Its Goals”
The ongoing strategy of governance of the ruling PFDJ as well as the attri-
butes of official formulations of Eritrean nationalism can find their roots 
in processes by which the EPLF consolidated control over the development 
of an Eritrean state and their particular nationalist ideology. Interestingly, 
the EPLF’s efforts sought to quite intentionally fuse nation to state, simul-
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taneously creating institutions to govern the country, instilling a sense of 
common national identity in its population, ensuring sovereignty over an 
independent national territory, and co-constructing both nation and state. 
In partial response to their contention that the ELF lacked an organiz-
ing ideology, in 1971, the EPLF authored the highly influential pamphlet 
“Our Struggle and Its Goals.” In fact, it is speculated that Eritrea’s president 
himself authored the pamphlet (Weldehaimanot and Taylor 2011). In the 
document, the EPLF outlines its version of the origins and history of The 
Struggle. This version of the history emphasizes the overwhelming sup-
port among Eritreans of all religions, regions, and ethnicities for Eritrean 
independence at the time of the BMA; the alliance of Ethiopia with foreign 
powers to ensure that Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia; political repres-
sion and manipulation on the part of Ethiopia, which dissolved the federa-
tion and led to the annexation of Eritrean by Ethiopia and the beginning 
of The Struggle in 1961; and, finally, the failings of the ELF to adequately 
organize or unify the country (Weldehaimanot and Taylor 2011). The 1971 
document distinguishes the EPLF and its ideology from that of the ELF as 
well as from that of Ethiopia, historically details the origins of The Struggle 
for independence, and outlines a sketch of the nationalist goals, which are 
further developed in documents produced by the EPLF in 1977 and 1994 
(EPLF 1977, 1994). One of the EPLF’s projects was to define Eritrea as an 
independent nation, differentiated from Ethiopia but also from the Arab 
world, with which the ELF had aligned. The pamphlet clearly notes that 
Eritrea shares with the Arabs a stance against colonialism, imperialism, and 
Zionism, but it differentiates Eritreans from Arabs, a distinction that the 
EPLF believed the ELF had not made (Weldehaimanot and Taylor 2011).
The EPLF’s nationalist language was heavily inflected by anti-impe-
rial and anticolonial sentiments, all of which were propagated through an 
aggressive series of political education campaigns. These focused on class, 
instilling in Eritreans a sense that their history was a history of struggle 
against imperial forces including, but not limited to, Ethiopia (Pool 2001; 
Weldehaimanot and Taylor 2011). Political education was also combined 
with development efforts, which included access to education, veterinary 
services, and health care in the liberated areas (Hepner 2009b; Pool 2001). 
Literacy campaigns and education were also a vital part of the EPLF’s strug-
gle, both for fighters and for civilians (Gottesman 1998).
In addition to its orientation toward development and progress and 
its anti-imperial stance, creating a sense of national unity among Eritrea’s 
diverse people was an essential part of the EPLF’s nationalist program. 
“Our Struggle and Its Goals” details the multicultural origins of Eritrea 
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and celebrates the diversity of its people (Weldehaimanot and Taylor 2011). 
The EPLF set out to create a common culture by studying livelihoods and 
lifestyles of its various regions and ethnic groups (Pool 2001). The party, at 
least initially, had a very strong sense of needing to not only learn from the 
people it was liberating but also educate them. The EPLF also attempted to 
pull together elements of different cultures to create a sense of fused Eritrean 
culture, something that has been continued by the PFDJ (Hepner 2009b). 
Organizationally, unlike the ELF, it merged fighters from different parts 
of the country into heterogeneous groupings. It also refused to declare a 
national language and set about establishing a program to promote indig-
enous language education in addition to using Arabic as a working language 
among the lowland populations (Bereketeab 2010; Hailemariam, Sjaak, and 
Walters 1999; Woldemikael 1993).
Another key element of the EPLF’s revolutionary nationalism related 
to gender roles. Partly out of a pragmatic need to expand its fighting force, 
the EPLF actively encouraged women to serve as fighters (Bernal 2000; 
Müller 2005; Wilson 1991). It later incorporated gender-based reforms into 
its land policies and political education program where possible, although 
following the war for independence, many of these reforms were hard to 
continue (Hepner 2009b; Pool 2001). While equality for women was core to 
the party’s revolutionary ideology, encouraging the participation of women 
in leadership roles was a key component of the way it formed governance 
structures in the liberated areas. Thus the PFDJ’s approach to gender was 
central to both its nation- and state-building agendas (Müller 2005).
One of the ways that ideology was disseminated was through various 
forms of mass organization, which gathered particular segments of the pop-
ulation—women, youth, workers, and peasants—into associations (Hepner 
2009b; Pool 2001). These efforts were remarkably successful in transform-
ing the EPLF into a popular front, reflective of its name and its nickname, 
Shaebia, which translates as “popular.” These organizations allowed mem-
bers, initially in Eritrea and later in the diaspora as well, to participate in 
broader political processes. Additionally, through these organizations devel-
opment was fused with political education, and fighters were able to engage 
with civilians around issues related to membership within these groups. 
Thus, Eritreans engaged with the front, and the nation, by joining an orga-
nization that represented their identities as youth, women, peasants, or 
workers, categories that cut across broader swathes of Eritrea.
The EPLF had a very strong state-building agenda. One of the factors 
that made the EPLF successful was that it began to act like a state even 
before liberation, organizing the civilian population, blending them with 
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the fighters, and very effectively disseminating its national ideology in a way 
that built on sentiments that saw independence as an answer to experiences 
of repression under Ethiopian rule. The party’s approach to nation building 
was not to work through existing organizational and institutional structures 
but to create its own and then to ensure that these new organizational struc-
tures, their ideology, and their symbolism were part of people’s daily lives. 
With this in mind, where possible the party replaced traditional governance 
structures, which it thought of as co-opted by Ethiopian rule, with its own 
administrators (Pool 2001: 118). Arguably, at independence, Eritrea’s lead-
ership had already done a great deal of quite effective nation-building and 
state-making work, enabled by several factors. The EPLF’s centralized gov-
ernance structure, extensive organizational capacity, and vision of unified 
national identity meant that a coherent nation-building project was already 
well underway by independence. But while this was remarkably successful 
in many ways, it also required intensive discipline and strict ideological 
orthodoxy among the fighters.
Like other socialist or communist revolutions, the EPLF was inspired 
by both Marxism/Leninism and Maoism and sought to create an egalitar-
ian socialist society, to reeducate the masses through the auspices of politi-
cal education campaigns, and to instill a strong organizational structure 
throughout society that would maintain discipline (Pool 2001). The EPLF 
was particularly effective at instilling discipline and political consciousness 
within the front itself, and in some areas it was quite successful at organiz-
ing the masses and inculcating political identities, although doing so among 
civilian populations was notably more difficult than it was in the army. 
Nonetheless, uplifting the masses from various forms of oppression, be they 
economic or colonial, was at the core of the EPLF’s doctrines. The expres-
sion awet n’ hafash (victory to the masses) is a “signature slogan” (Pool 2001: 
105) of the EPLF and continues to be used prevalently in the regime. In 
fact, all official communiqués are signed awet n’ hafash. As the front tried to 
extend its influence to civilian populations, it reached out especially to peas-
ants, the urban working class, women, and youth. Land reform throughout 
the liberated areas of Eritrea was particularly concerned with dismantling 
long-standing class hierarchies and building class solidarities (Pool 2001). 
Other policies were also aimed at building solidarity among the poor and 
working class and ensuring the business classes did not have access to dis-
proportionate wealth.
The EPLF drew on anti-imperial, anticolonial ideologies to argue 
for Eritrean independence, but its nation-building project also sought to 
transform Eritrean society and enacted an intensive ideological as well as 
46 | CH A P T ER 1
organizational campaign to do so. Much of the literature on Eritrea has 
detailed the ideological content of EPLF nationalism and its strong social 
organization of both the party and the masses. The EPLF has narrated the 
nation and its national origins in a very particular way. Following indepen-
dence, the EPLF attempted to fuse nationalism with quotidian experiences 
of Eritreans by making experiences of the nation a core part of individual 
memories and everyday lives.
Massification, Militarization, and  
Quotidian Nationalism
It is important to note that while the PFDJ/EPLF was quite adept at produc-
ing a cohering, revolutionary national ideology; building state institutions 
to disseminate it; and constructing the symbolic and ritual means to social-
ize Eritreans into this sense of national personhood, Eritrean nationalism is 
not merely a party construct. In large part, what has lent it emotional heft is 
the way in which it draws on the experiences of Eritreans, particularly dur-
ing The Struggle, and in so doing transforms experiences of suffering into 
valorous sacrifices and quintessential attributes of being Eritrean. The party 
narrates the nation in a way that connects with Eritreans’ everyday lives and 
their recent, personal historical memories. In this sense, it has made its ver-
sion of nationalism quotidian—a routine part of life. The following story 
about wanting to join the fighters told to me by one of my research subjects 
presents a narrative that is reproduced in various forms of popular media 
and aptly illustrates the ways in which lived experiences are appropriated by 
the party’s national narrative.
Growing up close to the front line during the war for independence, the 
war deeply and personally influenced Isaac, particularly when the Ethiopian 
government imprisoned Isaac’s father for revolutionary activities. Although 
the war ended before Isaac was old enough to join the fighters, he imagined 
that he would become a fighter and prioritized Eritrea’s independence over 
his own education or future, thus epitomizing the ethos of sacrifice for the 
nation:
The war was in the area surrounding [our village]. We could listen 
to the sound of the war. Our thinking was totally towards the war. 
Our brothers and sisters were at the front. We thought, “Why are 
we going to school here in the village? We should go to fight.” I 
didn’t have any goal or objective. But I did have a very long-term 
plan—when we got liberation, I would have good education— 
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better than under Ethiopia. This was my thinking. But we didn’t 
have any plan. My plan was just to be an Eritrean soldier. All the 
surrounding area was covered by Ethiopian soldiers. It was very dif-
ficult. Some of us found ways to go to join the Eritrean forces, but 
I couldn’t get to them. In 1989, Eritrean forces attacked my village, 
and then we tried to go with them, but when we went to this forest 
area to meet the fighters, they told us they were going a very long 
distance. They said, “We will come back again, so it is better to stay 
in your house. Stay here and go to school, and next time you will 
come with us.”
Although Isaac speaks of this in terms of “not having a plan,” the senti-
ment here is that his entire orientation was focused on the liberation of his 
country and becoming a fighter to bring this about. He could not have a 
plan because of the conditions his country was in. His story is an expression 
of willingness to sacrifice but also of the lack of options that war brings. 
Like many Eritrean young people growing up in Eritrea during the war for 
independence, early in Isaac’s life he was willing to sacrifice everything to 
become a fighter to liberate Eritrea. Many Eritreans in Isaac’s generation 
did join the fighters, and many others expressed the desire to do so. Even 
Eritreans who grew up in Ethiopia told me that their parents confessed that 
they did not tell them about The Struggle for fear that it would fill them 
with such a strong desire to join the front that they would run away from 
home and travel to Eritrea to join the fighters.
A young person “running away” to join the fighters is a common motif 
in Eritrean public nationalist discourse. Short plays that are either televised 
or performed live on public holidays often portray parents trying to con-
vince their child not to leave home and then ultimately accepting the deci-
sion and sacrificing the personal need to keep their child alive for the good 
of the nation. These dramas link highly personal and emotional memories 
of the war for independence, desires to liberate the country, and fear of 
personal loss with public performances of what it means to be Eritrean. 
In these dramas, a parent, often crying, typically tries to prevent the child 
(often a girl) from running away, but the dramas always end up with the 
child succeeding in running away and joining the fighters and the parent 
recognizing that love for country must take precedence over love for one’s 
child. This sends the message that everyone must be willing to make the 
ultimate sacrifice.
I would like to highlight two points that emerge from this narrative of 
running away to join The Struggle. First, any Eritrean could be, or imagine 
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him- or herself as, a fighter. The “fighter” (tegadalai/tegadalit) is simultane-
ously an Eritrean icon and everyman/everywoman. Fighters (tegadelti) are 
pictured on postage stamps, murals, and posters and in documentaries and 
music videos on Eritrean state-run television. The image of the fighter is 
everywhere. However, the fighter is not a distant figure but every Eritrean, 
literally and metaphorically. Many people joined The Struggle when they 
were young, tried to join The Struggle as Isaac did, or supported the fight-
ers in some other way. When Eritreans who grew up during The Struggle 
described their understanding of being Eritrean, it was often equated with 
a sense of wanting to personally help the country, particularly by helping 
the fighters, emulating the fighters, or becoming a fighter. Peggy Hoyle’s 
(1999) survey of university students provides evidence of the kind of nation-
al symbol fighters are—a heroic everyman. When asked who is “the great-
est hero of Eritrea,” most students answered, “all fighters,” “all martyrs,” 
or “all Eritreans” (1999: 407). Although there are specific Eritrean heroes 
and heroines from the long war for liberation, what was striking in Eritrea 
was that in the post-independence years, Eritreans regarded all who fought, 
suffered, and died to liberate the country as heroic (Hoyle 1999). This is 
indicative of the fact that, in the post-independence years, many Eritreans 
bought into the idea that all Eritreans were heroic and had worked together 
to liberate themselves by virtue of the national characteristics of fortitude, 
self-sufficiency, and willingness to sacrifice.
In an interesting inversion, just as the fighter is everyone, those who 
might be put on (or put themselves on) a pedestal as heroes from The 
Struggle for liberation instead behave as ordinary people. Eritrea’s leaders, 
including the president, take pride in being common people, something 
that Eritreans often comment on. They are not thought of as being above 
others, and, to this day, there is little cult of personality around the president 
himself. Ministers typically wear fairly casual clothes and drive ordinary 
cars. The party’s political culture does not require those with power to 
acquire visible adornments of affluence. In the years immediately following 
independence, President Isaias could often be seen driving himself around 
Asmara in a small, modest car. It was also a common experience for Eritre-
ans in Asmara to look up in a bar and find he was standing next to them 
watching a football game or enjoying a beer. These were not heroes put on 
a pedestal to hover over people and be revered by them; rather, they were 
thought of as ordinary Eritreans, just like everyone else.
Another idea emerging from narratives of young people running away to 
join The Struggle is the theme of sacrificing oneself and one’s family mem-
bers for the nation. A unit on patriotism in the national civics curriculum 
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illustrates this theme. The unit begins with a story of a grandfather and his 
grandson being apprehended by Ethiopian soldiers. A group of Derg (Ethio-
pian) soldiers was lost without food and water in the Eritrean countryside. 
They came across a man named Omar Mohamed near the town of Afabet, 
pulled out their guns, and demanded that he take them to water and food 
and show them the way to Keren. Omar refused, and the soldiers threatened 
to kill both him and his grandson who was accompanying him. Omar then 
said that he would show the soldiers where they could find food and water if 
they let his grandson go. The soldiers suspected that after they let his grand-
son go, he would then refuse to take them to food and water. They said 
they would kill both of them. The man then said that they should kill his 
grandson in front of him before they kill him. The Derg soldiers were con-
fused and wondered why this man wanted to have his grandson killed first. 
Then, fortunately, the EPLF showed up, freed the man and his grandson, 
did not harm the soldiers, fed them, and took them to prison. The conclu-
sion of the story then reiterates that the man had no intention of showing 
the soldiers where food and water were. He was thinking, the curriculum 
notes, that he would tell them to kill him after they freed his grandson. The 
curriculum also notes that he did not want to leave his grandson with “these 
cruel enemy soldiers,” but when it became clear that he could not save his 
grandson, he began to fear that if he died first, his grandson would show 
the soldiers to food and water, his focus shifting to protecting the nation by 
not showing the soldiers where the food and water were. The commentary 
on the story concludes: “Even this innocent child has to be sacrificed for the 
safety of his people and his country. There is a lot of this type of incidents 
in the Eritrean’s struggle for liberation. It is the highest stage of patriotism” 
(Ministry of Education, Moral and Civil Education Grade 6, unpublished 
document). Clearly this definition equates patriotism with willingness to 
sacrifice not only oneself but also one’s loved ones.
The celebration of martyrs and martyrdom extends the theme of valo-
rizing, validating, and nationalizing suffering and sacrifice. Martyrs Day 
is a public state celebration, but one that penetrates the intimate realm of 
the home and the family. The events of Martyrs Day are choreographed 
not only to produce a particular affective climate oriented around loss but 
also to vindicate these losses, to give them purpose and claim them for 
the good of the nation. Indeed, sacrifice for the nation is at the core of 
government-produced definitions of what it means to be Eritrean (Bernal 
2014). Through the commemoration of martyrdom, the government also 
subsumes personal memories of loss into the public commemoration of mar-
tyrs. Very personal experiences of grief and mourning are claimed by the 
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state and given meaning. Martyrs are both an intimate part of Eritreans’ 
everyday lives and key national figures who embody the national value of 
sacrifice. Few Eritrean families did not lose someone to The Struggle, and 
each family who lost someone is given a certificate, which is often displayed 
prominently in people’s homes. That person’s name is seldom mentioned 
without noting that he or she was “martyred” (e.g., “my uncle, the one who 
was martyred”). The martyr is a key national symbol and emblematic of the 
core national tenet of sacrifice (Hepner 2009b). As an ideal type of citizen, 
the martyr illuminates the ideal of willingness to sacrifice everything for 
the nation above all else. Being martyred, or being related to a martyr, thus 
demarcates the experience of being Eritrean, both identifying martyrs and 
their families as the ideal sacrificial citizens and locating the experience of 
mourning and loss within the national space.
In Eritrea, Martyrs Day has always been a somber occasion on which 
Eritreans grieve those they have lost in The Struggle. Unlike the more rau-
cous Independence Day celebrations, there is no drinking or dancing on 
Martyrs Day. Bars are closed, their lights dimmed. Throughout the coun-
try, Eritreans walk or stand quietly, holding candles in vigil. Martyrs Day 
in 2001 was particularly poignant. On June 13, 2001, approximately one 
year after fighting in a three-year border war with Ethiopia had ended, the 
government announced the names of nineteen thousand people who had 
died in the border war. It was, literally, a day of public, mass mourning. 
Red-eyed and tearful, people cried as they walked down streets and traveled 
on public buses moving from home to home where thousands of mourning 
ceremonies were simultaneously being held.3
Official versions of Eritrean nationalism are oriented around sacrifice, 
and patriotism is inherently linked with sacrifice. The necessity of sacrifice 
in the face of the brutality of enemies is a theme that shows up in various 
places in the national curriculum, typically when recounting the atrocities of 
Ethiopian rule. English texts, history texts, civics texts, as well as movies and 
television programs depict the horrors experienced under Ethiopian rule. A 
reading in a grade 10 English book goes into detail about the conditions in 
a jail for Eritrean dissidents in Asmara by describing the processes of being 
interrogated and tortured. It also describes the sympathy that other prison-
ers had for those who had been tortured and notes the patriotism of those 
being executed: “As prisoners heard their names, they started walking out, 
shouting slogans: ‘Long live the EPLF! Victory to the masses!’” (Ministry of 
Education, CRDI 1993: 21). This statement reflects a common theme that is 
also present in a passage on fortitude and other passages on atrocities under 
Ethiopian rule—that suffering can be transcended through patriotism.
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Building on narratives depicting common experiences of oppression and 
atrocity during the war and the period of Ethiopian rule, the civics text 
describes “fortitude” as the ultimate Eritrean national character trait. The 
text notes that “fortitude is one of the moral values which our forefathers 
cherished” and that “a person with this characteristic can endure any pain 
or difficulty.” It goes on to state that “he or she is dedicated to what he or 
she believes or stands for to the extent of death.” The text defines fortitude 
as the willingness to sacrifice oneself for a cause, as the Eritrean fighters did 
when fighting for freedom for thirty years. Furthermore, it notes that this 
characteristic “has a deep root in the blood of every Eritrean” and describes 
those who lack fortitude as a burden on society. The segment on fortitude 
concludes by noting that “every Eritrean has inherited this behavior as a 
culture and this was witnessed in the very long and bitter war for indepen-
dence. . . . There is no doubt that this moral value will also be inherited 
by all our young generation as a good culture of our forefathers” (Ministry 
of Education, Moral and Civic Education Grade 6, Unit 1, Fortitude, pp. 
23–24, unpublished document). This sense of national character is rooted 
in the notion that all Eritreans possess inherent fortitude in the face of diffi-
culty. The text depicts the fighters who liberated the country as embodying 
this characteristic; however, all Eritreans, the text suggests, have “inherited” 
this characteristic from their “forefathers.” Fortitude, the passage above sug-
gests, leads not only to personal success but also to the success of the nation, 
as the person with fortitude works hard, is patient, and is willing to sacrifice 
him- or herself for higher ideals.
In addition to the nationalization of personal experiences of loss and 
suffering, and the valorization of sacrifice and suffering for the nation, the 
party has also engaged in an ongoing, overt project of making the nation a 
core part of everyday life. As I noted above, the EPLF intentionally sought 
to produce a coherent, singular notion of what it meant to be Eritrean and 
a personal attachment between Eritreans, the party, and its revolutionary 
ideology. The EPLF, and later the PFDJ, utilized a variety of quotidian 
strategies to insert these values in Eritreans’ everyday lives. 
One quotidian strategy was the government’s use of rhetoric and sym-
bols to nationalize ordinary, everyday experiences and objects. The valo-
rization of the shida, which I discussed in the beginning of the chapter, 
is one example of the nationalization of the everyday. The shida is one of 
several quotidian nationalist symbols that enable Eritrea’s ruling party to 
imbue Eritreans’ daily lives with nationalism. Values that are core to The 
Struggle, such as fortitude and making due with local resources, can be 
read in the shida and in other symbols. Similarly, the camel, another some-
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what unusual national symbol, which appears on the national seal, refer-
ences endurance and self-reliance. The use of camels to transport weapons 
and supplies through the dry terrain has been celebrated as an example 
of utilizing local resources to win the war. Camels have been particularly 
important in Eritrea’s predominantly Muslim lowland areas, where people 
have commonly used them to transport goods. The camel’s elevation to 
a very public national symbol thus referenced the fusion of lowland and 
highland peoples and ways of life in the Eritrean nation (see Hoyle 1999 
for a discussion of camels as well as other national symbols). Additionally, 
the very use of the word “struggle” to describe the war for liberation may 
be seen as a quotidian rhetorical strategy. While “war” depicts events that 
are both geographically and emotionally distant and temporal (wars start 
and end), “struggle” is more intimate and continuous. Indeed The Struggle 
is depicted as the responsibility of all Eritreans. Like “revolution,” the term 
“The Struggle” seamlessly extends from armed combat to other struggles 
against oppression, poverty, underdevelopment, ignorance, or whatever the 
regime pinpoints as in need of being struggled against. Struggle is a word 
that galvanizes on an ongoing, personal level.
Another quotidian strategy of nation making was to create routine, ritu-
alized experiences for Eritreans that socialized them into what it meant to be 
Eritrean. National Service has been, of course, the quintessential process of 
socializing Eritreans into the values and experiences of being a fighter—the 
ideal Eritrean everyman/everywoman—but National Service was certainly 
not the only way to make Eritrean nationalism understood and felt to be 
part of everyone’s everyday lives. Additionally, throughout my fieldwork, 
there were a variety of everyday national routines. In major towns and cit-
ies, at the beginning and end of the workday, flags were raised and lowered. 
All pedestrians and traffic were expected to stop when a whistle sounded. 
Pedestrians then stood in silence to salute the flag while it was lowered and 
continued moving only after the whistle sounded again. It was a striking 
experience to be walking down the street and suddenly find everyone stand-
ing still while gazing up at a nearby flag.
Similar to National Service, after independence, the government initi-
ated a series of programs designed to ensure that this identification with the 
experiences of the fighter would transfer to subsequent generations. These 
programs initially built on desires to serve the country but over time turned 
mandatory. In the immediate postwar years, Eritreans willingly talked 
about the need to make sacrifices for the nation. This ethos of sacrifice, 
as recounted to me in interviews, often translated into a willingness to do 
whatever and go wherever the government said to. Aspiring students were 
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told to be patient and volunteer while they waited for schools to get started. 
Civil servants and high-level officials all found themselves being told to 
make sacrifices as their salaries were furloughed, raises that were long over-
due were delayed even longer, or they were transferred to postings they did 
not want (Hoyle 1999). Eritreans were told that their labor was badly need-
ed, enabling the new government to allocate workers where they needed 
them and to use a degree of coercion to tell people where to go and what 
to do. The legacy of loyalty and obedience gleaned from the disciplined 
military culture created during The Struggle and the strong sentiments of 
pride in the new nation made sacrifices for the nation in the immediate 
post-independence years seem like an inevitable part of being Eritrean.
The government yoked the rhetoric of sacrifice to several homegrown 
development-oriented projects, which enabled successive generations of 
Eritreans to experience the legacy of The Struggle and have experiences 
that approximated those of the fighters. Most notable in this regard was 
Eritrea’s National Service program. Initially, trainees spent several months 
on foot trekking through Eritrea’s rugged terrain much as the fighters had, 
something that many civilians complained was overly harsh. In addition, 
they received political education and were ultimately put to work on devel-
opment projects. Effectively, National Service was thought to transform 
all Eritreans into tegadelti (fighters). Citizens’ participation in the various 
forms of service intentionally simulated the service and sacrifice of those 
who fought in The Struggle (Hepner 2009b; Müller 2008). National ser-
vice thus was both a disciplinary practice that organized a labor force for 
development and defense and an ideological one intended to fuse the values 
of The Struggle into the population.
In the same vein, short-term service projects recruited high school stu-
dents, university students, women, or, sometimes, members of the popu-
lation at large into a variety of civic and service activities that might last 
anywhere from an afternoon to several months. Other mass service projects 
took on different forms, many of which simulated the developmentalist 
projects that brought civilians and fighters together during The Struggle. 
Community-wide cleanup days required all members of a community to 
clean their town or village. Summer service programs (ma’atot) sent high 
school and university students to different parts of the country to plant 
trees, terrace hillsides, or engage in other development projects. The goals 
of National Service and shorter-term service projects were to inculcate in 
citizens the value of service to the nation and to forge an attachment to 
the nation among all of its regionally diverse peoples through the common 
experience of service (Kibreab 2009b; Müller 2008). High school sum-
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mer work projects also required moving teachers and students to different 
regions where they would mix with others.
The spectacle of those serving the nation also generated mass euphoria 
in the population at large. As in many other nations, in Eritrea, national loy-
alty is inscribed through bodily practices; ideally, as citizens viscerally feel 
the nation in their bodies, they imagine the state as the benevolent keeper 
of the national vision. Tekle Woldemikael (2009: 4) notes the importance of 
Independence Day celebrations to “produc[ing] docile bodies, subjects who 
fit into the ruling party’s image of nationhood.” Similarly, students traveling 
to National Service or summer work programs were often paraded through 
large towns, waving from buses with horns honking.
By the end of The Struggle, being Eritrean had become a lived experi-
ence due to the prevalence of the war and the sense that the fighters were 
one with the Eritrean people. In the immediate postwar era, the euphoria 
of independence led to a continuation of the desire to serve and sacrifice 
for the country. In the decades that followed, the PFDJ has continued to 
merge nationalism with people’s lived experiences by creating a series of 
experiences whereby Eritreans viscerally and bodily experience the nation in 
their everyday lives. This happens through programs of mass socialization 
(National Service), everyday rituals (flag ceremonies), and the celebration of 
everyday, ordinary symbols that are both national and a part of everyone’s 
lives (the shida). However, quotidian nationalism has faced challenges to its 
legitimacy in the years following the border war.
Contradictions of Revolutionary Nationalism  
in Post-Independence Eritrea
Revolutionary movements face particular challenges in sustaining their 
revolutionary ideals when the fighting is over. In part due to their military 
legacy and in part due to their ideological purity, regimes that come to 
power through armed insurgency tend to require adherence to an ideologi-
cal orthodoxy and demand loyalty (or the performance of loyalty). They 
are also intolerant of internal cleavages, rifts, and dissent (Dorman 2006). 
But this adherence to ideological orthodoxy and absolute loyalty can prove 
to be unsustainable in the absence of a clear enemy. Postliberation or revo-
lutionary regimes merge a progressive and developmental vision for societal 
transformation with a kind of coercive and intolerant politics that, as I show 
in the next chapter, winds up eroding the legitimacy that enabled the revo-
lution in the first place. Thus, revolutionary movements can lead to politi-
cal hierarchies and a particularly closed political climate; in their efforts to 
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produce a society that is revolutionary, they also emphasize controlling the 
population over producing positive emotional attachments to the nation, all 
of which has been the case in Eritrea (Connell 2011; Dorman 2005).
Post-independence, the government showed itself to be intent on shoring 
up centralized state control. Shortly after independence, Eritrea reorganized 
the country administratively, creating five new administrative zones that 
bifurcated historic ones to ensure that no single ethnic group dominated 
any one geographical area. Also following independence, the government 
asserted administrative control at the local levels. While officially leaving 
traditional forms of governance intact, it also appointed to each village or 
municipality a centrally appointed administrator who, in practice, was more 
powerful than traditional leaders. Following the border war, these admin-
istrators were more often than not military personnel who had a great deal 
of power but little legitimacy (Dorman 2005, 2006).
The government also showed itself to be increasingly intolerant of all 
forms of dissent. From early on, the EPLF/PFDJ leadership cracked down 
harshly on any who opposed it, most notably in 1973, with the Menka’a 
incident in which a group of mainly former students protested the EPLF’s 
lack of democratic decision making (Connell 2001, 2005, 2011; Pool 2001). 
The movement was swiftly put down and its five leaders executed. After 
that, the EPLF devised severe punishments for anyone who criticized its 
leadership. A similar incident in 1976 also met with swift brutality (Hepner 
2009b). The EPLF was known for expecting loyalty to its vision for the 
nation, demanding strict discipline from its fighters, and enacting harsh 
punishments on anyone who disobeyed. This strict orthodoxy has been 
difficult to maintain in the postliberation years.
Since independence and particularly since 2001, any attempts to voice 
dissent have been cracked down on equally harshly. The summer and fall 
of 2001, only months after the cessation of hostilities agreement was signed 
with Ethiopia to end fighting between the two countries, was a time of 
unprecedented political debate. Letters drafted to the president from party 
elites raised questions about the management of the border war as well as 
the implementation of the constitution and the overall trajectory of the 
country. A group of diaspora intellectuals now known as the G-13 first 
attempted to engage Eritrea’s leadership in critical discussions about how 
the country was being managed. Their efforts did not lead to the wide-
spread debate they had hoped for but resulted in the country’s leadership 
questioning the group’s integrity (Hepner 2009b: 191–194). The G-13 was 
followed by a group that came to be known as the G-15, which authored 
“An Open Letter to Members of the PFDJ.” The open letter made many 
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similar points previously made by the G-13, but this letter was written by 
long-time members of the party’s inner circle and leaders within the govern-
ment itself, including ministers and ambassadors (Hepner 2009b: 194–196). 
In July 2001, student union president Semere Kesete was arrested follow-
ing a controversial speech he gave at the University of Asmara. His speech 
voiced long-time concerns that university students held about voluntary 
service during their school breaks. Students who protested his arrest were 
subsequently detained and sent to work camps in the desert later that sum-
mer. In mid-September 2001, eleven of the fifteen members of the G-15 
were arrested and have not been heard from since. Three were exiled, and 
one rejoined the government. Private presses were shut down at the same 
time and remain shut down to this day. Journalists were arrested or went 
into exile. Scores of others suspected of political involvement and activism 
were also arrested (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014). Since 2001, any attempts 
to organize and mobilize politically have been dealt with harshly; indeed, 
there has been little political resistance in Eritrea since 2001. In January 
2013, this pattern was broken when a group of soldiers briefly occupied 
the Ministry of Information and aired part of a statement demanding the 
release of political prisoners. Opposition websites report that participants in 
these events have been arrested along with military commanders suspected 
of inciting this mutiny.
Service and sacrifice have long been the core tenets of Eritrean nation-
alism (Bernal 2014; Hepner 2009b; Kibreab 2009b). While initially there 
was support for service projects, increasingly, people’s comments about 
government demands for service and control over citizens began to reflect 
increasing disillusionment with the government. This occurred against the 
backdrop of a broader critique of the government’s failure to hold elections, 
implement the constitution, and institute democratic reforms. Whereas dur-
ing The Struggle for liberation and in the early independence years people 
had faith in the ideal of service as well as, and perhaps even more signifi-
cantly, faith in the government’s capacity to manage manpower and care 
for citizens in service, later on service projects began to “lose their luster 
as more and more young people found their lives dictated by the govern-
ment’s demands for labor and defense as part of its self-reliant development 
strategy” (Hepner 2009b: 65–66). Throughout my fieldwork, I often heard 
the assertion, “We still love our country. We still love our country and we 
would defend it.” But in the postwar years, these assertions of willingness 
to defend were usually a preamble to a bitter critique of all that was going 
wrong, particularly with National Service. Service to the country, it seemed, 
had become a punishment, not a national duty.
2
“It Seemed like a Punishment”
Coercive State Effects and the Maddening State
“In Carcele; Be Back in Fifteen Minutes”
In July 2002, my husband and I were staying in central Asmara. Much of my husband’s time that summer was devoted to finding a rental house for his family, who had been living in one room in a “suburb” of Asmara 
that lacked running water and latrines. One morning, my husband had 
gone off to pursue this task, and, as I sat peacefully trying to write, the 
phone rang. A voice that I did not recognize on the other end told me in a 
combination of broken English and Italian that my husband was “in carcele” 
and that he would “be back in fifteen minutes.” Confused, I tried to ask 
more questions, and then the line went dead. Initially, I shrugged off the 
odd phone call, assumed he would be back in fifteen minutes, and went 
on with my work. I knew carcele meant “jail,” but why would he be in jail?
Fifteen minutes passed, and I started to watch the clock, which hovered 
on top of a street map of Asmara hanging on the wall. The word carcele 
repeated itself in my head despite my attempts to mentally brush it away. 
But after half an hour passed, the word reverberated even more insistently. 
Carcele, carcele, carcele. I started to wonder about the meaning of carcele 
and stood up to look at the map to see whether there was a neighborhood 
called Carcele, perhaps located near a prison, where he might have gone to 
look at a house. I started to feel a tingling in my limbs, blood swimming 
behind my eyes, the hot-cold tightening of the scalp that accompanies the 
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onset of panic. I took a deep breath and berated myself for being paranoid. 
Why would he be in jail? Why would he be back in fifteen minutes if he 
was in jail?
After an hour and still no sign of him, the deep breaths that I forced 
myself to take could not stave off the onset of terror. My eyes teared up, and 
I felt that there was no space in my chest for breath. I could not concentrate 
on my work. The words in the sentences I tried to write refused to stay in 
order. I paced. I sat on the bed and sobbed. I thought about leaving the 
house, but where would I go? I thought about calling someone, but who 
would I call? Desperate thoughts collided with each other. What would I 
do if he did not come back? Who would help me? The U.S. Embassy that 
could not even gain the release of its own employees, who had been in jail 
for more than a year?1 The Eritrean government? Whom was I connected 
to? Whom could I trust? Was I the reason he got arrested? Would I make 
more problems if I tried to fix things?
As quickly as I had worked myself up, I talked myself down. Things 
run late here. He is just running late. Everything runs late. He is not in jail. 
Why would he be in jail? He will be back. Carcele must be a neighborhood 
near a jail. He has found a house and is renting it. Fifteen minutes can mean 
two hours. I made some coffee and played a game of spider solitaire on my 
computer to distract myself, glancing at the phone, hoping it would ring, 
listening for the sound of his knock on the front gate.
I oscillated, several times, between tearful hysteria and calmly berating 
myself for being silly and paranoid. You have seen too many movies sen-
sationalizing dictatorships and disappearances, I told myself. This is not a 
movie. This is just Eritrea. This does not happen to ordinary people here.
When he appeared almost two hours later, he was furious. “They 
abducted me,” he said. The story unfolded. They, the government, were 
“abducting” any young man who appeared to be of military age, a process 
that came to be known as gifa.2 Military personnel were posted on street 
corners, demanding to see ID cards. When an ID was presented, inevi-
tably they were unsatisfied with it and required everyone to climb on a 
truck waiting to take people to one of the many detention centers set up 
for this purpose. Once in “jail,” paperwork was more thoroughly checked, 
and some people were released after several hours. Those who were unable 
to produce satisfactory paperwork had to wait until a supervisor came to 
prove that they were not supposed to be on active military duty. Some 
remained in detention for several days. Some were returned to military 
units where they might be detained further, assigned to hard labor or pos-
sibly tortured.
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When I heard that he had been in jail, my reaction was complex. Clear-
ly, I was relieved that he had made it back safely, and partly I felt vindicated 
that my worry did not stem from mere paranoia. He had, indeed, been in 
jail. My hysteria was a reasonable reaction. But simultaneously I was horri-
fied that what I had always feared—the latent capacity for the government 
to detain with impunity—had become real. Were there limits on its use of 
force?
The statement “in carcele; be back in fifteen minutes” is reflective of 
an ambivalence that Begoña Aretxaga (2003) aptly captures in the phrase 
“maddening states.” That maddening state3 refers to the profound ambiva-
lence citizens feel as they are trapped between their desire for the “good” 
paternalistic state, a desire so strong that it produces its own evidence that 
the state is benevolent, and utter fear of what the “bad” coercive state—the 
state that has turned against its people—can and will do. The desire for the 
paternalistic state is strong; it enables citizens to stubbornly cling to their 
illusion that the state cares about its people even amid tangible evidence to 
the contrary.
The first statement, “in jail,” inevitably raises alarm. Detention by 
authorities who have no cause, who are known to have the capacity to behave 
capriciously and without concern for individual well-being, as is the case in 
Eritrea, is distressing at best, terrifying at worst. A year earlier, in 2001, the 
Eritrean government arrested journalists and members of the inner circle 
of the ruling party who had openly spoken out against the government. As 
of 2002, the political purge of the previous year had not targeted ordinary 
citizens, but the potential for it to do so existed. Some Eritreans had expe-
rienced being detained by authorities, although a project on the mass scale 
of gifa had never taken place. Furthermore, many remembered the brutality 
of the Ethiopian officials prior to independence and were all too familiar 
with practices of arbitrary detention. People were alarmed that government 
personnel took it upon themselves to round up what seemed like everyone 
who was eligible for military service and put them in jail. There was clear 
evidence that the state was turning against its people.
But what do we make of the second half of the statement, “be back in 
fifteen minutes”? It sounds so ordinary, as if one had simply run out to the 
store for some eggs. It conveys that there is no cause for alarm, that all is 
well and normal. It conveys an assumption that detention is but a mere 
inconvenience. The statement is also intended to pacify. Indeed, my hus-
band clearly intended to pacify me. It normalized the experience of arbitrary 
detention without cause. Citizens’ faith that the state would not harm them 
and would protect them enabled this process of normalization. Citizens 
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believed that government officials might detain without cause, they might 
inconvenience people, but they would not hurt them, because the state, at 
some level, was benevolent. Depicting mass detention as routine and normal 
was a means for Eritreans to retain and maintain the sense that everything 
was normal and that the state still cared about its people.
“Be back in fifteen minutes.” This rather ordinary statement created a 
sense of affective dissonance. It said, “It’s okay, but nothing is okay.” This 
interplay between what was an extraordinary degree of coercion and con-
trol over citizen bodies on the part of the state and what was portrayed 
as “ordinary” and, therefore, nothing to worry about became a key part 
of the normalization of life in Eritrea from that time on. That afternoon 
in Asmara, my encounter with the capacity of the Eritrean state to detain 
with impunity, set against lingering imaginaries that characterized Eritrea 
as the kind of place where this did not happen, produced my own madden-
ing state—a state of such psychological contradiction that I still struggle to 
make sense of the conflicting emotions that I experienced that day.
The dissonance that I felt that day is a common characteristic of life 
in Eritrea. Underlying the maddeningly uncertain climate were questions: 
Did the state care about us or did it want to kill us? Was it fundamentally 
paternalistic or violent? In Eritrea, these questions had a deep emotional 
resonance, as what was at stake during the course of my fieldwork and 
what came to a critical juncture during the gifa of 2002 was an uncertainty 
as to the nature of the Eritrean state. Gifa befuddled the assumptions of 
many that the state fundamentally cared about them. Some, of course, had 
already had coercive, or even violent, encounters with the state in previous 
years. In contrast, others would continue to believe that the state cared for 
them long after. But the 2002 gifa was a turning point. It affected everyone 
in urban areas; thus, once the government started using widespread gifa, 
most Eritreans could no longer deny the coerciveness of the state, and yet 
many still wanted to believe, needed to believe at some level, in a state that 
would take care of its people, a state that had a plan. Yet experiences of gifa 
were evidence to many Eritreans that they were living in a punishing state, 
something that many still did not completely want to believe.
The central argument of this chapter is that despite tenacious beliefs in 
a caretaking state, punishment has become a key modality through which 
the state is imagined in Eritrea. Imagining the state as punishing, thinking 
of oneself as being punished by the state, and responding to that perception 
of being punished are state effects of coercion. However, actually knowing 
whether, when, or why one is being punished is almost impossible, and, 
because of the maddening nature of the state, imaginaries of the punishing 
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state always coexist with other explanations that rationalize the state’s use 
of force.
Theories of state effects are ways to understand that while the state is 
not “a thing,” it has the capacity to make people think, believe, and act in 
particular and specific ways. Timothy Mitchell (2006) notes that the state 
constructs its own “structural effect” whereby people come to believe that 
the state is an institutional reality. Although coercion is not often considered 
as a state effect in its own right but instead as a means to bring about other 
state effects, I suggest that exploring coercion as a state effect is essential to 
understand everyday life in Eritrea and elsewhere. Scholars have specified 
a number of state effects, including an individuating effect, a totalizing 
effect, an identification effect, a spatialization effect, and a legibility effect, 
all of which are a means to understand how state power manifests itself 
in the lives of state subjects without suggesting that the state is an actual 
thing (Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Mitchell 1991, 2006; Scott 1998; Trouillot 
2001). Framed by Michel Foucault’s (1990) work on governmentality, the 
focus on state effects explores the ways in which state power acts internally 
within subjects to produce ways of being, imagining, and thinking rather 
than externally (and emanating from particular actors) to constrain or pro-
mote particular actions (Mitchell 1991, 2006). State effects order individu-
als’ experiences of being state subjects through language (that is, by telling 
people who they are and how they are supposed to behave as a member of 
that polity) and by disciplining bodies. They categorize, organize, and order 
subjects in space and time and thereby enable people to think of themselves 
as attached to a nation and a state and as having particular positions within 
that nation and state. Studies of state effects seldom view coercion as a state 
effect in its own right. In contrast, I show that coercive power produces 
distinctive imaginaries of state coherence/incoherence, understandings of 
state subjectivity, and behaviors. Coercion is adept at creating an appearance 
of actual state power but not particularly effective at producing many other 
state effects. Indeed, the coercive state effects alter other state effects because 
being coerced makes it harder for subjects to identify in positive ways with 
the nation, national territory, and the population. A coerced subject has a 
harder time thinking of him- or herself as a loyal, docile national subject, 
yet, ironically, the experience of coercion simultaneously forges a powerful 
imaginary of the state—in this case, one that revolved around being pun-
ished by the state.
Through discourse about being punished, Eritreans scaled up from 
everyday encounters with state actors at the local level to the upper levels 
of government. In a similar vein, Akhil Gupta (2012) notes that in India 
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discourse and practices of corruption were the means through which people 
discursively constructed the state. Commentary about corruption in public 
media, people’s routine experiences of corruption, and their remarks about 
corruption reveal citizen imaginaries of the state and tie together the local, 
interpersonal level with the “upper” echelons of the state. Like the discourse 
of corruption in India, discourses of punishment enable an imaginative 
scaling of the state in Eritrea. Elsewhere, I have argued that this sense of 
being a punished subject in large part replaced notions that the government 
had the legitimate right to demand service and sacrifice from its subjects 
(Riggan 2013b). Here, I emphasize how Eritreans linked experiences of 
being coerced, or forced to do something, with a sense of “being punished” 
and, furthermore, extended this sense of being coerced and punished to the 
condition of being Eritrean more broadly. At times, people knew that the 
government was actually punishing them, but Eritreans used the language 
of state punishment to describe their frequent experiences of being forced to 
do things, including instances where this was not actually a punishment or 
instances in which it was unclear whether punishment was involved.
Punishments were often arbitrary and unpredictable, and this unpre-
dictability is a key component of the coercive state effect. The arbitrary 
sense that one could be punished at any time is better understood when we 
consider that Eritrea is a country aptly characterized by Giorgio Agamben’s 
(2005: 39) notion of a “state of exception” in which “there is the force of 
law without the rule of law” (for discussions of state of exception in Eritrea, 
see International Crisis Group 2014; Riggan 2013a; Woldemikael 2013). 
Under a state of exception, rules become permanently suspended such that 
the exceptional (and extralegal) treatment of part of the population (and in 
the Eritrean case, a very large part) becomes the norm. Citizens under such 
conditions can seldom rely on having their “rights” protected. An expression 
I often heard during fieldwork that aptly sums up this sense of ambiguity 
and uncertainty is that the government “writes in pencil.” This expression 
could refer to a range of government decisions, from whether teachers would 
be allowed to travel to Asmara for semester break to National Service eli-
gibility. It reflected widespread sentiments that there was no rule of law in 
Eritrea or clear policy making and implementation. Eritreans were suscep-
tible to the potential for a state actor, at any level, to use his or her power 
to force people to do things. In this context, force is more salient than 
written laws or policies, and state actors have the capability to utilize force 
in often unchecked ways; thus, no one knows where the state ends and the 
whims and opinions of individuals with the power to act on citizen bodies 
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begin. The phrase “written in pencil” depicted the ephemerality of state 
mandates as well as their susceptibility to being interpreted by anyone with 
power at the moment. This makes encounters with the state very personal 
but also ambiguous—it is never fully known whether one is being treated 
a particular way because of a policy or because of an individual’s decisions. 
Thus it was fundamentally unclear whether or when one was actually being 
punished, but such uncertainty enabled Eritreans to imagine themselves as 
punished subjects.
This chapter explores three facets of coercive state effects to argue not 
only that punishment has become a key modality through which the state 
is imagined in Eritrea but also that this imaginary has played a key role 
in delegitimizing the current government’s vision of the nation. First, as I 
noted above, the discourse of punishment enables the scaling of imaginaries 
of the state by linking experiences of being coerced that resulted directly 
from state “policy” (decisions made by top state actors) with more quotid-
ian experiences of coercion (experiences that may not have been the result 
of these top-down decisions). I explore this first by examining instances of 
state coercion and then by looking at how discourses of punishment were 
used to describe them. This imaginative reworking of the state as punishing 
partially replaced narratives of serving and defending the country but also 
led to a climate of impotence and evasion, which brings me to the second 
facet of coercion: Eritreans responded to this sense of being punished with 
tactics of evasion. Evasion, avoidance, or escape from experiences of being 
punished is the logical response to being forced to do things one does not 
want to do, but, more significantly, the state subject evading state punish-
ment is a radical departure from the national subject who willingly serves 
and sacrifices. Evasion thus hollows out these national ideals, leaving them 
empty and “impotent” (Mbembe 2001). Finally, I return to the concept 
of the maddening state to show that imagining the state as punishing is 
always nebulous—one does not know whether coercive actions are actually 
punishments in large part because of lingering notions of the caretaking 
state—the maddening condition in which the desire for a “good state” coex-
ists with evidence of a “bad state.” One way in which desires for a good state 
manifested themselves was through attempting to find a rationale for the 
government’s coercive actions. The government’s ongoing efforts to con-
struct a sense of heightened siege by reminding the population of various 
security threats contributed to the sense that the government was taking 
care of its people by resorting to extreme measures necessitated by a state 
of emergency.
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Everyday Life in the Prison State: Citizen Bodies 
and Coercive State Effects
Eritreans often directly or indirectly referred to their country as a “prison” 
throughout my fieldwork. This phrase has been picked up by journalists 
and human rights organizations, which often utilize the term “prison state” 
to evoke the level of repression present in Eritrea (see, for example, Interna-
tional Crisis Group 2010). However, while journalists increasingly utilized 
the term “prison state” to reference an alleged network of “underground 
prisons” throughout Eritrea, Eritreans’ depiction of Eritrea as a prison 
referred instead to the sensation of living in a place where they did not 
have control over their lives, their livelihoods, and, most importantly, their 
ability to leave the country. For Eritreans, the commonly voiced sentiment 
that the country is “like a prison” referenced the ubiquity of experiences 
of being forced to do things—for example, conscription, endless National 
Service, arbitrary transfers of civil servants, service projects, controls over 
people’s movements—the sense of constant surveillance, and the prohi-
bition on leaving the country. Talking about life in the prison state thus 
directly reflects the experience of state coercion.
By coercion, I mean actual instances in which people are forced to 
engage in a particular form of labor in a particular place, something that 
could occur literally at the point of a gun or through a similar threat of 
violence or through other coercive mechanisms. Gifa was an example of 
the former, but there was also a wide array of other ways in which the state 
could locate and relocate its subjects. The government in Eritrea forced 
a large number of Eritreans to live in particular places and do particular 
labor, either short term or long term. The government also coerced students 
to engage in various forms of service, civil servants to work in locations of 
the government’s choosing, and civilians at large to do particular forms of 
“voluntary” work for the state by using a variety of other types of coercive 
mechanisms, such as docking pay, withholding transcripts, denying leave, 
and threatening people with various punishments. Eritreans were “forced” 
to do things and, more specifically, to be in places they did not want to 
be. I argue that these forms of coercion constitute a state effect that alters 
other state effects—individuating effects, totalizing effects, identification 
effects, and spatialization effects—and thereby recalibrates the relationship 
between state subject and identification with the nation.
Although the 2002 gifa was the first time round-ups had been car-
ried out on such a large scale, gifa-like round-ups were not unfamiliar to 
Eritreans prior to that. During the war, there were quite a few accounts of 
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arbitrary round-ups by the military and military commanders comman-
deering civilian bodies. One group of teachers told me a particularly alarm-
ing story. On their way home late one evening in 1998, they were pulled 
aside by soldiers who forced them to climb on a truck. Several waiting 
trucks drove them a long way into the desert. Terrified, they realized that 
they were heading toward the front line of the war that was then actively 
being fought. At the front, they were told to collect the bodies of wounded 
soldiers, work that would typically be assigned to military personnel. Other 
friends and acquaintances also recounted being rounded up to have their 
identity documents checked during this time. The experience of being arbi-
trarily detained or having one’s labor commandeered was a ubiquitous one 
in Eritrea. While not all of these experiences were terrifying, all gave citizens 
the sense that their time and their bodies were not entirely under their own 
control. Furthermore, the government officials’ willingness to arbitrarily 
round up civilians, load them onto the backs of trucks, and require them to 
perform dangerous tasks, such as collecting the bodies of wounded soldiers, 
reflects an assumption that any Eritrean was available to serve the govern-
ment in whatever capacity a local official deemed necessary. As a result, 
civilians believed they were not safe in war time, not only because an enemy 
bomb might drop but also because their own government—or, more specifi-
cally, an individual with unchecked power—might place them in danger.
The constraints on citizen bodies were nowhere more apparent than in 
the de facto prohibition on leaving the country. Emigration was effectively 
illegal in Eritrea at the time of my fieldwork. Exit visas were required to 
leave the country, and completion of national/military service was a pre-
requisite to receive an exit visa or a passport (GoE 1995). Receiving an exit 
visa was premised on completion of National Service; however, since the 
border war with Ethiopia (1998–2000), very few had been released from 
National Service, and most recruited into National Service came to believe 
they would be serving indefinitely (Bozzini 2011; Kibreab 2009b; O’Kane 
and Hepner 2009; Reid 2009). Furthermore, during my fieldwork, exit visas 
were almost impossible to acquire even for those who had been released 
from or were exempt from National Service. Additionally, the border was 
heavily policed, and those who attempted to leave ran the risk of imprison-
ment, torture, being shot at the border, or being kidnapped by traffickers 
(Human Rights Watch 2009).
Preventing people from leaving the country transforms Eritreans’ atti-
tudes toward the national space, thereby altering the state spatialization 
effect. What Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2001) calls the spatialization effect is 
a means of producing an attachment between state subjects and their dis-
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tinct national territory. Symbols such as the map, awareness of borders, and 
anything that produces an understanding of belonging to national space 
constitute this effect in Eritrea and elsewhere. Eritreans were profoundly 
aware of the nation as a bounded, territorial entity; however, the coercive-
ness with which prohibitions on leaving kept Eritreans in produced negative 
attachments between citizens and national space. The country felt like a 
prison, and its citizens seemed to have the desire, above all else, to escape. 
This phenomenon continues to be evident in the large numbers of Eritre-
ans who flee the country despite the significant risks they face in doing so. 
Thus, state spatialization in Eritrea has bound Eritreans to the national 
territory by making them feel imprisoned by it, but the fact that such large 
numbers of Eritreans are fleeing the country suggests that this feeling of 
being made captive is at least in part responsible for producing the desire to 
escape (Poole 2013; Riggan 2013a).
National Service also produces spatialization effects, because it locates 
Eritreans across the country, but it simultaneously produces two other state 
effects—identification and totalization. Identification effects link indi-
vidual identities with the nation, while totalization effects make them feel 
part of a larger collective—in this case, the military. One of the key ways 
in which identification and totalization effects are produced is through the 
disciplining of time, space, and the body such that subjects come to order 
their individual lives in ways that align with the expectations of the totality. 
The experience of being in the military simultaneously produces a par-
ticular type of individuated subject and a larger collective (Mitchell 1991, 
2006). National Service is, first and foremost, an experience of becoming an 
individual military subject, an extreme form of subjugation in which one’s 
entire being is subsumed to total discipline, as space, time, and the body 
are significantly regimented (Foucault 1995).4 Military discipline (in the 
Foucauldian sense), in Eritrea and elsewhere, also produces totalizing effects 
whereby the effect of a collective military body to defend the nation is pro-
duced (Mitchell 1991, 2006).5 National Service is supposed to inculcate the 
values of The Struggle, make Eritreans feel national, and incorporate indi-
viduals into a military whole. However, the coercive state effects prevalent in 
National Service mean that while it did produce identification and totaliza-
tion effects, these came to have negative connotations, just as attachments 
to space did. Eritreans saw themselves not as docile, loyal individuals and 
not as proud members of a militarized core but as coerced subjects, forced 
to serve. Service denoted a collective experience of hardship at the hands 
of the state.6 Furthermore, coerciveness in the military was experienced 
through the arbitrary and unpredictable nature of military discipline. The 
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arbitrariness and unpredictability made it easy for conscripts to believe that 
they were at the mercy of their superiors and imagine themselves as being 
punished subjects. One of the ways this occurred was through the lack of a 
predictable schedule while in training. Time for military trainees was both 
intensively managed and unpredictable, making it totally oriented toward 
the will of commanding officers. Recruits were expected to live moment to 
moment and submit their entire beings obediently to their officers. Addi-
tionally, recruits were literally punished if they did not follow orders. I dis-
cuss punishments in more detail in the next section.
The coercive effects of National Service were well illustrated by a com-
monly heard phrase, “in Sawa,” which appeared frequently in both public, 
official media and everyday conversations among Eritreans. The town of 
Sawa is the site of the nation’s military training facility (and also the site 
of the newly created boarding school for all grade 12 students), but the 
commonly used phrase “in Sawa” had broad and complex meanings. In its 
most descriptive sense, “in Sawa” meant that someone was in service, and 
the phrase could refer to either going through military training, serving in 
the military, or serving in a civil capacity. The military training facility at 
Sawa is celebrated and glorified in public, government-controlled media 
and patriotic songs. The government hosts an annual youth festival at Sawa. 
Additionally, it sponsored trips to Sawa for diaspora youth, where they have 
experiences that are distinct from military conscripts and include musi-
cal entertainment. Sawa thus produces a spatial effect as it constructs an 
imaginary of a particular place and an identification effect with particular 
national narratives. However, for most Eritreans, mention of going to Sawa 
evokes fear and anxiety and is emblematic of the hardships, and coercive-
ness, of military training. The phrase “in Sawa” merges references to an 
actual place that has negative connotations associated with the hardships 
of military training with negative sentiments about service more generally. 
When most Eritreans commented that someone was “in Sawa” (a phrase 
heard almost daily), it referenced a sense of being subservient, and vulner-
able to, the government. For example, teachers who were completing their 
National Service as teachers often referred to themselves or were referred 
to as being “in Sawa” a condition that was typically pitied. Senior teachers 
expressed worry about being sent “to Sawa,” which evoked their concerns 
about having their salary and freedom taken away. Through the phrase “in 
Sawa,” Eritreans drew together experiences of military and civil service and 
linked both to an experience of hardship, referencing an imaginary that 
equated service, military training, and state-induced suffering. Eritreans 
tended to think of military training, National Service, and military ser-
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vice as part of the same process. For Eritrea’s leaders, this was supposed 
to produce an equalizing, nationalizing experience of service; however, for 
most Eritreans, the phrase “in Sawa” reflected an imaginary of a state that 
demanded service in a place that epitomized hardship.
One of the reasons service came to have negative connotations is that it 
became indefinite. Being a military subject is typically a temporary and lim-
ited experience. The vast majority of soldiers submit to that kind of intense, 
total subjugation for a specific amount of time. While militarization pro-
duces fairly common state effects, I suggest that coercive effects were cre-
ated by policies that forced people to stay in National Service indefinitely, 
transforming what should have been willing subjects into coerced ones. 
The Warsai Yikaalo Development Campaign (WYDC) is the main vehicle 
through which military service was extended indefinitely (Hepner 2009b; 
Müller 2008; O’Kane and Hepner 2009). Under the auspices of galvanizing 
National Service conscripts to work on development projects, the WYDC, 
introduced in 2002, enabled the government to avoid mass demobilization 
after the border war concluded and effectively extend National Service. But 
given that there has been no significant fighting with Ethiopia since 2000, 
the ongoing mobilization of such a large proportion of the population is 
generally seen as illegitimate and outside the scope of Eritrean law; thus the 
common assertion among Eritreans, scholars of Eritrea, and human rights 
organizations is that National Service is indefinite or permanent.
Gifa during summer 2002 occurred at the same time that the WYDC 
was announced, further reinforcing the notion that service was now some-
thing Eritreans had to be forced to do. That summer many people, typically 
men who appeared to be under the age of forty-five, were detained multiple 
times. In most cases, they were released within a few hours, although in 
some cases, they were detained overnight or even for a few days. As others 
have noted, there was a sense among the population of being under siege not 
by external enemies but by the Eritrean government itself (Bozzini 2011). 
Gifa illuminated the effects of a coercive state to move and detain citizen 
bodies. The Eritrean state has always had this capacity, as, indeed, all states 
do; however, when widespread, mass gifa was enacted in 2002, it indicated 
that the government was willing to use this capacity on a scale that had 
previously been used only during the war to mobilize reserve troops and 
new military recruits for the defense of the country.
The capacity for the government to control the lives and labor of its 
citizens through indefinite National Service, prohibitions on leaving the 
country, mass round-ups, and arbitrarily commandeered citizen labor forms 
the fabric of ordinary life in Eritrea. Encounters with government officials, 
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who were willing, empowered, or ordered to coerce citizen bodies in these 
ways, were ubiquitous; it would be hard to find an Eritrean, particularly an 
Eritrean adult man, living in Eritrea at this time who has not had one or 
more coercive encounters with someone representing the state. 
Additionally, coercive state effects were felt in other, less anxiety-provok-
ing but equally routine ways. Various types of service projects that could 
take anywhere from a few hours to a few months provide good examples of 
less extreme forms of state control. As early as 1995, the government set up 
summer service projects that took high school–aged youth to various parts 
of the country to terrace hillsides or plant trees. Similar forms of summer 
service exist for university students as well (and, indeed, conditions of these 
university service projects proved to be a political flashpoint in 2001). At 
the community level, mandatory cleanup days were required of entire towns 
several times a year. All of these projects were efforts to require citizens en 
masse to provide service to the government. Both National Service and 
other mass service projects create an individuating effect by producing sub-
jects who think of themselves as service-providing subjects, but they also 
have a totalizing effect, as those in service became a highly visible corps.
The extreme and ubiquitous levels of control over bodies, space, and 
time in Eritrea resemble what Katherine Verdery (1996) refers to in her 
research on Romania as the etatization of time. Time is etatized when the 
state usurps people’s time, compelling them to expend their time on state 
projects.7 Eritreans’ time was certainly etatized. In military service, Eritreans 
report that the microscopic detail of when (and where) to eat, sleep, study, 
run, walk, dance, and play was dictated by superiors, but because National 
Service was indefinite, Eritreans’ time over the long haul was also controlled 
by the government. Entire lives were etatized because Eritreans were giving 
a life of servitude to the government. Eritreans complain that they could 
not go on to higher levels of education, get married, choose where to live, or 
have control over their lives because of the mandate that they serve, and in 
many cases serve indefinitely, either in the military or in civil service. Large 
numbers of Eritreans were located far from their own families and communi-
ties, giving the government direct control over when they could return home. 
This was true of not only military conscripts but also civil servants and even 
students. In all of these cases, few or no policies and procedures were in place 
to allocate leave in the case of a wedding, illness, death of a family member 
or vacation to visit family. Similarly, there was seldom a policy to determine 
when a civil servant or military conscript merited transfer. 
Any attempt to move physically around the country necessitated an 
intense, interpersonal negotiation with low- and mid-level state function-
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aries, who thus had a great deal of power over individual lives. Eritreans 
describe these negotiations over leave and transfers as being based on their 
supervisors’ highly personal feelings, which could be positive and sym-
pathetic to personal circumstances or negative. Supervisors were often 
described as making certain decisions to punish those under their com-
mand. In these instances, the discourse of punishment brought the intimate 
and interpersonal state into alignment with the larger “government.” Below, 
I explore the ways in which these experiences were depicted as punishments 
even when they were not necessarily actual punishments.
“It Seemed like a Punishment”: Imagining  
Everyday Encounters with the State
In the wake of everyday experiences with coercion, many Eritreans started 
talking about themselves not only as living in a prison state but also as being 
punished. Discourse of the state as punishing is one mode of imagining the 
coercive state. Through talk about punishments, Eritreans link encounters 
with everyday coercion, such as those I describe above, to a sense of con-
stantly being susceptible to punishment. Punishment here becomes a means 
of commenting on and interpreting state coercion and enables linkages to be 
made between a variety of types of experiences of the state, both those that 
individuals experience directly and narratives that circulate broadly in con-
versations and rumors. Eritreans interpreted the actions of supervisors and 
superiors as punishing but then, based on that experience of “being pun-
ished,” imagined the state itself as punishing. This perception came from 
evidence that the government, in fact, had begun to punish people. While 
the motive to punish was clear in some cases, in other cases it was anything 
but, yet the widely circulating discourse around punishments constructed 
an imaginary of the state as punishing.
While they were in National Service itself, conscripts described being 
constantly at risk of being punished. Indeed, according to human rights 
reports, a culture of violence and punishment has taken hold in the military 
(see, for example, Human Rights Watch 2011). Teachers and others recount-
ed to me from their experiences in military training that if they were not in 
the right place at the right time, if they could not perform tasks as request-
ed, or even if they were caught purchasing food other than what was issued 
to them, they could be punished. Punishments that teachers described to 
me from their experience in National Service varied from minor forms of 
corporal punishment, such as being asked to hop like a frog or roll in the 
dirt, to more extreme forms of punishment, such as being beaten and tied 
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in stress positions. Accounts from those who are still serving in the military 
are far more severe, with depictions of torture. Interestingly, in many of 
these accounts of military punishment, the land itself is used as a means to 
punish people. Both civil servants and National Service conscripts are sent 
to parts of the country with the harshest heat as punishment. A common 
form of corporal punishment in the military is to tie someone up and leave 
him or her in the hot sun in a desert area. (This too produces a particular 
spatialization effect—the Eritrean earth and climate are punishing.) Per-
haps most importantly, these accounts all reflect the fact that conscripts are 
susceptible to the whims of their commanders and superiors. The lack of 
rule of law means that punishments are arbitrary and highly interpersonal. 
Furthermore, family members have been detained or fined in what has been 
referred to as “collective punishment” if a conscript escapes (Human Rights 
Watch 2011). In the military, by all accounts, there is a culture of violence, 
coercion, and punishment. As I have described above, punishments within 
National Service were common at the time of my fieldwork (and, by all 
accounts, still are). However, talk about punishment was also common, 
even when it was unclear whether one was truly being punished.
Being sent to National Service itself has been used as a punishment for 
civil servants and others. One incident in particular signaled to Eritreans 
that service itself could be used as a punishment (Müller 2008; Treiber 
2009). In summer 2001, Semere Kesete, the head of the University of Asma-
ra student union and valedictorian of the senior class, was arrested for pub-
licly protesting the conditions of service. University students subsequently 
protested his arrest and were themselves arrested, detained in the city’s soc-
cer stadium, and sent to work on a summer service project in the town of 
Wi’a, one of the most remote and hot parts of the North Red Sea zone. It 
was common knowledge that students were sent to Wi’a as a punishment, a 
sentiment that circulated broadly in conversations among Eritreans and that 
the government did not seem to deny. Two students died of heatstroke there.
Another instance of using service as punishment affected a group of 
teachers whom I knew personally. After the evacuation of Assab, upon 
arrival in Massawa, every able-bodied man of military age was conscript-
ed. When the teachers arrived in Massawa, the precise date on which they 
would begin their military training was unclear. Officials in Massawa gave 
the teachers and other evacuees from Assab permission to make a brief trip 
to the capital, Asmara, where most had relatives, to drop off their belong-
ings. Officials told them to return to Massawa on a particular date, but 
because the teachers were not sure when exactly military training would 
begin and knew that the government was notorious for starting things late, 
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several of them decided to spend some extra time with relatives in Asmara. 
They planned to return to Massawa when they heard that training would 
start rather than on the appointed date. Another small number of teachers 
who were long-time residents of Assab actually stayed in Assab instead of 
evacuating. They received word that they had been called up for military 
service quite late and then had to figure out how to make the two-day 
journey to Massawa. The entire group of teachers from Assab who came 
late to military service—both those who had decided to spend more time 
with their families in Asmara and those who decided not to evacuate from 
Assab—were subsequently punished with the addition of a period of sev-
eral months to their time in military training. While other teachers were 
released after their military training ended, these latecomers were required 
to stay in service to perform an additional two months of hard labor in the 
western lowlands even though the war had ended by that point. Making 
conscripts perform additional labor and denying them release time to visit 
family were common punishments in National Service and often had the 
effect of making sure that people reported for military duty and complied 
with government mandates.
In addition to what appears to be a culture of punishment within the 
military and the utilization of service itself as a punishment, civil servants 
believed they were constantly susceptible to being punished by their superi-
ors and described actions that their supervisors took against them as punish-
ing even when it was unclear whether they actually were being punished. 
There was a general sense that when it came to conscripting older, educated, 
professional people, such as civil servants and teachers, being called up for 
National Service itself was often used as a punishment. In perpetuating this 
belief, older civil servants discursively linked their experience/perception of 
being punished to narratives of national punishments, such as the incident 
at Wi’a and the generalized sense that soldiers were punished people. Like 
those in the military describing being punished by superiors, many teachers 
described their transfers as reflective of highly personal grudges, jealousies, 
and emotions. In fact, any time a teacher was transferred to a remote loca-
tion, he or she assumed that someone did not like him or her. There were 
several cases among teachers I interviewed in which a teacher was offered a 
much coveted and rare opportunity to attend Eritrea’s sole university or to 
leave the country to get a master’s degree, only to hear a few weeks later that 
he or she had also been called up to report to Sawa for military training and 
National Service. These teachers inevitably assumed that some particular 
individual was jealous of their receiving an opportunity to further their 
education and was instead routing them to service.
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Teacher Elias recounts one such experience. He was selected to work on 
a master’s degree partially at the University of Asmara and partially abroad. 
While working on his degree, he was assigned as an administrator in the 
central Ministry of Education office:
My boss at that time was not good. From the day I came here [to the 
Ministry of Education Office], I was treated not well. They thought 
I was new and could be treated how they wanted. He was not a real 
boss. He deliberately sent me to Sawa. He sent my name to them. 
So, anyway, I had to go, and I told them that I have to complete my 
education, but the Ministry of Defense didn’t care.
Stories like Elias’s were quite common. Two points are key here. First, Sawa 
is depicted as a form of punishment or mistreatment. Second, Elias blames 
his boss’s personality, claiming that his boss was “not good” and “was not 
a real boss” because he behaved jealously rather than fairly. Indeed, I heard 
that teachers had been simultaneously selected for higher education and 
National Service frequently enough to believe that these were not coin-
cidences. Teachers often cited these types of stories as evidence that the 
power of immediate supervisors was often utilized intimately, maliciously, 
and based on personal emotions, such as jealousy.
Casting individuals with power as malicious and jealous set against the 
backdrop of the state known to be punishing reveals a scaling up from an 
individual encounter with a jealous superior to an imaginary of the punish-
ing state as a whole. Elias blames his boss for “sending his name to them” 
but then becomes a victim of the uncaring Ministry of Defense and ulti-
mately is susceptible to being sent “to Sawa.” The jealous punishing boss sets 
him on a path of state punishment and thus has two faces, and an encounter 
with the state through this boss has two meanings—on the one hand, the 
supervisor is an individual using his power punitively and capriciously, but 
at the same time, he represents the punishing nature of a state that oper-
ates on the basis of these personal jealousies. This is similar to what Walter 
Benjamin (1978) and Aretxaga (2003) think of as the “double body” of the 
state.
Elsewhere, I have detailed the nature and variation of these types of 
imaginaries of the punishing, jealous state (Riggan 2013b). For example, 
younger service teachers might more quickly imagine all Ministry of Edu-
cation officials as punishing, while more experienced professional teachers 
might distinguish between those who are bad and not bad. In all of these 
instances, however, power is experienced as “close to the skin” and then 
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interpreted, imagined, and scaled up, on the basis of its closeness, to reflect 
a broader imaginary of the “bad” state, or the government turned against 
its people (Aretxaga 2003).
Similarly, teachers in the South Red Sea zone experienced being trans-
ferred to teach in remote locations in the Danakil desert not as part of a 
broader nation-building project but as a form of punishment. In doing so, 
teachers often cast blame on the punishing nature of their supervisors who, 
like Elias’s bad boss, often made decisions based on jealousy. Especially after 
the Wi’a incident, teachers increasingly commented that anyone who made 
trouble, complained, or spoke out might be sent to the desert as a punish-
ment. There was some evidence for this belief that being transferred to the 
desert was a punishment. Teacher Ezekiel, who was transferred to Tio in 
2000 at a time when many of his peers were being transferred to Asmara, 
was chair of his department and a highly regarded teacher. Ministry of 
Education officials argued that they needed strong, well-trained teachers in 
villages such as Tio, where a new Junior Secondary School had recently been 
opened, but Ezekiel insisted that his transfer was a punishment for being 
too outspoken. He often complained openly about problems with the school 
and policies of the local Ministry of Education office. He believed that he 
was a direct threat to the then regional director of the Ministry of Education 
and that he was transferred accordingly. Another teacher also transferred to 
Tio claimed that his transfer was a punishment as well and cast blame on 
the punishing nature of his supervisors rather than on his own actions when 
discussing the situation with me:
Jennifer: Tell me about your transfer to Tio.
Gebreselasie: [My transfer to Tio] seemed like a punishment. If you 
look at the soldiers, there are so many ways to punish them, but 
there is no way to punish teachers. Because we are National Ser-
vice [and not earning salaries], they cannot take our salary. The 
only thing they can do is send us to Tio.
J: So what did you do to make them punish you?
G: I don’t think I did anything. As I told you, I was given some 
months’ rest, and I was in Asmara for about six months.
J: Did they send you [to Tio] for coming late to school?
G: They gave so many reasons for this.
I would like to highlight several points revealed by Gebreselasie’s comments. 
First, while Gebreselasie may have deserved to be disciplined for arriving 
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late—and, indeed, he was something of a bane to his supervisors—it is key 
to note that they had no means to discipline him because he was in National 
Service. National Service, which was the very mechanism set up to manage 
the population and transform the entire populace into a particular type 
of national subject, made it impossible to discipline and hold individual 
teachers accountable. Prior to summer 2001, at which time the vast major-
ity of teachers were recruited into National Service, supervisors and school 
directors punished teachers by docking their salary. However, when teachers 
no longer received a salary because of National Service, there was suddenly 
no way to hold them accountable. Several supervisors and school directors 
expressed great frustration to me that there was no way to discipline teachers 
and often noted that if they were soldiers, there would be ways to “punish 
them.” (This is an example of the inefficiency of coercion and the ensuing 
impotence of the state, which I elaborate on in the next section.)
Second, and even more importantly, it is significant that Gebreselasie, 
like other teachers, believed that his being sent to a remote area was a pun-
ishment, and, furthermore, asserted that he had done nothing to deserve 
this punishment. When I asked Gebreselasie if the government transferred 
him because he showed up several weeks late for the school year, he waived 
his hand dismissively and said with disgust, “They gave so many reasons 
for this”—or, in other words, it had no good reason for this. Gebreselasie 
did not believe that this punishment/transfer was merited by any particular 
action on his part. Instead, he believed that it was characteristic of the state’s 
desire to punish.
Perhaps most importantly, Gebreselasie’s comment that “there are so 
many ways to punish soldiers” recasts the soldier from national symbol 
to punished figure. It is telling that in discussions that evoked teacher 
transfers as punishments, comparisons between teachers and soldiers often 
came up. These comments typically built on the idea that soldiers could be 
punished. In making this comparison, Gebreselasie and others who made 
similar comments undermined the symbolic value of a pivotal and much 
celebrated national figure—the tegadalai/tegadalit, or fighter. As noted in 
the previous chapter, the quintessential Eritrean is the fighter in the struggle 
for liberation. The fighter embodies nationalist values of personal sacrifice 
and willingness to defend or develop the nation. In contrast to the heroic 
revolutionary fighter, the punished soldier is cast as a victim of demands for 
endless service. The word “soldier” in Tigrinya tends to refer to professional 
soldiers, a category that many Eritreans argue does not exist in Eritrea. The 
occupational group described by the English word “soldier” was referred to 
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by participants in my study using two different terms in Tigrinya: When 
describing former fighters, Eritreans used the word tegadelti, but in contrast, 
those in military service tended to refer to themselves simply as agelglot (ser-
vice), emphasizing their servitude (Bozzini 2013). When using the English 
word for soldiers, Eritreans described a group of people to be pitied because 
they were highly disciplined, were often punished, and had little control 
over their lives. Their bodies were totally at the mercy of the state. But even 
as teachers differentiated themselves from soldiers in their talks with me, 
they also believed that they were like soldiers. Like soldiers, teachers felt 
controlled by their supervisors and the state itself, but unlike soldiers, teach-
ers’ supervisors and directors did not control them as intensely as military 
authorities controlled soldiers. Teachers had much more freedom in their 
everyday lives.
Michael Herzfeld’s (1997) notion of social poetics is useful here as 
a means to explore the interplay of official symbols and narratives with 
everyday discourses that reinterpret and rewrite official symbols and nar-
ratives. As Herzfeld (1997: 25) notes, social poetics “links the little poet-
ics of everyday interaction with the grand dramas of official pomp and 
historiography in order to break down illusions of scale.” If we understand 
Gebreselasie’s commentary on soldiers as one such instance of these “little 
poetics of everyday interaction,” we can see how this commentary reworks 
the “grand drama” of Eritrean nationalism, a drama that casts the figure 
of the soldier as the quintessential sacrificing, serving Eritrean. Rather, the 
soldier is symbolically evoked as a victim of a punishing state. Thus the state 
not only is characterized as inherently punishing but also, in characterizing 
soldiers as victims of punishment, engages and alters the symbolism of the 
nation itself.
Eritreans playfully engaged the idiom of the fighter/soldier. Ironically, as 
the Eritrean government has developed increasingly coercive mechanisms to 
shuttle all Eritreans into service, Eritreans have come to identify with being 
fighters/soldiers, but in the process the fighter, an icon of willing service, has 
been transformed into the soldier, a specter of punishment. Just as “in Sawa” 
has come to have negative connotations, the soldier has come to be used as 
an index of how the state “controls” its citizens in various forms of service. 
Casting “service,” in its various forms, as a punishment delegitimizes the 
government’s ability to require service from its citizens. In the absence of a 
widespread sentiment that people should serve the country, the government 
has had to resort to increasing levels of force to pull people into service. In 
turn, the people themselves have begun to find more ways to evade and 
avoid being caught by the government.
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“Sleeping Late and Making a Wide Turn”:  
Evasive Maneuvers and Impotence
During the course of summer 2002, the house where we were staying was 
often turned into a safe haven of sorts. We would hear a knock on the door 
and a friend or relative—a man of military age—would duck in, usually 
smiling and joking, making a quick escape from the authorities. Located in 
central Asmara, we were well positioned for that summer’s events. At times, 
it felt like a rolling party in our house. At other times, parties we had planned 
fell flat because everyone stayed home to avoid gifa. It was not uncommon 
to see young men duck into shops when walking the main streets. More 
common was for young men to avoid the main streets altogether. Gifa had 
the capacity to change ordinary, daily life events and reorder time in highly 
unpredictable ways. Coercive state effects not only “etatized” time but also 
politicized the ordinary actions of everyday life, commanding citizens’ bod-
ies, time, and public spaces (Bayat 2010; Verdery 1996).
Coercion produces a vicious cycle. The regime was increasingly not 
imagined as the benevolent, caretaking state. It could no longer legitimately 
command Eritreans to do their national duty; it could only coerce them to 
do so. As Eritrea’s leadership became more and more reliant on using force 
to command Eritreans to do their “duty” as citizens, civil servants, and stu-
dents and, specifically, to conscript them, the state became more illegitimate 
and impotent. When a regime must rely on force to govern, it strips itself of 
legitimacy, thereby further necessitating a reliance on force.
The concept of impotence, which I borrow from Achille Mbembe 
(2001), illuminates the effects of state coercion. Mbembe notes that authori-
tarian regimes produce a condition of impotence as they attempt to com-
mand subjects who are subtly but persistently resistant to their commands 
but never capable of overturning them. What I call coercion is in many 
respects similar to Mbembe’s notion of the commandement. As I have noted, 
according to Mbembe, when state subjects perceive that the state has the 
capacity to absolutely command (coerce) them—to tell them when, how, 
and where to walk, stand, dance, talk, work, fight, and so on, they will com-
ply, but only to the extent that they are forced. Mbembe notes that as the 
commandement is enacted, symbolic and disciplinary realms join to produce 
docility and obedience, but they never quite produce complete compliance 
among citizens, and thus the seeds of transgression may emerge in subtle 
ways as symbols are transformed, rituals subverted, and narratives quietly 
rewritten.8 Subjects simultaneously evade or resist the state commandement 
and ridicule those in power with all sorts of humorous and vulgar displays 
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that delegitimize their power. This process of evasion and ridicule leads to 
what he calls impotence. Impotence is not resistance to power but a condi-
tion of mutual disempowerment—an effect of coercion. Mbembe (2001: 
111) argues that the subtle inversion of the signs and symbols of officialdom, 
rather than undoing official power, “produces a situation of disempower-
ment . . . for both ruled and rulers”; it erodes official power but fails to pro-
duce effective resistance, resulting in what he calls “mutual zombification.” 
Ruler and ruled are caught in a sort of bizarre, grotesque dance that leaves 
them both sapped as impotence profanes the sacred symbols of nation and 
state and also lays the groundwork for the evasion of state commandements.
Gifa created unofficial categories of people—those who were safe from 
prolonged detention and punishment and those who remained vulnerable 
to imprisonment, conscription, and further punishment. These categories 
did not necessarily reflect who was actually avoiding service and who was 
not. People with high positions in the ministries, who tended to be released 
quickly as soon as they were identified, were inconvenienced by gifa but 
not endangered by it. Civil servants who were doing essential jobs, such 
as doctors and nurses, tended to be released within a few hours. Teachers, 
who were on leave for the summer, might languish in detention for several 
hours or even days before a supervisor got around to getting them released. 
And those who were self-employed or business owners, and therefore not 
under the control of the government, might have a very difficult time being 
released unless they happened to have a close contact among the country’s 
leadership. Thus, those more essential to the state were relatively safer in 
times of gifa, while those who were not essential were in relatively more 
danger of being ignored, forgotten, and released only after a great deal of 
effort, or perhaps not at all.
The unpredictability produced by this time of intense gifa led not only 
to anxieties about being detained but also to tremendous inefficiencies. 
When people were detained for hours or days, they could not work. Because 
the net of gifa was cast so widely, even officials, administrators, and super-
visors were detained. Initially when the 2002 gifa began, the only people 
qualified to secure the release of the detained were those who were very 
highly placed—in some cases, the minister or the minister’s deputy. This 
meant that during times of gifa, high officials were spending a great deal 
of time negotiating the release of their employees rather than attending to 
other tasks. Furthermore, gifa encouraged people to hide at home, leaving 
government offices and businesses understaffed. During gifa, young men’s 
friends, family members, and even supervisors advised them not to go out 
on the street, even if it meant not coming to work. During one particularly 
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challenging week in summer 2002, I had conversations with several teachers 
who had business to complete in the central Ministry of Education office 
and complained that they were unable to do their business because they 
were arrested every time they left their house. They were advised by Min-
istry of Education officials to stay home. Magnus Treiber (2009) also notes 
that one of his informants was told to leave work and go home, where he 
would be safe, because he did not have the correct paperwork. Employers 
and supervisors apparently thought it was easier to send people home to hide 
than to get people out of detention. Productivity slowed.
Through gifa, everyday life was politicized because everyone became 
potentially suspect of avoiding service. Ironically, this coercive politiciza-
tion of everyday life rendered the functioning of the government itself com-
pletely inefficient, as Eritreans responded to this politicization of everyday 
life with evasion, something Asef Bayat (2010) notes is common under con-
ditions of authoritarian rule. If the round-ups themselves were described 
as evidence of the mean-spirited nature of the government as a whole, the 
individuals carrying out the round-ups were described as ineffective tools in 
the hands of that mean-spirited government. Many Eritreans commented 
that the military police doing the round-ups were illiterate, did not recog-
nize all forms of identification, and were from remote (read: less developed) 
parts of the country.
The Eritrean state had a strong need for a means to catch those evading 
National Service, but a limited technical capability to monitor the popula-
tion (Bozzini 2011). Until about 2004, civil servants typically did not have 
papers that denoted that they had completed National Service, which made 
it difficult to ascertain who was and was not evading it (Bozzini 2011). 
Because so many people were in National Service, the government lacked 
clear mechanisms to show who should be in a military unit and who should 
not. Furthermore, a wide array of documentation could be used to show 
that someone was not required to be in National Service. Student IDs and 
ID cards awarded by an individual’s employing ministry typically served 
this purpose. But rather than actually proving completion of military ser-
vice, these cards showed only that the individual was temporarily ineligible 
for service or had been ineligible at some point in the recent past. This 
plethora of forms of identification and documentation required that police 
or military personnel make determinations about their validity (Bozzini 
2011). Gifa created a massive net intended to catch all who were evading 
military service, but in the absence of a clear means of identifying evaders, 
the mechanism proved clumsy and coercive. Gifa was a blunt object in the 
hands of a government that wanted to exert tight control over its entire 
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population but lacked the technology to do so. As more and more people 
started trying to evade service, this lack of technological capability became 
clear, leading the government to turn to force and creating a manifestation 
of the vicious cycle of impotence.
What evolved during summer 2002 was a series of techniques of evasion 
and a general sense of good-humored solidarity around how to best avoid 
gifa. By evasion, I refer to tactics to avoid being punished by the state (or 
avoiding coercion perceived to be punishment). When passing each other 
on the street, strangers would warn each other about which way to walk 
to avoid the soldiers. Rumors would circulate as to which days gifa would 
happen, and people would avoid going to work that day. One friend of 
mine articulated a strategy to evade gifa that I think is emblematic of the 
condition of impotence that marked this time period. Because gifa typically 
occurred during the hours when people were commuting to work and sol-
diers tended to be located on the busiest street corners, his strategy was to 
“sleep late” (meaning leave for work late) and to “make a wide turn” (mean-
ing walk to work down side streets). His comment that he could avoid gifa 
by sleeping late and making a wide turn highlighted the absurdity of the 
situation and articulated the ethos of evasion that took hold that summer 
and came to demarcate Eritreans’ relationship with the state.
Jokes about gifa, such as my friend’s comment about sleeping late and 
making a wide turn, revealed that the overall climate in summer 2002 was 
not one of fear, although fear was present, but of solidarity in evading the 
authorities. A culture of evasion was produced that resulted in many people 
“sleeping late” or avoiding work altogether to evade being rounded up. If 
practices of gifa made things inefficient, then solidarities formed around 
evasiveness, and jokes made about evasion rendered the state completely 
illegitimate, ridiculous, and impotent.
Solidarities created around evasion extended to other areas during the 
years of my fieldwork as well. Teachers avoided returning to schools at the 
start of the school year, making schools start weeks and at times months late 
(something I take up in more detail in Chapter 4). In some regions where 
teachers traveled back and forth to Asmara regularly, I heard from supervi-
sors in the Ministry of Education that schools ran only three days a week 
because teachers were constantly traveling to Asmara, thereby evading work. 
Civil servants also dragged their feet and refused to go to posts at times.
Perhaps the clearest example of evasion is reflected in the extraordinarily 
large numbers of people who have fled the country. While the number of 
people fleeing Eritrea has always been high, a variety of reports suggest that 
there has been a surge in these numbers (Al Jazeera 2014; Gedab News 
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2014c; UN News Centre 2014).9 Eritreans continue to flee the country 
despite known, and increasing, dangers and risks of capture, kidnapping, or 
shipwreck in doing so. Recent accounts on opposition websites suggest that 
what we might think of as evasive tactics are becoming more widespread in 
other ways. These websites suggest that the army is operating at a fraction of 
its strength because so many have fled (Gedab News 2014b, 2014d). Awate 
notes that the army recently told returning recruits to stay home instead 
of returning to their units, and, taking advantage of a lapse in government 
control, many either fled or went into hiding to avoid being recalled to their 
units in the future (Gedab News 2014a). 
I think it is also significant that evasion and avoidance are far more 
common that outright resistance in Eritrea. With a couple of notable excep-
tions, there have been no instances of outright, open, coordinated protest.10 
Evasion, however, is highly political. It is a form of what James Scott (1985) 
would call a form of “foot dragging” and a “weapon of the weak.” Typically, 
this type of resistance has an impact, as Scott argues, but it is not as effec-
tive at bringing about political change as more coordinated resistance. As 
I showed above, evasive maneuvers, such as sleeping late and making wide 
turns, make the functioning of the state inefficient but lack a coherent mes-
sage or intention.
There are some interesting signs that more recently the tendency toward 
evasion has been galvanized and transformed into a more coordinated polit-
ical message. In 2011, opposition groups inside Eritrea organized “Free-
dom Fridays.” Freedom Fridays are a form of protest in which Eritreans are 
encouraged to stay home on Fridays rather than going out, to act by not 
acting—in short, to be evasive. As this book goes to press, accounts gleaned 
from opposition websites suggest that government tactics in the latter part 
of 2014 have oscillated between increased coercion and evidence of loss of 
government control. In light of this, there is even more evidence that what 
have been individual evasive tactics are being organized into coordinated 
resistance movements. Reports on Asmarino in October 2014 note that 
Freedom Friday urged Eritreans to refuse to report for National Service, 
calling on them to do, or rather not do, something that it appears many 
were already inclined not to do in the first place (Arbi Harnet 2014a, 2014b, 
2014c; Plaut 2014; Vincent 2014). Freedom Friday has “organized” people 
around refusal, or, in other words, organized people around a strategy they 
may have already been using to evade and avoid becoming a punished sub-
ject. If evasion has functioned as a spontaneous and logical response to 
state coercion, Freedom Fridays might be seen as an effort to coordinate 
and politicize this natural, everyday form of resistance. In short, Freedom 
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Fridays ascribe a political message to evasion and encourage Eritreans to 
oppose the regime by being evasive.
The government’s loss of control in part comes from the sheer difficulty 
of managing the large numbers of people evading government control. If 
accounts of the military (and the civil service) operating at a fraction of its 
strength are true, it is no wonder that the government can no longer engage 
the population coercively. I can think of nothing that makes Mbembe’s 
(2001) notion of impotence clearer—a government that cannot control its 
people because it has chased so many of them away by being too coercive, 
a government that has been so coercive and punishing that it no longer 
has the capacity to coerce and punish. The vicious cycle of coercion and 
evasion, which for so long has resulted in impotence—mutual disempow-
erment—may finally have run its course, ending the impotent stalemate 
between coercive state and subjects seeking to avoid punishment. Or, as 
many speculate, the government could return to even greater use of force to 
limit the capacity for escape from being a punished subject.
It is, perhaps, curious that, in a regime renowned for its long-term armed 
struggle for independence, evasion is the predominant form that resistance 
to the regime seems to be taking. I think there are a few reasons for this. 
First, it is very likely that many, if not most, Eritreans are afraid of outright 
resistance, something that is not surprising given what has happened to 
those who have attempted to resist the regime over the years. A number of 
writers have discussed the state’s construction of fear (Feldman 1991; Green 
1995; Skidmore 2004; Sluka 2000). However, an affective tone of fear is 
complex. The climate produced in Eritrea by the state’s coercive effect at the 
time of my fieldwork reflected fear mixed with a number of other powerful 
emotions, such as anger at being coerced and solidarities formed around 
evasion. Fear was tempered by frustration and disappointment in the way 
things had turned out. The affective tone with which gifa was described 
reflected a sense of righteous anger at being denied rights and a sense of 
being entitled to certain freedoms. Additionally, fear was often accompa-
nied by humor and shared strategies of evasion. People made jokes about 
the government’s strategies of rounding people up not working very well. 
People were fearful enough that they tended not to resist in any coordinated 
fashion, but they often refused to comply with government mandates, citing 
all kinds of excuses or simply sleeping late and making wide turns. Second, 
beliefs in the caretaking state still coexisted with coerciveness. It is hard 
to mount outright resistance to a state that has delivered so much histori-
cally—independence and its promises. There were lingering beliefs that the 
government was using force only because extreme measures were needed to 
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protect its citizens from an ongoing threat—the return to war. The palpable 
sense of siege cultivated by the government and the ways in which a sense of 
siege continued to render the state maddeningly ambiguous are addressed 
in the next section.
State of Emergency or State of Exception?  
Rumors, Rationale, and “the Last Gifa”
I arrived in Asmara from Assab to lecture at the university on November 
15, 2004. A tension that encompassed the country as a whole was palpable 
in the capital city. The government had announced that everyone who had 
served in the military and was not currently working as a civil servant, 
including students over eighteen, was to report to his or her former military 
units. This order evoked memories from just prior to the war in 1998, when 
all reserve units were called up in a similar manner. It elicited a sense of fear 
of renewed war and of being on alert. In Asmara, fighter jets buzzed over 
the city every night for several weeks.
Around the same time (about ten days before I arrived in Asmara), an 
incident occurred that has come to be known as the Adi Abeto incident. 
Earlier that November, the government began rounding people up in the 
capital in what some of my interlocutors referred to as “a massive gifa.” 
Rumors about Adi Abeto not only had spread through Asmara but had 
already reached Assab. In fact, we heard that one of our colleagues, a teacher 
in the Senior Secondary School, had been arrested in this round of wide-
sweeping gifa. When I arrived in Asmara, I was able to piece together what 
happened and recorded the following account from one of my interlocutors 
in my field notes:
My friend was there, and so I can tell you what happened. They [the 
people who were detained] were being held and got frustrated. They 
realized they could push down a wall, and they did. Two soldiers on 
the other side were crushed to death. Other soldiers started to fire. 
Prisoners, especially those without an ID, started stampeding to get 
out. Many died or were wounded either from the soldiers’ fire or 
from being stampeded.
The Adi Abeto incident, like gifa and the government’s coercion of civil-
ian populations more broadly, poignantly reveals the maddening state of 
Eritrea during these years. Clearly Adi Abeto was an extreme manifestation 
of state violence, but it occurred amid an attempt by the government to 
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galvanize its defense capabilities. Conversations about Adi Abeto reflected 
struggles with questions about whether the state was good or bad. Was the 
violence of Adi Abeto an unfortunate side effect of necessary processes of 
calling up reserves, reconscripting anyone who could fight, and placing the 
country on war footing? Was it a necessary measure to protect the country 
from the threat of renewed war? Was the threat of war legitimate? Or were 
efforts to place the country on war footing a charade to create an illusion of 
danger and thereby justify these extreme uses of force? Was the government 
mandating brutality because it was brutal? What is maddening about the 
coercive state is that citizens can never quite know whether the state is using 
force for protective, and therefore benevolent, ends or malevolent ends.
Another way to think through this maddening condition in which the 
benevolence/malevolence of the state is ambiguous is to understand the 
blurry distinction between the state of emergency and the state of exception 
(Agamben 2005). By evoking states of emergency, something states often do 
in wartime or other crises, states claim exceptional powers, particularly the 
use of force. Agamben’s (2005: 39) notion of the state of exception allows 
us to see how the state of emergency becomes normalized and operates as 
an ordinary technology of the state. Like the state of emergency, the state of 
exception derives from the perception or reality of being constantly under 
siege, or, in other words, from concerns about security. Indeed, Eritrea has 
been described as “a siege state,” a place where exceptional measures are taken 
to reorganize society around the need to defend against perceived external 
threats to the nation (International Crisis Group 2010; Müller 2012a; Tron-
voll and Mekonnen 2014). Siege gave a rationale to state coercion during the 
war, but after the war the sense of siege was more nebulous and no longer 
fully legitimated the use of force. In the years following the border war, this 
wartime state of emergency has been indefinitely extended. As the state of 
siege extends there are ever-expanding gray areas where written law becomes 
secondary to governing practice, including practices that are experienced 
as coercive. Because gifa and other forms of state coercion emerged from a 
wartime state of emergency, there was always a maddening ambiguity regard-
ing whether the state was trying to punish its people for disloyalty or trying, 
albeit sloppily, to bring order to and improve the country.
Wartime entangles experiences of being coerced by the state with 
beliefs in a caretaking state. In wartime, the state is supposed to take care 
of its people, and many citizens are willing to do their part to defend the 
nation. For this reason, under conditions of war, many citizens are willing 
to accept a state of emergency, which extends greater powers to state actors 
to address security concerns (Agamben 2005). In Eritrea, commentary on 
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other instances of state violence also shows Eritreans’ attempts to reconcile 
state violence with the perceptions of an ongoing state of emergency. The 
following story told to a group of us in the school cafeteria and recorded in 
my field notes captures the tension between experiences of coercion at that 
time and rationalization of why the government needed to use force:
Iyasu told us a troubling story. He was at the front fighting during 
the third offensive during the border war. When he returned to 
Assab after the fighting stopped, he was rounded up. He remem-
bered watching people who were resisting the soldiers. The soldiers 
were using a lot of force. He recounted that he saw people being 
handcuffed and tied around the neck. He saw people being beat-
en and yelled at. They tried to arrest him because the person he 
was with did not have an ID, but he convinced them to let him go 
because he had an ID. Iyasu in the end said, “This is a state of emer-
gency, so the government has to do these things.”
Despite these extremes of violence, Iyasu attempted to explain the gov-
ernment reactions by saying, “This is a state of emergency.” The question of 
whether Eritrea is in a state of emergency is key to making sense of the mad-
dening state in Eritrea—if the country faces a legitimate threat, then the 
government, according to some, may use exceptional powers, even against 
its own people, to keep the country safe. But if the threat is no longer 
legitimate, then the government’s use of coercion against its own people is 
malevolent and punishing, not benevolent and protective.
When the border war began in 1998, citizens were forced into the mili-
tary and thus began to feel even more coerced and punished, but, until 
fighting ended in 2000, they also believed that what the government did 
was in the interest of defending the nation. Although a state of emergency 
was never formally declared in Eritrea, various government actions indicated 
that something approaching a state of emergency was in place. In 1998, just 
prior to the outbreak of war, everyone who had been trained in the military 
was recalled to his or her unit. Thus the wartime state of emergency allowed 
the government to extend the time-limited contract of National Service (a 
contract that allocates eighteen months of citizens’ lives to the government) 
indefinitely. Under conditions of “war and mobilization,” the National Ser-
vice Proclamation states, “Anyone in active National Service is under the 
obligation of remaining beyond the prescribed period” (GoE 1995, Article 
21). This is not particularly unusual in times of war, but during the war in 
Eritrea, the government also conscripted a much larger proportion of the 
86 | CH A P T ER 2
population. Therefore, wartime not only extended military discipline across 
a longer span of time for those recalled to National Service; it also expanded 
the number of people who came under military discipline. Eritreans were all 
directly affected by the war. Although there was still a sense that the govern-
ment itself was dangerous, unpredictable, and could harm its citizens, there 
was also a sense that it was appropriate to mobilize citizens to defend the 
nation and that if the government needed to use force to do so, that force 
was justified. Not surprisingly, the desire for a state that could be thought of 
as benevolent, protective, and paternalistic coexisted with these fears. People 
understood that wartime produced a state of emergency, which might lead 
to extreme measures. Most who were headed off to the front lines during 
the war went willingly. The state was charged with defending the nation, 
and during the war there was an understanding that people needed to par-
ticipate in this defense, but even at that point, using civilians, not military 
personnel to do so, created a sense of fear in the state, leading to the “mad-
dening state” of tension between imaginaries of a paternalistic state and a 
coercive state (Aretxaga 2003).
After the war, the ongoing use of force was increasingly delegitimized 
through the discourse of punishment and solidarities formed around eva-
sion of state coercion. In closing this chapter, I return to the maddening 
state to argue that, despite increased state illegitimacy, uncertainties about 
whether the state continued to be a caretaking, protective entity lingered in 
the imaginations of Eritreans. If imagining the punishing state is a way of 
interpreting state coercion as evidence that the state is malevolent, seeking 
out a rationale for the state’s use of coercion is a lingering attempt to imag-
ine the benevolence in the caretaking, protective state.
Rumors that circulated in 2002 in an attempt to explain why the gov-
ernment was using gifa provide particular insight into attempts to make 
sense of being a coerced subject at this maddening time, during which 
the line between emergency and exception blurred. Many of these rumors 
attempted to ascribe a motivation to the government’s efforts to round 
people up. Some tried to ascribe a protective role to the government. Most 
were highly ambivalent. One rumor that was particularly common dur-
ing summer 2002 (one of the most intensive periods of gifa) was that the 
government was not really trying to catch draft dodgers but was using 
gifa as a pretense to round up hidden political dissidents. These rumors 
suggested that gifa was effectively a cover for catching a small, limited 
number of individuals and that mass round-ups were a pretense for mak-
ing isolated arrests. This rumor tried to distinguish between “bad” people 
who might actually be undermining the security of the country and other 
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“good” Eritreans. By evoking this rumor, Eritreans cast themselves as 
“good” and the government as attempting, albeit clumsily, to protect the 
country. Other rumors suggested that those detained during round-ups 
were suspected of producing counterfeit ID cards. Indeed, mass round-ups 
placed new importance on having a valid ID card and created a great deal 
of confusion about which ID cards were acceptable because they were not 
standardized. The fact that there were no standardized ID cards created a 
healthy market for counterfeit identification. Understandably, at this time, 
the government had great anxieties about the counterfeiting of ID cards, 
which would only make the population harder to manage and control, but 
like rumors that suggested that the government lacked the means to catch 
those who were opposing it, rumors about counterfeiting also revealed the 
weakness of the state.
In 2004, following the Adi Abeto incident, rumors took a different 
tone. Amid speculation about whether the nation was actually at risk of 
returning to war or the government was simply rattling the war drums to 
legitimize its use of force, many people suggested that, following the deaths 
at Adi Abeto, the government would cease using gifa as a technique because 
it would recognize the limits on its use of force. Adi Abeto was talked about 
as a sort of “last gifa,” and comments on it suggested that the government 
realized that things had gone too far. (Although, as David Bozzini [2011] 
notes in his work, gifa certainly did not end after the Adi Abeto incident, 
there was a sense that that was the last gifa for a while). Like rumors that 
sought to ascribe rationale to round-ups, rumors about “the last gifa” were 
also an attempt to find benevolence in the state. Commentary on “the last 
gifa” reflected the hope that state actors know when they have gone too far. 
These rumors suggested that the state knew its limits, alluding to the fact 
that while the government may have deemed some force necessary, it could 
be held accountable for the use of extreme force. All of this suggested an 
imaginary of state power in which the state was characterized as ultimately 
concerned for its people, if flawed and at times violent.
Rumors that suggest there is a reason for and a limit to state violence run 
counter to imaginaries of the punishing state. Ascribing a rationale to state 
violence reflects lingering desires for the paternalistic state—the state that 
would take care of its people—and recasts gifa, which was an experience of 
being a target of state coercion, as an experience of being accidentally caught 
up in the state’s attempt at protecting the population from various threats, 
such as counterfeiters, dissidents, and others. Imaginaries of being punished 
do the opposite—they delegitimize state violence and instead focus on expe-
riences of being a coerced subject.
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It is also important to note that the particular rumors about gifa, both 
in 2002 and 2004, demonstrated a popular awareness of state impotence. 
While these rumors ascribed a rationale and a limit to state violence, they 
also depicted the state as somewhat incompetent in these efforts. Rumors of 
counterfeiting reflected an imaginary of a state that could not keep the lid 
on illegal activity. Rumors of government attempts to catch someone elusive 
through gifa provided evidence of a government that had to resort to the 
sweeping, blunt instrument of mass round-ups to catch a small number of 
people. These rumors that tried to make sense of gifa thus revealed both a 
desire for a paternalistic state and a frustration with its ineptness. Rumors 
about counterfeiting, government dissidents, and “the last gifa” were simul-
taneously commentaries on the state’s preoccupation with control and an 
evaluation of its lack of capacity.
States can never control their populations solely through force. The 
demands that the Eritrean state placed on citizen bodies, particularly 
National Service, lost their legitimacy after the war, meaning that the gov-
ernment had to rely increasingly on coercion to conscript its citizens. But 
coercion produces a vicious cycle of force and evasion—increasing reliance 
on force renders that force less and less legitimate, leading increasing num-
bers of citizens to evade coercion, which in turn leads to increasing reliance 
on force. Additionally, as more and more citizens have to be forced into 
service, the state capacity to do so becomes weakened, making the state 
impotent both symbolically and in terms of its actual capacity to control 
its population.
State coercion is seldom legitimate, but it is always maddening. It results 
in subjects who commonly comment on being punished, forge imaginaries 
of the punishing state, evade, form solidarities around evasion tactics, and 
ridicule the state’s efforts at controlling them even as they fear the conse-
quences of coercion and violence. And yet citizens’ desires for a benevolent 
state produce an attempt to rationalize its use of force, to make state actors 
out to be rational. However, even these rationales reveal the state’s weak-
nesses and impotent condition. The state cannot control without force, yet 
force can never be legitimate and only leads to further evasion. The ultimate 
state effect of coercion, thus, is impotence. This interplay of impotence and 




Troubled State Technologies and the Imagined  
Future of Educated Eritrea
Cowboy Hats and New Curriculum
A couple of days after I arrived in Eritrea in August 2003, I ran into two friends who were elementary school teachers. With a grin they asked me, “Jenni, have you heard? They are going to give us horses 
and cowboy hats when we teach!” We shared a hearty laugh about that. 
They were referencing the workshop they were attending on what teachers 
dubbed the “new curriculum.” Teachers who were in Asmara to attend end-
of-summer teacher training sessions were under the impression that they 
were being trained to implement a curriculum based on Texas’s standards-
based curriculum,1 although no one knew exactly what that meant or what 
was Texan about the curriculum. No one was taking it seriously. I heard a 
version of this same joke repeated over the coming weeks and even months 
later.
But after that summer, no one mentioned Texas. Several months later, 
when I conducted interviews with Ministry of Education officials and spe-
cifically asked about Texas, they refused to acknowledge that it was more 
than a passing influence. And yet teachers were aware enough of it that 
they made jokes about cowboy hats. In fact, prior to my arrival in Eritrea, 
I had seen several e-mails calling for consultants who could adapt Eritrea’s 
curriculum to the Texas standards. I never did find out what happened to 
Texas, but once the school year started, it turned out to be irrelevant.
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Teachers were accustomed to new policies being introduced and then 
either sluggishly implemented or never fully implemented at all. Educational 
policies, it was often said, like laws in Eritrea more generally, were “written 
in pencil.” They were reflective of someone’s idea of what education should 
be but so disconnected from the material reality of overcrowded classrooms, 
teacher shortages, and lack of materials that they were impossible to imple-
ment. The jokes about cowboy hats, on one level, were a commentary on 
the lack of capacity to implement new policies and the misfits between these 
policies and the lack of resources in schools.
However, while certain components of the policies introduced in 2003 
were weakly implemented, other components were anything but. These 
policies were far more comprehensive than any previous policy reforms—
they applied to all subjects, all grade levels, and even the system of higher 
education as a whole. They were intended to radically change curriculum, 
course offerings, pedagogy, and promotion policies. They restructured sec-
ondary and tertiary education. Indeed, these policies did radically change 
the education system, but not in the ways denoted by policy documents. 
This chapter explores these 2003 policy reforms, the differences between 
policy reforms on paper and in practice, and how these radical policy 
changes revealed competing visions of the ideal Eritrean citizen. Teachers 
struggled to make sense of these new policies and reconcile them with long-
held beliefs about the meaning of education and its potential to bring about 
a bright future for the nation. What was revealed in this process was the 
complex micropolitics of making meaning out of education. As technolo-
gies of the state shifted away from teachers’ disciplinary focus on producing 
a small cohort of educated, elite individuals and toward the government’s 
biopolitical emphasis on producing a nationwide mass of student-soldiers, 
inconsistencies emerged. Teachers and students continued to assert their 
own beliefs about what education meant and to argue that changing edu-
cational priorities would result in profound consequences for the nation.
A Bright Future?
The education reforms had many facets, but the most radical was to seam-
lessly integrate the education system with military training and National 
Service by requiring all grade 12 students to attend school at a boarding 
facility in Sawa, the location of the military training center, where they 
would complete the first part of military training prior to their final year 
of high school. Students would enlist in National Service prior to grade 
12, by virtue of moving to Sawa and beginning military training. Prior to 
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the implementation of the 2003 policies, students were required only to go 
to Sawa for military training and enter National Service after they either 
turned eighteen or completed the highest year of education for which they 
qualified, whichever came last. Previously, students entered into secondary 
school, were promoted each year of secondary school, and then qualified for 
university by passing rigorous exams. Under the new policies, students took 
a selective exam to enter into secondary schools, but after that all students 
were mass promoted through each year and went to Sawa for their final year 
of high school. From there, they were given exams to qualify for higher edu-
cation; those who did not pass seamlessly entered the military, while those 
who did were assigned to National Service as teachers or civil servants when 
they completed their education.
It is well known that schools either directly or indirectly, officially or 
unofficially, by design or by default, prepare students for particular eco-
nomic, political, and social roles once they complete their schooling (Bour-
dieu and Passeron 1990; Foucault 1995; Levinson and Holland 1996).2 The 
2003 reforms changed the ways in which educated Eritreans were prepared 
for these roles in two ways. First, the reforms made military service a pre-
requisite for completing secondary school and moving on to higher edu-
cation. Second, military service effectively became a direct consequence 
for students’ failure to qualify for tertiary education. This altered both the 
imagined and actual life course of educated people and had implications for 
how the nation, national duty, and state were imagined.
There are inherent tensions between the “bright future” of being an 
educated person and the bleak future of being a military subject, which we 
can better understand by examining how educated persons are culturally 
produced, particularly in the developing world, where education is avail-
able to very few and educated people tend to see themselves as a some-
what exceptional, valued, and valuable elite. Educational development and 
expansion are integral to developmentalist aspirations at both the personal 
and national levels. In much of the postcolonial world, schooling—par-
ticularly secondary and tertiary schooling—is a scarce resource, accessible 
to very few and oriented toward producing not just a national subject but 
a national elite who comes to think of him- or herself as an educated per-
son destined to play a particular role in developing the nation (Levinson 
2001; Stambach 2000).3 In Eritrea, educated people were thought to not 
only possess particular skills but also be endowed with particular moral 
attributes that would enable them to lead society. The perceived superior-
ity of educated people in terms of skills, morality, and responsibility is a 
key part of how the educated national subject is constituted in much of 
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the developing world, and it is a traditionally prevalent view in Ethiopia 
and Eritrea.
Education produces a teleological imaginary of the nation—an imag-
ined past but also an imagined, aspirant future and, most importantly, 
a sense of the role of educated people in bringing this future into being 
(Kaplan 2006; Stambach 2000). The hopes for progress and prosperity in 
the future of the nation are cultivated through education and the processes 
of producing educated subjects. Students are, in theory, endowed with par-
ticular skills and knowledge to provide the human capital to bring this 
imagined future into being, but they are also taught to think of themselves 
as doing this for the nation (Benei 2008; Kaplan 2006; Levinson 2001).
In contrast, the military is the instrument of sovereignty, defense, and 
violence. If one of the key roles of educational institutions is to produce 
national subjects who can imagine a brighter future for the nation and help 
bring that future into being, one of the key roles of military institutions is to 
produce a sense of the might and power of the nation and national subjects 
willing to kill or die to defend the nation. The military is responsible for 
protecting and defending the territorial state, the people within it, and the 
values that the nation is imagined to stand for. Soldiers, the national sub-
jects produced through processes of militarized nationalism, are symbolic 
of the state, responsible for its defense, and victims of state violence (Bick-
ford 2011; Macleish 2013). As symbols, they represent the state’s protective, 
paternalistic capacity and its capacity for violence. They represent patrio-
tism at the height of its passions—the willingness to kill, hurt, and die for 
the highest ideals of the nation. But the lived experience of being a soldier 
is often at odds with what the soldier symbolizes. Being a soldier is often 
marked by the trauma associated with suffering or perpetrating violence, 
harsh living conditions, a lack of control over one’s daily existence, and the 
general invisibility of soldiers to society overall (Macleish 2013). Somewhat 
ironically, while soldiers as symbols are celebrated and venerated, soldiers 
as people are disposable (Macleish 2013)—bare life, in Giorgio Agamben’s 
(1998) terms. They are allowed to die to defend the nation. But soldiers are 
also sovereign in Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 2005) and Agamben’s (1998) sense 
that the sovereign is the one who “decides on the exception” or decides when 
to apply violence and to what extent.
The teleological orientation of education thus clashes with the sacrifi-
cial orientation of the soldier. In Eritrea, government employees, bureau-
crats, and officials themselves seemed aware of the fact that while both were 
essential for nation-state making, experiences of being militarized and being 
educated were radically different. Citizens in Eritrea and elsewhere imagine 
ST U DENTS OR SOLDIER S? | 93
education as bringing promise, while the military brings pain. Educated 
subjects think of themselves as having power to shape the nation, while 
militarized subjects must think of themselves as giving up power over their 
own survival in the name of the nation.
This student-soldier was a very different kind of national subject than 
the educated citizen imagined by teachers and students. These educated 
people thought that the attributes, character, and life trajectory of a student 
subject should be distinct from that of a soldier. This is not to say that teach-
ers and students believed that educated people should be free of responsibili-
ties to defend the country or fulfill their duty in National Service. Indeed, 
most teachers had either fought or trained to fight during the border war, 
and most would argue that it was their duty to defend the country in times 
of crisis. But in peacetime, the outlook of these educated people was that the 
student subject must be able to envision an imagined future distinct from 
that of the soldier.
As I discuss in more detail below, when I asked teachers what was wrong 
with the new educational policies, they repeatedly said that students no 
longer had a “bright future” and asserted that a “bright future” was neces-
sary to motivate them to work hard and do well in school. Exploring the 
way teachers imagined this bright future, and perceived that it was endan-
gered, helps explain how the relationship between the nation and the state 
was recalibrated at this particularly complex time for Eritrean schools. For 
Eritrean teachers, “bright future” referenced a particular way of imagining 
the future of the nation and of the individual students, and it depicted a 
particular relationship between national subjects and the nation. Teachers 
believed that for the future of the nation to be bright, the future of the stu-
dents had to be bright, and vice versa. In this particular moment, the future 
for educated people seemed bleak rather than bright.
The Rapid Transformation of Eritrean Education
The official rationale for new policies in Eritrea was to increase the over-
all level of education, with level defined as the number of students who 
had completed high school. Other elements of the reforms emphasized more 
pragmatic education with an emphasis on skill building. But ultimately, 
in its moment of transition, the new package of policies implemented in 
2003 created an entirely new pathway through which students were chan-
neled into the military while they were still students, replacing the imagined 
“bright future” of being educated with the bleakness of a military future. 
The main aims of the reforms are summarized in the draft document out-
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lining the “Rapid Transformation of the Eritrean Education System” (Min-
istry of Education 2002a):
Now the time is ripe for the Eritrean government to make all the 
necessary changes and reforms it needs to make so that the Eritrean 
educational system would measure up to the needs of the country 
to produce manpower necessary to propel it forward as a viable and 
vivacious nation of the twenty-first century. The reforms that should 
be introduced must achieve the following:
a)  All wastage of manpower, resources, effort and time in the 
educational system must be abolished in as much as it is 
humanly possible.
b)  All doors and opportunities must be open to Eritreans of all 
ages to develop to their full potential both professionally and 
personally.
c)  Education must be employment oriented such that at the end 
of any level of education any person can find gainful employ-
ment commensurate with the person’s level of education or 
training.
d)  The standards and quality of education and training in the 
educational system must be high enough such that products 
of the educational system would have a high degree of accept-
ability in the international arena of education and employ-
ment.
To meet these goals and make the Eritrean education system simultane-
ously efficient, pragmatic, internationally competitive, and high quality, a 
plan detailed the following changes. The overall emphasis of these changes 
was twofold—to make education more oriented toward job skills and to 
expand access to education. Education would become job oriented through 
the addition of certain subjects, such as IT and home economics, and by 
emphasizing learner-centered pedagogies. Over the course of the coming 
fifteen years, Eritrea planned to build more schools at all levels, develop 
regional vocational colleges, and implement new curricula in all grades and 
subjects (Ministry of Education 2002b). Additionally, at the tertiary level, 
there were plans to build six new colleges. Finally, the new policy changes 
also radically changed the structure of secondary education and promo-
tion policies. Grade 12 was added as the final year of Senior Secondary 
School, but, as I have noted before, it was offered only at a boarding facil-
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ity in Sawa. Elementary schools continued to teach grades 1–5, and Junior 
Secondary Schools continued to teach grades 6–8. All Senior Secondary 
Schools around the country offered grades 9–11. And all students went 
to Sawa for grade 12.
Before and after the reforms, education was, in theory, open to everyone 
up to grade 8, although Junior Secondary Schools were not available in all 
areas and some students chose to withdraw from school before grade 8, usu-
ally for financial or family reasons. In grade 8, students would take an exam 
to determine whether they qualified for Senior Secondary School. Promo-
tion levels between grades in Junior Secondary School and between Junior 
and Senior Secondary Schools remained largely unchanged. Admission to 
Senior Secondary Schools had always been extremely competitive, but there 
was also intense competition between grades. Many students flunked out 
between grades, and many others did not make it to university. In 2000, 
only 9 percent of Eritrea’s Senior Secondary School–aged youth attended 
school at that level, only 55 percent of students who entered Senior Second-
ary School had the opportunity to sit for the matriculation exam, and only 
10 to 15 percent of those had the chance to go on to some form of higher 
education (Ministry of Education 2002a).
New promotion policies sought to ensure that once students passed the 
grade 8 exam and entered into Senior Secondary School, they would com-
plete grade 12. They would begin military training in the summer before 
grade 12, complete grade 12 in Sawa, and take the matriculation exam. If 
they passed the matriculation exam, they would gain admittance into one 
of the new colleges and then complete National Service after their schooling 
in a professional capacity. If they did not score well on the matriculation 
exam, they would go into National Service immediately and would likely 
serve in the military.
Despite the fact that the military component of the new policies was the 
most strongly implemented, it is largely unarticulated in policy documents, 
where the merging of military training gets only a brief mention. The Min-
istry of Education policy document that outlines the change in educational 
policies mentions the integration of summer service and National Service 
with secondary education only briefly toward the end (Ministry of Educa-
tion 2002b):
According to the new recommended education system, the stu-
dents start to branch out into different fields of study starting from 
Senior Secondary School. This allows for students to take military 
training as electives. So, most or all of the six months’ training of 
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the National Service that Eritreans have to undertake can be incor-
porated into the Senior Secondary School education program. For 
example, students can take military training as elective courses dur-
ing the school year when they are in the eleventh and twelfth grades. 
This combined with field training during two summers at the end 
of their eleventh and twelfth grade school years should enable them 
to complete all the military training they are supposed to get in the 
National Service. Actually, the training they acquire this way should 
be much better because they would have more time for theoretical 
military training in the classroom and they have a longer time in 
general to seep in their training both physically and mentally. Some 
Senior Secondary Schools in the USA actually have such programs. 
Interestingly, while this clearly states the ideal of merging military training 
with secondary education, such as exists elsewhere, it suggests that this is 
an elective, an option, painting quite a different picture of how the military 
would be embedded in secondary education. In contrast, military training 
was a required component of education and was experienced as being forced 
on students.
There is a striking difference between the policy priorities stated in 
documents and the way these policies were actually implemented. As with 
previous policy changes, many remained changes on paper only, or changes 
weakly implemented. Meanwhile, other components of the policy were not 
just implemented but expanded.
New courses and the promotion of learner-centered pedagogies were 
never fully put into practice. The Ministry of Education introduced new 
curriculum in select grades, and a selection of teachers from all grades were 
trained in learner-centered pedagogies; however, the new textbooks were not 
available in any of the subjects in the Junior and Senior Secondary Schools by 
the time I completed fieldwork in 2005. Teachers generally disliked and dis-
trusted the oversimplified content of the new curriculum. Furthermore, they 
balked at what was communicated to them as a prohibition on lecturing. 
“They told us we are forbidden to lecture,” one teacher complained to me. 
Initially teachers blamed the adoption of a “foreign” curriculum for the poli-
cies’ ineffectiveness and commented that what worked in Texas would not 
necessarily work in Eritrea. Teachers were also concerned because it seemed 
that, in the absence of textbooks, there actually was no curriculum; instead, 
there was a set of vague guidelines that they were told were loosely based on 
the Texas standards. A train-the-trainer model was implemented whereby a 
few teachers were trained in the capital and then would give similar training 
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to the rest of the teachers in their schools; however, these training sessions 
tended to be poorly attended. While teachers were given a stipend to attend 
the train-the-trainer training in Asmara, the local training sessions carried 
no such stipend. The fact that teachers were paid very little if at all meant 
that there was much bitterness and jealousy about who got to attend train-
ing in Asmara. In fact, teachers spoke of training as a chance to earn much-
needed extra income rather than as a chance to gain professional skills. This 
meant that training sessions in Asmara were much coveted, while training 
sessions in local sites stirred up resentment. Additionally, teaching materials 
required for learner-centered pedagogy, such as lab equipment, manipulables, 
and even library books, were often nonexistent or in short supply, making 
many new subjects and new activities impossible to implement. Despite these 
limitations, many teachers experimented with learner-centered pedagogies. 
I witnessed some very creative attempts to do lab experiments and science 
demonstrations with large classes and few materials. I also observed history, 
geography, and English teachers engaging students in debates and discussion 
activities with some interesting results. But overall, there was no mechanism 
to enforce the implementation of these “new” methods, and teachers tended 
to teach in ways that were familiar, comfortable, and effective given the con-
straints of class size and resource scarcity.
The teaching of new subjects did not fare any better than the attempt 
to change pedagogy. The situation in the Senior Secondary School in Assab 
was typical for many such schools. Memos would come through mandat-
ing that schools offer new subjects, such as IT and home economics. The 
director would diligently change the weekly schedule to incorporate the new 
subjects, but then no teachers arrived to teach those subjects. Existing teach-
ers were then assigned to teach the subjects, but they lacked materials and 
training to do so. The teacher assigned to teach IT barely knew how to use 
a computer himself and had only one computer to wheel to class with him. 
One teacher, whom the students commonly regarded as a buffoon, taught 
the home economics class infrequently and irregularly. After an unqualified 
teacher had been attempting to teach a new subject for a few weeks, inevi-
tably another memo would arrive cancelling the subject. One semester, the 
director had to change the roster four times as he dutifully tried to comply 
with mandates for which he had no resources. Eventually the Ministry of 
Education agreed that schools did not have the resources and retroactively 
advised them to cancel the new subjects. By the end of each school year, 
only the traditional subjects were taught. As a result, students never took 
new subjects seriously. These classes were poorly attended, and students who 
did attend were even more poorly behaved.
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In contrast, several elements of the new policy were stringently imple-
mented. First, the government opened the Warsai Yikaalo School in Sawa 
immediately. The first class of high school–aged students in that school 
completed grade 11 in spring 2004. Almost immediately after the 2003–
2004 school year ended, the government arranged for buses to take students 
to Sawa to begin military training, and, despite a somewhat-delayed start to 
the school year, they began grade 12 the following fall.
Second, the tertiary education system was also overhauled, although 
popular perception of these changes differed significantly from the ratio-
nale for the redesign of the system. There was a common belief that the 
government was trying to destroy the University of Asmara. Many believed 
that this was out of anger toward the students who had protested in 2002. 
Beginning in 2003 and going until each class had graduated, the university 
did not enroll new first-year students. At the same time, in 2002, a new col-
lege in Mai Nefhi was opened, and in the years that followed, other colleges 
were opened around the country. Once all students had graduated from the 
University of Asmara, it was temporarily closed and then reopened to house 
one of these new colleges, but this college was one of a network of colleges 
and did not have the same symbolic significance as the national university 
had. Although the university was not immediately or officially closed, the 
failure to admit new students to the university was generally believed to 
be the beginning of the end of the university and all that it represented. 
At the time, there was little faith that these new colleges could equal the 
University of Asmara in quality or stature. Many Eritreans believed that 
this new higher-education structure was a government effort to destroy the 
national university. Subsequently, teachers and students believed that the 
role of Senior Secondary Schools was fundamentally altered. Senior Second-
ary Schools would no longer funnel students into the university, once the 
pinnacle of the education system, but instead into Sawa. As of 2015, seven 
colleges exist around the country, and students who pass the matriculation 
exam currently move from the Warsai Yikaalo School in Sawa into these 
various colleges, thereby integrating the military/National Service system 
with the education system (NOKUT 2013). Students moving into tertiary 
education have to do so via Sawa and military training. They then move 
from tertiary education into National Service.
Finally, the policy of “avoiding wastage” by changing promotion policies 
was implemented very seriously, although with complex results. The policies 
implemented in 2003 mandated that all Senior Secondary School students 
should be promoted from grade to grade, and all should be given the chance 
to sit for the matriculation exam. By the end of the 2003–2004 school year, 
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Senior Secondary School teachers understood that students should not fail. 
Almost all grade 11 students passed to grade 12; this was accomplished by 
simplifying the curriculum but also by changing the role of the teacher. 
Teachers who previously created competitive conditions designed to weed out 
large numbers of students were now responsible for enabling students to pass.
Subtle and not-so-subtle messages made it clear to teachers that they 
were to ensure that their students were promoted. The new policies man-
dated limited student failures; however, initially teachers and school admin-
istrators were confused as to how to pass students. Prior to 2003, students 
who “failed” for the year would repeat the grade the following year. Stu-
dents who failed a second time had to withdraw from school.4 Following 
the policy changes, teachers and students were initially told that students 
who failed would be required to take a summer make-up class (for which 
they would pay) and to pass a “re-sit” exam before being promoted to the 
next grade. However, during the two years of my fieldwork, the school did 
not offer a make-up class, few students took the re-sit exam, and all of those 
who did, passed to the next grade.
Despite the initial confusion, it quickly became clear that the govern-
ment was serious about enforcing the policy intended to promote students. 
To ensure that students would not fail, in spring 2004 the Ministry of Edu-
cation dropped the grade necessary to pass from 60 percent to 50 percent, 
and again in spring 2005 from 50 percent to 40 percent, meaning that 
almost all students passed. Because mass promotion coincided with send-
ing grade 11 students to Sawa, teachers, parents, and students interpreted 
dropping the promotion grade as a government technique to enlist as many 
students as possible in National Service.
Meanwhile, in grade 8, many students actually feared passing, because 
failure in the Junior Secondary School was a means to avoid being sent to 
Sawa. As I noted above, education was open to everyone through the Junior 
Secondary School level (grade 8). At the end of grade 8, students took a 
national examination to determine whether they would be promoted to 
Senior Secondary School. However, there was no uniformly implemented 
policy that determined how many times grades could be repeated in the 
Junior Secondary School. In the absence of a clear policy regarding promo-
tion at this level of education, increasingly large numbers of students, partic-
ularly students who knew they would not be promoted to Senior Secondary 
School, were failing and repeating grades year after year as a means to avoid 
entering into National Service. These students, according to teachers, were 
not interested in learning or being students but merely using schooling as a 
means to evade service.
100 | CH A P T ER 3
Taken together, these three policy changes—the change in promotion 
policies, the changes to tertiary education, and the addition of grade 12 in 
Sawa—altered the way schools prepared students for the future and trans-
formed the future for which students were being prepared. It was difficult 
for teachers to understand why the government would undermine what 
they saw as a functioning education system by simplifying the curriculum 
and promoting most students. The fact that everyone was sent to Sawa for 
military training made teachers even more skeptical of the government’s 
“real” motivations in changing promotion policies. Although some teachers 
understood and supported the logic of helping weaker students and avoiding 
wastage by making sure all students learned, most believed that this clashed 
with their educational values of rigor and competition and undermined 
their primary role of cultivating elite students for participation in university. 
The University of Asmara was effectively being closed and students were 
simultaneously being mass promoted via the grade 12 boarding school in 
Sawa into the military, which meant that teachers became even more skepti-
cal of the government’s motivations. They questioned whether the govern-
ment really cared about education. The fact that certain components of the 
reforms were weakly implemented (new textbooks for the new curriculum, 
an adequate number of teachers, substantial teacher training, and materials 
for the new subjects were not provided) while those most closely affiliated 
with militarization were strongly implemented further fueled mistrust in 
the government’s motivations. As I illustrate below, it was generally per-
ceived that what motivated the government to “avoid wastage” and institute 
policies of mass promotion was its desire to enlist all educated people more 
efficiently in National Service. Schooling had been reduced to a conduit for 
producing soldiers.
Students or Soldiers?
Eritrean teachers and students were quick to assume that the government’s 
implementation of new educational policies was merely about producing sol-
diers. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front/People’s Front for Democracy 
and Justice (EPLF/PFDJ) has a long history of subsuming education into the 
military. During the struggle for liberation, education as a strategy of nation 
building went hand in hand with fighting to defend the nation (Gottesman 
1998). The EPLF always prioritized education, and as soon as resources were 
available it ensured that recruits in the liberation forces were literate (Gottes-
man 1998; Müller 2005, 2007; Pool 2001). Additionally, it implemented lit-
eracy campaigns in liberated areas and set up schools (Gottesman 1998). In 
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Chapters 1 and 2, I showed how pivotal military identities were to a sense of 
being Eritrean, but these military identities meant something quite different 
for Eritrea’s leaders, most of whom were fighters in the struggle for liberation, 
and for ordinary Eritreans, especially educated Eritreans.
The revolutionary front’s ideal of merging “fighting and learning,” to 
borrow Les Gottesman’s (1998) term, never quite took hold in the post-inde-
pendence years. During this time, many Eritreans revered and celebrated 
the figure of the fighter as liberator of the country, but these same Eritreans 
were not necessarily keen to become that revered figure. As I discussed in the 
last chapter, once the government started forcing everyone into indefinite 
terms of National Service, the meaning of being a fighter changed. Fight-
ers no longer represented the national value of sacrifice but were instead 
seen as punished figures. While Eritreans might have venerated fighters in 
the postliberation years, they now experienced being a soldier as a punish-
ment. At the same time, the inevitability of almost everyone becoming a 
fighter/soldier threatened educated people, because this was the antithesis to 
a “bright future” for both the individual and for the nation. Being a fighter 
indicated a future of endless sacrifice as one waited, ever ready to defend a 
country that might be plunged into conflict at any moment.
For teachers, who had always tried to help students imagine a bright 
future for themselves and the nation, the policies signaled an attack on what 
they thought of as their nation-building work—to produce a motivated, 
educated person who would build the nation through example, by having 
a nice life, and by contributing to society by virtue of being educated. Edu-
cated people believed that the government regarded them as a threat. The 
president in particular developed a reputation for being “anti-education.” 
On several occasions, I heard teachers complain that the president never 
attended a graduation ceremony at the University of Asmara, yet he never 
failed to attend the graduation of each group of recruits at Sawa. Another 
subtle but reoccurring critique that I often heard throughout my fieldwork 
was that the country was being run not by educated people but by fighters 
who had gotten their education in the field. Teachers often questioned the 
legitimacy of educational administrators who had received their education 
in one of the many schools set up for fighters during The Struggle. This 
challenge to the legitimacy of fighters, whom teachers regarded as unedu-
cated, set up a contrast between two forms of education—that of soldiers 
and that of formally educated people.
As I noted earlier, the dominant, official version of Eritrean nationalism 
asserted that being Eritrean was defined through the values inherited from 
the struggle for liberation, values that were to be embodied by the lived 
102 | CH A P T ER 3
experiences of all Eritreans, particularly through National Service. Those 
who fought in The Struggle, and particularly those who were in leader-
ship positions, would argue that Eritrea’s indigenous education originated 
in The Struggle. The director general of General Education emphasized the 
importance of teaching these values to produce students willing to defend 
the country:
This [new policy] is modern. At the same time, it has some ele-
ments of the indigenous situation. In general, we are transforming 
the education system in terms of content, and at the same time this 
transformation takes place in the attitude of the child. . . . Let me 
give you an example [of] modernity: We have to introduce infor-
mation technology. This is one of the aspects of the modern. At 
the same time, we also have our own values that we should give to the 
society. These values are inherited from the armed struggle. We want 
to build on that so this will be one of the subjects incorporated into 
civics education. (Interview, Director General of General Education; 
emphasis added)
Teaching the values of The Struggle was seen as an essential component of 
producing an Eritrean student who was willing to defend his or her country 
and make sacrifices for it. In the following quotation from the director of 
Quality Management, an Eritrean’s love for his or her country is character-
ized primarily through a willingness to defend and sacrifice for the country:
We want to make students who love their country, who love work, 
who love their people, and who are willing to defend their coun-
try. . . . And the whole idea behind civics education is about doing 
this. We provide civics education, we provide [the] history of Eritrea, 
we provide [the] geography of Eritrea, we teach about the liberation 
struggle, and we bombard the child from all sides, and the whole 
idea is to produce a student who loves their country, who is ready to 
defend their country, who is willing to sacrifice. (Interview, Director 
of Quality Management Division, Ministry of Education)
The merging of love of country, love of work, willingness to defend the 
country, and values of The Struggle, as articulated by the director of the 
Quality Management Division in the Ministry of Education—himself a 
former fighter—mirrored the rationale for National Service itself. As Gaim 
Kibreab (2009b) notes in his discussion of National Service, the institution 
ST U DENTS OR SOLDIER S? | 103
was set up not only to defend the country but also to instill in youth a “love 
of work” and the values of National Service. In fact, Kibreab (2009b) quotes 
President Isaias Afewerki in the Eritrean Profile in 1994, when National 
Service was instituted, as using the phrase “love of work.” Furthermore, 
as Kibreab notes, the proclamation that set up National Service outlines 
its key goals, including (1) establish a defense force; (2) pass on the “cour-
age, resoluteness and heroic episodes of the last thirty years”; (3) “create a 
new generation characterized by love of work”; and (4) promote economic 
development and national unity (GoE 1995). The ideal Eritrean citizen, as 
defined by officials in the Ministry of Education, directly mirrored this lan-
guage in the National Service charter and also resonated with other official 
accounts of what it means to be Eritrean.
In contrast, for teachers, the ideal citizen revolved around notions of 
morality, knowledge, and respect. Teachers’ discussions of their role in mak-
ing students into citizens focused less on helping students develop a willing-
ness to sacrifice for and defend their country and more on having “a great 
responsibility to make citizens, to make them knowledgeable and respect-
ful of society” (Interview, Yakob). Being a good citizen was equated with 
morality. As another teacher reflected, “The teacher should try to mold the 
students as a good citizen of the nation. How do they become a good citi-
zen to the nation? We have to introduce some moral values into the minds 
of the students” (Interview, Estifanos). Teachers saw themselves as shaping 
students to make the nation a better place:
When I started teaching, I got very much interested. I found that 
it’s a very noble profession, and a desire in me started—I should pro-
duce better children for our nation. . . . You see, to build a nation, 
it’s in the hands of the teacher, so we can produce such children for 
the nation. Those [children] themselves are the nation. I think the 
teacher is the luckiest person, whose work is to shape a child. We 
know what is good and what is bad. We just concentrate on the good 
things, not only teaching what is there in the lesson. The teacher has 
in his hand the development of the child. He is like a potter. If he 
shapes it in his hands, he makes its shape. He decides if he wants it 
to be narrow or round. The teacher is very lucky to have this chance. 
If I teach two plus two is five, he learns five. If I say it is four, he 
believes four. It is in the hands of the teacher. (Interview, Arvind)
These were common sentiments among all teachers: The student was 
a moral blank slate, an unformed lump of clay who needed to be taught to 
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distinguish right from wrong. Rather than being prepared to sacrifice for 
the nation, children “[were] the nation.” Thus, for the nation to be good, the 
child had to be made good. The notion that the students were the nation 
reflected the ideal, common among educated people, that the future of 
the nation was reflected in the future of its educated people. This posed a 
direct contrast with notions of soldier-citizenship, in which the future was 
sacrificed for the nation. As another teacher noted:
When the teacher gives advice [to students], their behavior becomes 
good. If they give respect for school or learning, then they help 
the society. This is a young generation. When they have a family, 
they will become good parents for their students. The teacher tells 
them about their future. Otherwise, if the teacher doesn’t care about 
behavior, they become bad students. (Interview, Isaac)
The belief that there was a continuum between school and the society 
was apparent. If students developed well in school and learned right from 
wrong, they would be good parents and good members of society. Respect 
for school helped society. Learning to be a good student made them a good 
parent. Focusing on the future would make them good citizens. Teachers’ 
beliefs about the moral worth of schooling itself was evident in this and 
other quotations, as was the moral worth of the educated person to society 
as a whole.
Additionally, teachers’ vision of the ideal educated citizen was someone 
who was characterized by the motivation to do well in school and had the 
discipline to accomplish this goal. Ideas of respect for authority and society 
were embedded in this vision of the disciplined student. Respect was specifi-
cally exemplified by the idea that students should follow the rules, adhere 
to schedules, be neat, and observe particular spatial boundaries. Ideally, 
teachers in Eritrean schools expected students to follow schedules, arrive in 
school at the appointed time, sit in class in an orderly way, remain in the 
classroom throughout school hours, and generally comport themselves “as 
students should.” As one teacher told me, ideal students “follow the rules 
and regulations of the school. They should attend the flag ceremony and 
the class properly. They should go out only at the time of break time. They 
know all these things” (Interview, Vijay).
Teacher Iyob fleshed out this notion of the morality of the educated 
person and rooted it in Eritrean traditions. He spoke specifically about what 
motivated people toward education and the importance of rewards:
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The value of education in Eritrea goes back to the old generation. 
They [our parents] have that idea. The person who has studied and 
learned has a better life and also more money. That [idea] comes 
from the old generation and also from how the educated people are 
acting in the society. Even when I was a child, I didn’t like to go to 
school, and I remember how my mother was encouraging me by 
giving me some sweets or some chewing gum to encourage me to 
go to school. . . . They [our parents] used to also say as a proverb, 
“Those who didn’t learn cannot save you from anything.” This is an 
old proverb. . . . They can see the society and how educated people 
are leading the country and working in different departments. And 
they think, hopefully, their sons and daughters will accomplish that. 
Even to be a priest, a religious leader, they have to read, they have to 
write. So on the basis of this, they have this interest [in education]. 
(Interview, Iyob)
I would like to highlight two points about the value of education and 
the role of the educated person that emerge from Iyob’s words. First, he out-
lined the role that educated people should play in leading the country and 
society and bringing about change. The belief that only educated people 
could help society was commonly held among students and teachers; in 
fact, some version of this was repeated in almost every interview I did and 
in many of my informal conversations with students and teachers. Iyob’s 
reference to the proverb stating that “those who didn’t learn cannot save you 
from anything” reflected the sentiment that educated people were special.
Second, Iyob linked being educated with personal improvement—higher 
levels of education should bring with them “more money” and thus a “bet-
ter life.” As I noted earlier, educated people were supposed to have a bright 
future. But it is also interesting to note that Iyob suggested that his mother 
had to bribe him with sweets to do well in school. The emphasis here was on 
using something sweet to create positive associations with education. Sweets 
were given to students because the rewards of education were to be sweet, 
he suggested. The way Iyob’s mother talked about sweets was similar to the 
way teachers talked about giving students a bright future. Children were to 
be motivated by sweets, while high school students were to be motivated by 
the promise of a bright future. The message here was that education is hard, 
so there should be rewards for those who engage in this hard work.
Many teachers depicted having a bright future as essential to motivating 
students to do well in school and thereby become the ideal educated citizen. 
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The University of Asmara played a key role in framing how students imag-
ined their future. As the only university in Eritrea, it was what secondary 
students ideally strove for and the goal for which all teachers prepared their 
top students. It was the pinnacle of the competitive education system. The 
university also functioned symbolically to determine the aspirations and 
define the imagined future of educated persons.
Such universities as Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia and the Uni-
versity of Asmara are inherently elite, competitive institutions. Addis Ababa 
University in Ethiopia was at the top of the education system and the most 
prestigious university in Ethiopia. Prior to independence, the University of 
Asmara functioned as a satellite site of Addis Ababa University. The vast 
majority of all university-educated people, including the Eritrean second-
ary school teachers of the older generation in my study, were educated at 
Addis Ababa University. One gained admittance to the university through 
successfully competing one’s way through eleven or twelve years of educa-
tion. A quotation from Emperor Haile Selassie’s ([1961] 1965: 306) speech 
at the inauguration of Addis Ababa University in 1961 acknowledges the 
elite nature of the university: “The educational process cannot be a narrow 
column; it must be in the shape of a pyramid and broadly based.” While 
universities were for the elite at the top of the pyramid, they in theory relied 
on competition among those who wished to become the educated elite—a 
broad base for the top of the pyramid to rest on. In African countries, where 
the demand for university education far exceeded the capacity, this competi-
tion was especially exacerbated. Since Eritrea had been part of Ethiopia in 
the memory of most teachers at this time period, Addis Ababa University 
was seen as the pinnacle of educational accomplishments, highly competi-
tive but worthy in part because of this competition.
In the early days of independence in many African nations, universities 
were charged with not only developing nations by creating skilled man-
power but also cultivating the social, cultural, and spiritual development 
of the nation. With words that resonated with many teachers’ beliefs about 
educated people, Emperor Haile Selassie ([1961] 1965: 305) spoke to the 
highly nationalistic and profoundly symbolic role that the university played 
and the value of university educated people: “A university taken in all its 
aspects is essentially a spiritual enterprise which, along with the knowledge 
it imparts, leads students into wiser living and a greater sensitivity to life’s 
true values and rewards.” These words in many ways resonate with the 
comments made by teachers in the emphasis placed on moral “wise living,” 
knowledge, and rewards. The quality and existence of institutions of higher 
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education, the competitive nature of the university, the wisdom and moral-
ity of educated people, the rewards they would reap, and the future of the 
nation were tightly linked. The university thus symbolically embodied the 
potential of the nation to have a bright future and represented the pathway 
through which educated people would develop the nation.
Teachers’ vision of producing educated citizens hinged on challenging 
students, making them work hard, and encouraging competition. Teachers 
believed that the move to mass promotion indicated to students that they 
did not have to challenge themselves educationally and that if students were 
assured of passing, they would not see the value in working hard and striv-
ing for educational success. In the following quotation, Teacher Kessete 
explains how facing challenges in one’s education was essential for learning 
to face life and to develop the country:
Life itself is difficult. We are teaching students to cope with life. . . . 
We need to give them challenges. If we forget the difficult things 
in life, how are we thinking that students are going to develop the 
culture? If we make things simple, how are they going to solve their 
problems? For everything, we have to fight. Even for grades. There 
is now a very big difference between [the new policies] and the real 
life. (Interview, Kessete)
For teachers, it followed that this shift to mass promotion undermined the 
rigor of the education system and, by extension, the quality of the educated 
manpower that was needed to lead and develop the nation.
A very particular notion of self is apparent in these ideas about what it 
meant to be an educated person—the educated subject is seen as having a 
special role in the future of the nation. For this reason, the educated subject 
needed to be a cultivated self, cared for and nourished not only with good 
moral lessons and knowledge but also with the material rewards promised 
by the sweetness of a “bright future.” In contrast, the military subject, as I 
showed above, was supposed to be willing to sacrifice his or her time, aspi-
rations, freedom, and, if need be, life for the nation. The educated citizen 
was prepared for rewards. The military citizen was prepared for sacrifice.
Teachers saw that requiring students to go to Sawa was incompatible 
with cultivating the educated subject. It was the opposite of giving them a 
bright future. Teacher Fitwi linked the idea of making things easy on stu-
dents through the policy of “avoiding wastage” with the government’s inten-
tion of forcibly recruiting more students into Sawa for military training:
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This new policy says that there should be no wastage, so this makes 
the students not work hard. They are thinking that the government 
is going to take them to Sawa and, because the government wants 
to send them to Sawa, there is no chance for them to repeat grades. 
(Interview, Fitwi)
Fitwi suggested that students saw no point in working hard if they would 
be sent to Sawa regardless of how hard they worked. Repeating grades indi-
cated having a second chance to work for university admission. Without the 
chance to repeat grades, students could not move on with their education. 
Instead, with the policy of avoiding wastage, becoming a soldier became the 
inevitable outcome of being a student, regardless of how individual students 
performed in school. Teacher Fitwi continued:
The thing I always think is that the curriculum should make the 
students have a bright future. It should make them have a bright 
future. It should encourage them. How do you encourage them? 
This National Service, going to Sawa, in my opinion, should be 
voluntary. We should not push all people to go there. Those who 
have done service should have government advantage and privileges. 
By having those privileges, you can push other students to go there. 
Now students are discouraged to go there. So it should be voluntary. 
Then the students would have bright futures. So the students would 
try to compete in the classroom for opportunities. (Interview, Fitwi)
Fitwi argued that if Sawa were voluntary and based on rewarding the 
students who went, students would be more motivated. Students could not 
see a “bright future” if their education was leading them into the punishing 
conditions of Sawa rather than the reward of attending university.
Teacher Vijay also reflected the sentiment that Sawa should be voluntary 
and that its being mandatory was damaging the good students:
Now at this time, when they complete 11th grade, they are all going 
to Sawa. I don’t know, going to Sawa, they are afraid of it. When 
they go to Sawa, they are going to do some work. They are going 
to delay what they do in grade 11. Earlier it was not like that; when 
they completed their matriculation exam, some would go to Sawa 
and some to university, but now all the students will go to Sawa. 
Of course, the students were needed to do some work, but they 
should not be forced to do it like this. Even in India, the students 
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are doing some National Service. Those who are interested to join 
will join. But here, it is not like that. They are forcing the students to 
these things. All the students are forced to go to Sawa. Before there 
were some brilliant students who were curious and asking many 
questions, and now they don’t care; they will say, “We are going to 
Sawa.” (Interview, Vijay)
Other teachers noted that a large part of the problem was that National 
Service had become permanent. Embedded in these complaints about the 
length of time that the military took was a complaint about the nature of 
suffering in military training as well. One teacher explained to me why 
Sawa was incompatible with having a bright vision:
Tomas: Students aren’t motivated. In order to motivate them, they 
must have a vision. A bright vision, but they don’t see it. Without 
that vision, they are not ready to learn, so that’s why they don’t 
go to school on time, they don’t follow rules, they don’t care if 
you send them out or not. So they don’t care; they don’t expect 
a bright future. I’m afraid of it.
Jennifer: The future?
T: Yeah. The near future.
J: What makes you afraid?
T: Students do not have vision. Unless they learn and have the posi-
tive vision, who are we? They are not ready for education.
J: There is a whole generation who is lacking vision.
T: I’m sure of this.
J: What could be done to improve or correct the situation?
T: The policy of the government should be changed.
J: Which parts?
T: The military training. The way they are handling it.
J: The length of time or the training itself?
T: Well, no length of time is good. You go there. You suffer. You 
serve five or seven years. The youngsters see it that way. So I 
think this is the case. It’s the way they are handling the military 
training and the length of time they serve. I have my daughter 
there. She was nineteen, and now she is twenty-six, and she is 
still serving. So this is the problem, of course. (Interview, Tomas)
Again, here we see commentary on the belief that suffering inhibited the 
bright future of both students and the nation. Military training, indefinitely 
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imposed on students, prevented the nation and individuals from having a 
bright future.
None of this is to say that teachers did not think it was their (and their 
students’) duty to defend their nation, but rather that being a soldier was 
antithetical to being educated for the nation; thus, when the government 
forced students to become soldiers, their passion for National Service was 
dampened. Teacher Kessete complained to me that even his very clever 
students lacked motivation because “they just think they will be soldiers.” 
This was a common refrain among teachers. In a conversation that appeared 
in my field notes, he contrasted the enthusiasm that young people had for 
going to Sawa when National Service was instituted in 1995 with the cur-
rent situation. Whereas once they were excited to go to Sawa, he noted, 
“They think it [Sawa] is the worst place.” But then he added at the end of 
his comments, as if to put all of this into context and remind me that Eritre-
ans are patriotic, “We still love our country and would defend it.” Teacher 
Kessete’s and other teachers’ comments revealed that teachers and students 
were critical of the state that forced them to serve but not of the nation itself, 
which they were still willing to defend.
Teachers also suggested that National Service had undermined their 
ability to motivate students’ and society’s respect for education. This was 
manifested by parents’ lack of concern for their children’s education:
National Service has spoiled the teaching and learning process. 
Everyone here under forty is in National Service and cannot support 
himself and cannot have anything. So he has some [work] other than 
teaching. The way society thinks about teachers—they don’t give 
respect for teaching. They send their kids to school but do not follow 
up because they think about other things. They send their students, 
but when they come home, no one follows up. There should be [a] 
connection between parents and teachers. So when students come 
home, parents will follow up [on] their behavior. At this time, there 
is not much relationship between parents and teachers. So we don’t 
know what the society thinks about us. There should be a close 
relationship. If the society knew about the teaching and learning 
process, they would respect [it] and be responsible. National Service 
spoiled not only teaching but everything for everyone. Everyone in 
this country is trying to think of something else. We give respect 
for our country and are trying to protect our country from outside 
attackers, and we always try to develop our country socially, eco-
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nomically, politically, but to do all these things, you should have 
something comfortable. (Interview, Isaac)
This quotation outlined the belief that National Service took away the 
hope of “something comfortable” for the future, which not only had eroded 
the teaching and learning process but also had led parents, society, and 
students to devalue education and teachers. The words “National Service 
spoiled . . . everything for everyone” are a powerful statement about the 
relationship between stalled progress, dashed hopes for the future, changed 
parental expectations, and radically altered educational processes, even 
though Eritreans still had a strong desire to defend and develop the country.
One argument teachers and students often made was that students 
should first be given the chance to finish school before joining National 
Service. As one teacher described, “Grade 12 is very military, and children 
at this age should be with their family. They are told when to study, when 
to work, when to eat, when to play. They have some military exercises. 
They don’t like it” (Field notes, October 2004). Another teacher who was 
assigned to take the students to Sawa in summer 2004 recounted their fear 
upon getting off the bus. He told me that when the students arrived, mili-
tary personnel immediately drilled them, something the students had never 
experienced and were terrified of. This teacher shook his head sadly and 
reflected the same sentiment stated above—that they were too young to 
go off to Sawa alone: “They should be with their family. They should be 
students” (Field notes, July 2004).
Anxieties about students being sent across the country to Sawa where 
they would be removed from families and communities and at the mercy 
of military commanders directly referenced an imaginary of the punishing 
state. “Family” was thought of as safety and security for students. In Eritre-
an culture, as elsewhere, family is supposed to protect young people and 
keep them free from harm and, even more importantly, from corrupting, 
immoral influences, an idea that I expand on in the next chapters. Com-
ments that “students should be with their family” suggested that if they 
were removed from their families, students would be vulnerable because no 
one would be there to morally guide them and to protect them from poten-
tial abuses. Rumors of military trainees being abused by superior officers—
and, in particular, women in service being sexually abused—heightened this 
sense that students were vulnerable. Adults’ uncertainty about whether the 
government (and individual government actors) would behave in benevo-
lent or abusive ways was key here. The fact that they had little faith that 
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state actors in Sawa would take care of the students who were in their care 
reflected an imaginary of a state turned against its people rather than of a 
caretaking state that had legitimate rights to require service.
While educated people in Eritrea increasingly saw “student” and “sol-
dier” as two radically opposed ways of being Eritrean, the imaginary of 
the state as punishing further amplified the disjuncture between the two 
national imaginaries. Embedded in the distinction between student and sol-
dier was a very different notion of the national subject. In short, the military 
subject needed to be willing to subsume all parts of him- or herself to the 
nation, sacrificing any ability to choose or work toward his or her future. 
In contrast, the educated person was supposed to cultivate him- or herself 
with learning, good habits, and the promise of future rewards. The educated 
subject was produced through discipline—specifically, the competitive con-
ditions of the national exam, the hard work needed to do well on the exam, 
and the rewards given if he or she succeeded. The educated subject was an 
elite who not only expressed love for the nation by striving, studying, and 
working hard for it but also embodied the hopes for the future of the nation 
and its capacity to move in new, “bright” directions. The military subject, 
in contrast, needed to be willing to obliterate him- or herself for the nation. 
A military subject’s love for the nation was expressed through his or her 
willingness to sacrifice and die for it. Merging being a student with being 
a soldier, symbolically and literally, contradicted the role that the educated 
elite was envisioned as playing in developing the nation. This new and uni-
form military future in National Service directly contradicted the “vision” 
of a “bright future” that teachers believed students should have to perform 
well as students.
From Discipline to Biopolitics
Above, I suggested that when the promotion policies changed, there was 
a great deal of uncertainty as to whether schools were preparing students 
for a future as educated citizens or a future as soldier citizens. Previously, 
examinations were the sorting mechanism and also the orienting principle 
around which schooling was organized. Examinations determined which 
level of education each individual student would achieve. If a student failed 
a grade in Senior Secondary School twice or did not get a high-enough score 
on the matriculation exam, he or she would go into National Service; when 
finished, he or she would be eligible for a job, probably in one of the min-
istries. In Eritrea, secondary schooling was so competitive and there were 
so few secondary school students in the country that each grade completed 
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in secondary schools added a level of stature and qualified students for bet-
ter jobs and higher salaries. Although students feared examinations, which 
were very difficult to pass, teachers and students believed them to be fair. 
Teachers and students thought that the stringency of the examination put 
all students in the same field, emphasizing the commonality of the student 
experience even if that commonality ultimately landed students in different 
places.
As I outlined above, teachers believed that this rigorous and competitive 
system motivated students, but they also thought that students were moti-
vated by their future ability to get a good job by virtue of having completed 
some secondary education:
Earlier, before the war started, when a student completed second-
ary school, he thought he could become a worker in any office, and 
he knew his elder brother and sister would have the chance to be 
employed in the port or the refinery or the offices. So they knew 
they would have good futures, and they were encouraged to study 
in the school. And they were very much interested in studying and 
learning in the school. (Interview, Iyob)
Here Iyob, like many other teachers, linked students’ motivation to do well 
in school with their understanding that working hard would lead to educa-
tional accomplishment, a job, and a “good future” even for those who did 
not matriculate to university.
All of this changed with the implementation of the new promotion poli-
cies, which effectively changed schools from institutions oriented toward 
rigorously preparing individual students for a tremendously selective and 
challenging matriculation exam to institutions oriented toward preparing 
all students in the nation for promotion. This transformation entailed a shift 
from disciplining individual students to managing the entire student body.
Michel Foucault’s (1997, 2004) discussion of the transition from dis-
cipline to biopolitics as a technology of state power is particularly helpful 
to illuminate these shifts. Discipline focuses on the regulation of space, 
time, and the body to simultaneously train individual bodies to behave in 
appropriate ways and to normalize the rationale for doing so, such that dis-
ciplinary training comes to seem natural and inevitable. Biopolitics shares 
with discipline the capacity to produce norms but, in contrast, is concerned 
with the attributes of the population rather than the individual. Indeed, 
biopolitics is concerned with the population only as understood through a 
series of measures, statistics, and indicators and not at all with the individu-
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als who make up that population. In Eritrea, the new educational policy was 
concerned with the entire student population completing high school rather 
than the quality of rigorously trained individuals who would pass into uni-
versity. In this transition, teachers were told that they had to be concerned 
with promotion rates among the student population as a whole rather than 
with building the capacity of individuals who were capable of passing the 
matriculation exam.
Schools are extraordinarily adept as disciplinary institutions. They con-
sist of rules and procedures that regulate time, space, activities, and behav-
iors. Systems of punishment keep these regulations in place. Schools are 
“observatories” in which surveillance and strict regulation of time, space, 
and the body instill in students “correct” attitudes and dispositions (Fou-
cault 1995). In the process, schools not only train students to act appro-
priately but also define and normalize what appropriate student behavior 
is. The disciplinary nature of schooling thus is about not only disciplining 
individual bodies to comply with school rules but also making the rationale 
for discipline, an often taken-for-granted norm.
The changing meaning and use of examinations in Eritrea illuminate 
the shift from discipline to biopolitics and highlight why this change was so 
threatening to students and teachers. According to Foucault, in Discipline 
and Punish (1995), the examination is central to disciplinary power. Dis-
ciplinary power combines hierarchical observation and normalizing judg-
ment, merging the two through practices of examination. Examinations 
simultaneously produce a sense of collective experience (everyone takes the 
exam and views it as a pivotal event in schooling) and differentiate among 
that collective (the examination determines different life outcomes).
In Eritrea, the collective experience of taking exams and the collective 
anxiety about this experience were key components of what it meant to be 
a student. In addition to the National Exam and the Matriculation Exam, 
which were the culminating events that students spent their years of educa-
tion working toward, rigorous end-of-semester exams framed the student 
experience. Teachers shared the collective belief that this system of stringent 
selection examinations would ensure that the best and the brightest would 
move on to each level of education. Students became students through par-
ticipation in this experience. Competition itself was disciplining; although 
not all students would pass, the disciplining effects of preparing for and 
orienting oneself toward that exam compelled disciplined behavior. As a 
technology of the state, these national examinations thus produced a com-
mon, national experience of being a student, but they also distinguished 
between good, bad, and mediocre students. And since there was limited 
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money and space in higher levels of education, examinations determined 
whom the government would allocate these scarce resources toward.
In this highly selective and competitive system, the impetus was on 
students to be motivated and do the work needed to pass. Selective exami-
nations disciplined students to act like students—to study hard and follow 
rules. The role of the teacher was to set a challenging examination rather 
than an examination that would enable students to pass. In fact, in con-
versations with many teachers, I learned that they intentionally put a cer-
tain number of challenging questions on their exams, even if they had not 
explicitly taught the material or skills to answer them, to distinguish the 
exceptional students.
The new promotion policies (and the fact that the Ministry of Edu-
cation was very serious about making sure that these policies were being 
implemented), including the mandate that all students should pass, repre-
sented a decided shift toward biopolitical forms of management and away 
from disciplinary technologies as being the central role of examinations. 
Few documents were available from the Ministry of Education, but a quo-
tation from the World Bank, which was working with the Eritrean govern-
ment on these reforms, utilizes the language of biopolitics to explain what 
was increasingly seen as the “problem” with the Eritrean education system. 
This report describes what the World Bank, and, indeed, the Eritrean gov-
ernment, regarded as the “problem” of grade repetition, efficiency, and wast-
age prior to the implementation of the new policies:
Internal efficiency indicators are unacceptably low. The repetition 
rate stands at about 20 percent for elementary and middle levels 
and 27 percent for secondary school. Repetition is encouraged by 
highly stringent selection examinations and the limited spaces as the 
learner progresses up the education ladder. In an attempt to improve 
their chances of qualifying for a place in the upper grades, learners 
repeat grades sometimes several times. . . . In addition to increasing 
the cost of education, high repetition rates deny other children an 
opportunity for schooling. It is estimated that at a ratio of 42 learn-
ers to a classroom, about 16,870 repeaters occupy 401 middle school 
classrooms and 11,627 repeaters take up 277 high school classrooms. 
(World Bank 2003)5
Interestingly, the World Bank document accurately assesses the education 
system as tremendously competitive due to few slots at each progressively 
higher level of education. However, what teachers valued as competitive and 
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challenging for students is described in this document as an “unacceptably 
low” “efficiency indicator.” For teachers, the fact that few students were 
promoted and many had to repeat grades had previously indicated that 
the system was working well, because it channeled the appropriate number 
of students into higher education; the World Bank, though, labels this as 
“inefficient,” because too many students failed and repeaters were taking 
up classroom space. The shift in emphasis here was away from the quality 
of the educated individuals and their experience in school (for example, 
what they learned or became capable of as a result of their years in school). 
Additionally, what promotion, failure, and repetition meant to individual 
students was not taken into consideration. The focus instead was explicitly 
placed on indicators that reflected a concern for the system as a whole, such 
as the “percentage rate” of failure, promotion, and repetition, as well as an 
emphasis on the completion of each “level” of education.
The new promotion policies rewrote the goals of the education system 
and reinvented the norms on which the system was based. The “stringent 
selection examinations” that teachers valued as “competition” because they 
motivated and trained individuals, particularly the very talented, were now 
thought to hold down the overall percentage rate of students who com-
pleted each level of education. The meaning of “promotion” changed from a 
privilege for a few to something that was accessible to everyone. Meanwhile, 
promotion rates became a way to assess the country as a whole. Prior to the 
new policies, many students expected to fail. After the new policies were 
implemented, “failure” itself became not a norm for most students but an 
indication that schools were failing. Grade repetition was transformed from 
an opportunity that gave many a second chance to an indicator that the 
system was inefficient. The completion of each level of education suddenly 
became the normative expectation rather than a much-coveted reward for 
a select few.
New policies in Eritrea were concerned not with creating a carefully 
cultivated educated individual who possessed attributes of discipline but 
rather with creating an educated population of high school graduates. Like 
discipline, biopolitics aims to internalize power by naturalizing a particular 
set of behaviors; however, unlike discipline, which is concerned with pro-
ducing norms and normalized behavior at the individual level, biopolitical 
technologies are much more concerned with management through statis-
tical means and accountability measures designed to produce particular 
behaviors on a larger scale. For teachers, making this shift from partici-
pating in state technologies of discipline to being part of this biopolitical 
machinery was troubling.
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Teachers as Troubled Technologists of the State
According to the new policies, there were to be limited failures among stu-
dents; however, initially there was a great deal of confusion as to how this 
was to be accomplished. The transition between the disciplinary and bio-
political paradigms was not easy. This normative shift from discipline, with 
its focus on training individual bodies, to the biopolitical regulation of the 
population as a whole led to pressures on teachers to change the way they 
engaged with students. Teachers were told that they had to promote stu-
dents; furthermore, they were quite suddenly held accountable for student 
performance in a way that they had not been previously. The system blamed 
teachers when students failed despite the fact that one year earlier, teachers, 
Ministry of Education officials, parents, and students themselves expected 
that many students would fail. However, as teachers predicted, students 
who were no longer challenged by a selective examination were simply not 
motivated to work. To make it even more complicated, many of the students 
themselves were purposely trying to fail to avoid or delay going to Sawa even 
though the system was reoriented to make them pass more easily. 
Teachers were charged with the duty of following up with and helping 
“at-risk” students, a term first heard in Eritrean schools after the promo-
tion policies changed. Prior to 2003, failing students were the majority. 
These students were not considered “at risk,” because it was expected for 
large numbers of secondary school students to fail and there was nothing 
wrong with their doing so. Completing secondary school was not seen as a 
necessity for everyone, but a privilege for a few. The shift to labeling failing 
students “at risk” was confusing for teachers who saw these students as no 
more at risk than they had been prior to the implementation of these poli-
cies. The creation of the “at-risk” category was fundamentally a biopolitical 
technology that enabled failing students to be considered a problem (rather 
than an inevitability) and thereby enabled teachers to manage this problem. 
Previously, a teacher’s job was to work within the system of stringent exami-
nations to discipline students, enact rigorous training, and let the exam 
itself determine who would or would not pass. Under the new biopolitical 
dispensation, a teacher’s job, in theory, was to manage the entire mass of 
students and ensure their promotion.
Teachers were instructed that they should also utilize a variety of tech-
niques to enable students to pass. The school director made it clear that 
teachers were to contact students’ families if they were doing poorly and 
offer extra help to these students. While some teachers had always been 
in touch with families and most teachers had always been willing to offer 
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extra help, previously teachers had done these things out of a sense of kind-
ness, community, or intellectual camaraderie. The mandate that they do so 
had a distinctly biopolitical tone. It was the teachers’ duty to manage their 
students’ lives by staying in touch with the families of at-risk students and 
recommending that these students get extra help if the teachers determined 
they needed it. Supervisors also advised teachers to use a rigorous system of 
record keeping to monitor students’ progress.
Another strategy that teachers were instructed to use to help students 
pass was “continuous assessment,” which involved giving students more fre-
quent assignments and tests. Most teachers believed that this technique 
made it easier for students to pass. “The more tests, the more promotion,” 
many teachers often repeated. Trainers urged teachers to “continuously 
assess” students and emphasized theories of assessment for formative and 
pedagogical rather than summative and evaluative purposes. A series of 
assessment “frequencies” mandated precisely the number of homework and 
classwork assignments, tests, quizzes, and projects teachers were to assign 
each semester. Under the previous disciplinary system that revolved around 
examinations, students themselves were responsible for their performances 
on the exam. Under the new system, teachers had to monitor students and 
help them pass. Continuous assessment was a means to do so.
Despite all these techniques, many students were still doing all they 
could to fail. In many cases, students were showing up for class infrequently 
or not at all, or they were not doing their work when they did show up. 
Teachers were not willing to simply pass these students, despite the man-
date to do so, so they labeled large numbers of students “incomplete.” This 
category had always existed but was seldom used and was typically reserved 
for a student who had a good reason for not completing his or her work 
during the semester—for example, a severe health issue. The large numbers 
of students labeled “incomplete” were in a holding pattern, a liminal space 
of sorts between the disciplinary paradigm, under which they would have 
failed based on their lack of hard work and attendance, and the biopolitical 
paradigm, which sought to include them among the statistics of those who 
were promoted. Teachers knew they were supposed to pass these students 
but could find no grounds on which to do so.
The increased usage of the category of “incomplete” revealed the trou-
bled transition between the disciplinary and biopolitical systems. Teachers, 
caught uncomfortably between two paradigms of promotion, were troubled 
technologists of the state and from this position created a new category in 
which to fit students. The following excerpts from a description of a staff 
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meeting, which occurred in February 2004, a few months after the new 
policies had been implemented, illuminate the troubled nature of teachers as 
technologists of the new biopolitical machinery. The debate during this staff 
meeting addressed the issue of incomplete students and the role of teachers 
in managing student promotion more broadly.
Henok, a new teacher who had been teaching for less than a semes-
ter, asked earnestly what to do about incomplete students. The director 
answered that first Henok should try to “make the student understand his 
problem.” The director then said that homeroom teachers should have a 
record from all classes and asked whether Henok had such a record for his 
own homeroom class. Henok, growing frustrated, said he did. The director 
then asked whether Henok had given these students “moral advice,” a senti-
ment that echoed older views of education as inculcating moral virtues rath-
er than the biopolitical technique of mass managing the population. To this, 
Henok replied that he did not even know the students, because they had 
never come to his class. Effectively the director was suggesting that Henok 
utilize three different techniques to biopolitically manage the students so 
they would pass—informing the students of their progress, monitoring the 
students through record keeping, and advising the students about what they 
might do to avoid failure.
Ironically, Henok could utilize only one of these techniques—record 
keeping—because these students were not coming to class at all. They exist-
ed on paper only. Still, the blame for the failure of these techniques was 
placed on the teacher; the assumption of the director was that Henok was 
not using the tools at his disposal to appropriately monitor and promote his 
students. In the past, these students would have been categorized as school 
leavers and removed from the school’s roster. However, because of the new 
policies of mass promotion, students were no longer allowed to be dismissed 
from school.
As the discussion continued, other teachers became involved in the con-
versation. A more senior teacher, Kessete, supported Henok by noting that 
many students were not attending classes. Another teacher then added that 
it was “not a teacher’s work to do all of these things,” meaning that it was 
not the teachers’ responsibility to monitor students who refused to show up 
for classes.
The director then jumped back into the conversation and responded 
with frustration, saying that there was a common problem throughout the 
nation about the students’ futures, but the school was still charged with 
a particular responsibility. He said, “So what shall we do? Kick them out 
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of school? Or try to help them?” Interestingly, the director quite clearly 
articulated the problem and the mandate: He noted that the problem was 
a national one, implying that the problem was with National Service, but 
then he returned the conversation to the idea that teachers must try to help 
students.
Alem joined the discussion and argued that while teachers could better 
take measures to monitor students, they could not resolve this problem: “In 
my four sections, all of the teachers are doing this kind of counseling. The 
attending students didn’t fail. But some students had to sign a disciplinary 
warning for absences and still they are absent. If they are doing that to me, 
what are they doing to the new teacher?”
The conversation concluded with Mahendra asserting angrily, “They 
should fail.” This was the first and only acknowledgment in the conversa-
tion of the role of failure in maintaining a disciplined system.
There are a few points to highlight about this exchange and teacher 
responses to the new policies. First, no teacher suggested that teachers should 
not be monitoring students. Teachers accepted their biopolitical mandate to 
monitor students and facilitate promotion and adapted their techniques to 
the ethos of mass promotion. But while teachers seemed to have partially 
made the shift from their disciplinary roles to their biopolitical ones, most 
drew the line when it came to passing students who were simply not coming 
to class. They could not manage all of these students into passing, because 
the situation was out of their control.
The school never fully resolved the dilemma of what to do with incom-
plete students, who were doing all they could to fail while schools were man-
dated to pass them. Similar problems were occurring around the country. 
Eventually, a Ministry of Education mandate would make a much larger 
percentage of students pass by dropping the grade required to pass from 60 
percent to 50 percent. These students would not do well enough to move 
on to higher education after military training, so when they were inevita-
bly shuttled off to Sawa, they would find themselves endlessly trapped in 
National Service. Given that permanent National Service would be the end 
result of mass promotion for many students, we might view teachers’ refusal 
to pass incomplete students as a refusal to take part in a system that wanted 
to transform schools into a biopolitical mechanism oriented toward mili-
tarizing students en masse. Teachers were, at least in part, willing to make 
the paradigm shift to manage and facilitate student promotion, but they 
chafed at the mandate that they promote students who they knew would be 
relegated to a life of National Service.
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Conclusion
Teachers and students were mistrustful of the new policies from the begin-
ning. These policies, introduced under the auspices of modernizing and 
improving the education system, were unevenly implemented. While weak-
ly implemented policies were familiar to teachers and students, what made 
them mistrust these policies was the fact that the parts that were effectively 
implemented resulted in shuttling students into Sawa, dismantling the ter-
tiary education system, and radically altering promotion policies. It looked 
like education was being embedded in the institutions of the military and 
National Service. As teachers and educational officials commented on these 
new policies, what was revealed were two radically different ideals of the 
kind of national subject to be produced by schools—an official, govern-
ment-sponsored version of the soldier-subject revolved around sacrificing for 
and serving the nation, while an educated student-subject revolved around 
students’ becoming a carefully cultivated elite who would set a good, moral 
example for society.
Simultaneously, the new promotion policies radically changed the 
techniques and technologies that teachers used and were mandated to use. 
Teachers’ roles shifted from one oriented toward discipline to one oriented 
toward biopolitics, from a focus on disciplining and cultivating talented 
individuals to shepherding and managing a mass of students through a sys-
tem of mass promotion. Many teachers were willing to make this shift, in 
part. They slowly embraced the biopolitical shift in their work as educators, 
but they were not willing to become part of a state technology that simply 
shuttled students into the military.
4
Educating Eritrea
Disorder, Disruption, and Remaking the Nation
A Ritual for the Nation
It was October 2003 in the Senior Secondary School in Assab at 7:20 in the morning, ten minutes after the flag ceremony was scheduled to begin. A teacher stood on the podium next to the flagpole, lecturing the 
hundred or so students who stood in scraggly rows in front of him. He com-
plained that only 30 percent of the student body was regularly attending 
the flag ceremony. The students applauded in the middle of his speech, and 
a teacher standing beside me laughed and told me that meant they wanted 
him to stop talking. No one was in uniform.
Two teachers walked up and down the disorderly lines of students, say-
ing, “You, go there. You, make the line straight.” They pushed students 
into the correct positions. Students responded, good-naturedly but lazily, 
moving as directed but then jumping into a different line when the teacher 
was not looking. Another teacher walked in and out of classrooms, swish-
ing a switch he had pulled from a tree through the air as he chased students 
hiding in the rooms into the schoolyard. Their playful shrieks and giggles 
distracted the students standing in front of the flag. Most of the teachers 
waited in the staff room for the ceremony to end.
A boy ascended the podium and tied the flag to its pole. The lead teach-
er instructed the students, “OK. When I say ‘attention,’ you have to stand 
like this.” He demonstrated the proper attentive position, in an exaggerated 
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manner, pinning his legs together, standing straight with his hands at his 
side, pushing his chest out. “When I say ‘at ease,’ go like this.” He demon-
strated for them. Then he drilled them. “Attention! At ease! Attention!” The 
students in the front followed his instructions as he chastised them to “do 
it right.” The students in the back ignored him, slouching with their arms 
dangling at their sides, gazing down at the ground or up at the sky. The 
ones in the middle shuffled their feet back and forth in a vague imitation 
of the drill.
Giving up on having his instructions followed, the teacher continued, 
“OK, begin singing.” The flag rose, and the sound of the students singing 
was so soft it could not be heard over the rushing wind. The teacher cried 
out, “Be loud!” The students’ voices rose to a barely audible pitch.
Flag ceremonies, pledges of allegiance, or other rituals for the nation 
are present in schools around the world. They epitomize the process of 
inculcating the nation into students and, in doing so, creating a national 
citizenry (Rippberger and Staudt 2003). In Eritrea and elsewhere, students 
are inspected, lined up, drilled in military fashion, and required to sing the 
national anthem in unison. Theoretically, as individual student bodies are 
fused into a collective, national body and then marched off to class, a spe-
cific kind of educated national subject is produced (Foucault 1995; Luykx 
1999). In this process, the nation becomes “embodied,” or viscerally felt 
(Benei 2008). These ceremonies are also a routine part of everyday “banal” 
nationalism—nationalism that gets inside its subjects and normalizes itself 
there (Billig 1995). Flag ceremonies are indubitably one of the most salient 
means through which students come to know that they are national, but 
these rituals do not always make students feel national, at least not in the 
way the nation’s leaders want them to.
As described above, in the Senior Secondary School, deviance and eva-
siveness occurred with such frequency during the morning flag ceremony 
that the ceremony became a mockery of itself. Students hid in classrooms 
or arrived late. Those present slouched, shuffled through the drills, and 
dragged their feet. They refused to sing. They lackadaisically went through 
the motions, not rejecting or opposing the ceremony outright but resisting 
through passivity, performing the ceremony, but not as they should. In the 
process, the symbols of the nation—anthem, flag, military-like drills—
were hollowed of their meaning and no longer sacred. The authority figures 
ostensibly leading the ceremony—teachers—were either avoiding the cer-
emony or being laughed at by students.
More often than not throughout the time of my fieldwork, the flag 
ceremony in the Senior Secondary School was more a reflection of disorder 
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and mockery than of discipline. The broader politics and power dynamics 
at play in Eritrea produced this dance of resistance and discipline and effec-
tively reduced the quintessential ritual of the nation to a caricature of itself 
and a joke. National rituals provide a rich framework through which to 
understand how national subjects feel about the nation, and classroom-based 
rituals are a key means to produce affective ties to the nation and embodied 
sentiments of reverence and passion for it (Benei 2008). However, a particu-
lar kind of affective tie to the nation is produced through disorder; at the 
same time, disorderly performances of the nation are also a manifestation 
of the everyday politics of impotence.
Education embodies the hopes (and fears) for the future of the nation 
itself. As noted in the previous chapter, one teacher stated, “Children are 
the nation.” Thus, perceptions of whether children will grow up well reflect 
imaginaries of the nation’s future and the ability of the nation to develop 
as well. The way citizens think about the transformation of the educated 
young person into a productive adult is reflective of desires not just for 
young people to grow up well but also for the nation to grow up well. 
According to many—teachers, members of the government, and parents—
the failed aspirations for a “bright future” both reflected and produced a 
crisis, not only for schools but also for the nation. Mockery of the flag 
ceremony was emblematic of the conditions of disorder present in schools 
across Eritrea following the implementation of new educational policies. I 
knew from conversations with teachers who worked elsewhere and educa-
tional administrators that Assab was not the only town experiencing such 
disorderly conditions. While some flag ceremonies in Assab and through-
out the country were far more orderly than those that routinely occurred 
in Assab’s Senior Secondary School, many schools repeatedly experienced 
conditions of chronic disorder.
These conditions of disorder in schools were a result of the vicious cycle 
of coercion and evasion that emerged in the years following the implemen-
tation of the Warsai Yikaalo Development Campaign (WYDC). As noted 
in Chapters 1 and 3, for the ruling party in Eritrea, learning to be national 
was equated with learning to be military—or, more specifically, adopting 
the ethos of the fighter. National Service was designed to be a transforma-
tive experience. It was supposed to ritually change students into national 
subjects who would emulate the values of the fighter. Given this, we might 
expect that as policies embedded schools into the military, everyday life 
in schools would become more ordered and disciplinary like the military 
and that teachers’ roles would shift accordingly. Indeed, in other countries 
with a strong military ethos, schools have been militarized in this way. For 
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example, in Turkey, schools and the army are both seen as training grounds 
for national subjects (Altinay 2005; Kaplan 2006). But in Eritrea, schools 
became a site of resistance to militarization. The widespread use of coercion 
to impose the military project on citizens resulted in evasiveness rather than 
buy-in. This chapter shows how this evasiveness played out in schools. Dis-
order was a manifestation of evasiveness, a means for teachers and students 
to enact their discontent with mass militarization, and a rare opportunity 
for critique of the government.
Schools in Eritrea and elsewhere are the key site through which educated 
young people learn to be national, and discipline and order are key means 
through which students become properly educated, national subjects, but 
the political implications of disorder in schools and its role in the production 
of national subjectivity are seldom examined and little understood. If order 
produces a disciplined, docile subject, disorder produces and is produced 
by a subject who is critical but also stuck in a liminal state, and therefore 
impotent. Disorder in Eritrean schools was produced through the tacit com-
plicity of students and teachers as a political response to the implementation 
of life-changing policies, which they were powerless to protest. The first 
section of this chapter looks at schooling as a site of ritual transformation 
whereby children are turned into adult citizens within the context of mass 
militarization in Eritrea. I show that, in light of permanent National Ser-
vice, students specifically and Eritreans more generally failed to “grow up” 
and instead got stuck in a permanently liminal condition. The following 
sections explore the implications and consequences of limitless liminality 
for schools, for relationships between students and teachers, and, ultimately, 
for the formation of affective ties to the nation. Educated subjects in Eritrea 
were produced through disorder, which, in turn, produced a climate in 
which a critical stance toward party versions of nationalism could emerge. 
Disorder in schools was a reflection of not only the broader national climate 
of evasiveness but also official struggles to legitimize the national project 
and the ensuing condition of impotence for both citizens and the state.
“A Teacher Is Someone Who Doesn’t Grow Up”:  
Education, National Service, and Limitless Liminality
In the modern era, schooling is a key rite of passage, a key means to grow up 
by acquiring status and stature. Formal education moves students from the 
life stage of child to adult and, in doing so, transforms them from unedu-
cated to educated people.1 This transformation involves not only growing 
up in age and maturity but also acquiring a higher status as an educated 
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person and as a full, adult, national citizen. The years spent in school may 
be thought of as a liminal phase in a young person’s life through which the 
young person moves from the dependency of childhood to the responsibili-
ties of adulthood, which include duties to the nation. Liminality denotes a 
condition of being “betwixt and between” known social categories (Turner 
1969).2 So, too, students are liminally located between the dependency of 
childhood and the responsibilities of adulthood (Quantz 2011). The con-
cept of liminality denotes a phase of ritual in which subjects retreat from 
society and go into seclusion to learn the sacred teachings of that society 
and reemerge, transformed and prepared to take on a new role as an adult 
or higher-status subject (Gennep 1960; Turner 1969).
Schooling is not the only means through which young people make this 
transformation to responsible adult subjects/citizens. Many countries utilize 
the military and national service to turn young people into full citizens 
(Gorham 1992). In Eritrea, National Service and military training were 
arguably the government’s preferred method of ritually preparing its young 
for their roles as adult citizens in the nation. National Service, which was 
supposed to last for eighteen months, typically in a remote location, was 
arguably an intensive initiation into being Eritrean. While in National Ser-
vice, the nation’s young people had to submit absolutely to military author-
ity, were indoctrinated and given political education by fighters who fought 
for the country’s freedom, and were put through a series of rigorous physical 
exercises. The period of isolation from society, the submission to authority, 
the sacred teachings about the nation, and the physical rigors present in 
National Service were all reminiscent of initiation rites. By merging edu-
cation with National Service, the two forms of ritual were fused, and one 
became fully Eritrean by becoming simultaneously educated and “like the 
fighters.” If we see both education and National Service as liminal phases 
out of which a full-blown Eritrean adult emerged, fusing them suggests that 
the new policy reflected a move toward producing educated fighter-citizens 
rather than two distinct classes: educated citizens and fighter citizens. 
By merging education and National Service and situating National Ser-
vice at the end of students’ secondary education, the government made it 
clear that Eritrean young people would not be allowed to become edu-
cated without also going into National Service, effectively combining the 
two liminal stages to produce an educated and militarized Eritrean man or 
woman. This merger by itself was problematic, given that many Eritreans 
tended to see the two classifications as distinct, but it was even more so 
because the liminal phase never ended. Liminality is, by definition, an in-
between stage, and a transition from one phase to another. Clarity regard-
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ing what precedes and follows it is necessary to bound and give meaning 
to the nebulous “in-between-ness” of liminality. Increasingly, in Eritrea, it 
was unclear which stages Eritreans were between. When National Service 
became indefinite with the introduction of the WYDC, the in-between 
became the norm, but it did not ever seem to lead to another stage. When 
one entered National Service, one did not leave normal life to pass through 
a liminal phase and emerge as a military, national citizen. Instead, one left 
ordinary life and entered into an indefinite phase of limbo.
A key example of this endless “in-between-ness” is illustrated by the 
blurring of category distinctions among types of teachers. There were two 
roughly defined categories of teachers—service teachers and professional 
teachers.3 (The latter were generally referred to simply as “teachers,” but 
for clarity, I use the phrase “professional teachers.”) Service teachers were 
assigned to teach as the unpaid, volunteer portion of National Service. In 
contrast, professional teachers were teachers who did not enter the teaching 
profession by way of National Service but instead had been teaching for 
some time. During the first five years or so after the National Service pro-
gram was introduced in 1994, the lines between service teachers and profes-
sional teachers were quite distinct. But as time went on and more and more 
university graduates were assigned to the teaching profession upon comple-
tion of their service, these distinctions started to blur—service teachers 
eventually became professional teachers. When their voluntary service was 
over, they would begin to receive salary and, in many cases, would continue 
teaching in the same location. The border war and the WYDC blurred 
these status distinctions even more. Between 2000 and 2002, the majority 
of professional teachers were compelled to join National Service. Indeed, in 
2001, as noted in the Introduction, all teachers around the country who had 
not previously completed military training were conscripted into military 
training.4 Following their training, they continued their work as teachers 
but now worked for pocket money, like others in National Service. The 
WYDC then extended this eighteen-month National Service commitment 
indefinitely. Thus, almost all male teachers under forty-five could have been 
thought of as “service teachers,” yet the professional teachers never com-
pletely thought of themselves in this way.
Despite this blurring of categories, there were still distinctions between 
types of teachers. Professional teachers continued to disparage the lack 
of maturity and commitment among some of their junior, “service” col-
leagues. Service teachers and professional teachers also had a different sense 
of the extent to which they were being coerced to teach by the government. 
Being “in service” made teachers feel as though they were being compelled 
128 | CH A P T ER 4
to teach. Conversely, being released from service through demobilization 
would indicate to teachers that they had a modicum of free will, would 
begin receiving their salaries, and could choose their jobs. (In reality, demo-
bilization meant that they were finished with their National Service com-
mitment and would begin to receive their full salaries again, although they 
still had little choice about remaining in the teaching profession.) As of 
2003, no teachers in Assab had been demobilized. All of them were disap-
pointed, but professional and service teachers articulated these feelings dif-
ferently. The professional teachers spoke as if it were just a matter of time. 
Indeed, within a few months of the start of my fieldwork, the professional 
teachers had been demobilized (at that point, this group of teachers had 
been in National Service for approximately two-and-a-half to three years). 
In contrast, the service teachers were frustrated, hopeless, and seemingly 
completely confused about their status vis-à-vis National Service. They had 
no faith that they would ever be released.
Service teachers and professional teachers shared the sense that their 
lives were commandeered by National Service, leaving them in limbo. This 
created a sense that teachers would never “grow up.” While all teachers 
regarded teaching itself as a condition of being “stuck” and failing to “grow 
up,” service teachers felt particularly stuck. The following is Paolo’s story of 
how he came to be a teacher in Assab. It reflects this sense of being stuck. 
His story reveals his ambitions, his sense of lack of progress, and the role of 
both teaching and National Service in his failure to “grow up.”
Paulo was a geography teacher in Assab with whom I always enjoyed 
talking a great deal. Like many of the teachers, he was good-humored and 
keenly analytical about his own circumstances and how they reflected the 
circumstances in the country as a whole. He was a service teacher. Neither 
of Paolo’s parents had any formal education, and yet, like many, he placed 
great importance on education. His father was a small business owner, but 
his mother was illiterate. He had hoped to study business or accounting and 
become a business owner, but because he was working while in school, his 
exam results were not high enough to join the business program; instead, 
he was assigned to geography. As soon as he was assigned to geography, he 
knew he would be a teacher, because there was nothing else for a geography 
graduate to do. He told me that his first instinct was to leave the univer-
sity and start a business on his own, but he knew if he did not stay in the 
university, he would be required to go into National Service, so he stud-
ied geography. When he finished his studies, Paolo completed his military 
training and then was assigned by lottery to do his service teaching in Assab. 
Most of the other teachers were assigned in the central highlands where 
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they were from. “I was unlucky,” he said with regard to his assignment to 
Assab. At first he did not like Assab, and at the time of our interview he 
still had mixed feelings about the town. He said that he was “afraid of the 
climate” because of the heat and worried because he did not know anyone. 
For a service teacher, who earned almost nothing, having relatives nearby 
was essential to survive.
From the beginning, Paolo treated teaching like a lower-status, unde-
sirable career path that he took only because it represented an escape from 
the worse path of permanent conscription into the military. As a result, he 
noted that he had difficulty feeling like he was a teacher, especially because 
he was in National Service:
Paolo: When I came to this school, I thought to myself, “I am a 
teacher, and I should be acting like the other teachers,” and I was 
always trying to explain my knowledge to the students.
Jennifer: What does it mean to act like a teacher?
P: Outside the school, I don’t feel like a teacher. Starting from the 
beginning, my interest was not in geography or in teaching, but 
because I didn’t have good results, the university assigned me to 
be a teacher. So it is my duty to do everything that the teachers 
do, and I keep to my duty and try to think to myself, “Now I 
am a teacher and I should act like a teacher, and that is why I am 
trying to spread my knowledge.” I have a duty, but when I am 
outside, I am different. I came to Assab as National Service and 
am still National Service.
Paolo cast himself as not really being a teacher but merely “acting” like 
a teacher. He equated teaching with National Service, a liminal phase that 
he clearly hoped to pass through.
Paolo felt stuck in not only teaching/National Service but also the town 
of Assab. He noted that over time he came to like the town of Assab but 
would never stay there voluntarily because it was a dead end: “There is no 
opportunity [in Assab]. I like the society, but I don’t want to stay, because 
there is no opportunity. Not only for us [teachers] but for everyone in this 
city, there is no opportunity. It is a big military camp. I like the society; 
when you make relations, it is good, but there is no opportunity. Here we 
are young, so we have to grow up.” Again, he equated being stuck with 
militarization. Since the evacuation in 2000, Assab was full of soldiers on 
leave from the front and people in National Service. Paolo’s perception that 
the town was a “military camp” was a commentary on the everyday life of 
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the town being commandeered by National Service, which eroded civilian 
life and the capacity for business development.
He also illustrated the low status of teachers and the consequences of his 
own failure to grow up by talking about a failed relationship with a woman 
whom he was trying to pursue:
I was trying to make some relation with one lady, and I invited her 
to have a lunch, and the fourth or fifth time, she asked me about 
my job. So when she asks me about my job, I say I am a teacher, and 
she says, “Oh, Jesus.” She was surprised and upset [and said], “Oh, 
teacher, I hate teacher.” Because she knows about their economic 
background. So I became upset. So maybe what she says may be 
reflected and the society thinks in that way. They might think a 
teacher is someone who doesn’t grow up and doesn’t get opportunity, 
so how can you feel good? So it creates [a] certain pressure on me.
I asked Paolo what he meant when he said teachers never grow up, and he 
answered:
Here the society gives respect for someone with good position and 
money. Teachers don’t have power and money and status. So how 
can society give respect? So if you don’t have those, you become 
careless. Then students don’t do what their teachers say in class. So 
their parents’ [attitudes] become influential for their students. And 
the students don’t give respect for us, and this becomes really bad 
for the whole situation. Here the students are not motivated to learn, 
because no one has any opportunity. Everyone is involved in mili-
tary service. Most of them have jobs, and they care more about their 
jobs than school. So there is some crisis in the idea about school.
Paolo’s story, like the life narratives of many teachers, was marked by not 
only aspirations and hopes for a better future but also the belief that being 
educated should help him meet his goals but, given the current climate 
of mass military service, could not. Teachers and students believed that 
because they were educated, they should have the chance to grow up, or to 
acquire greater status and wealth, but instead, teachers believed that they 
were relegated to a permanently lower-class status. This feeling had mate-
rial effects on their ability to get promotions and to be able to save enough 
money to attract and marry a spouse, both actions that are markers of being 
“grown up” in Eritrea. But, as Paolo noted, national/military service was 
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central to the inability to grow up, and ongoing National Service led to 
“carelessness” among both teachers and students.
Paolo’s story was reflective of the dreams of many Eritreans. It was also 
reflective of broader trends throughout the developing world, where educa-
tion is seen as the means to change one’s status but quite often never enables 
educated people to achieve this hoped-for status bump (Bolten 2015; Mains 
2012). In Eritrea, teachers’ dashed hopes were exacerbated because their 
lives were commandeered by demands for endless service. Arguably the telos 
of hope for a better future both gives meaning to being an educated person 
and is produced through aspirations for education. Conversely, the failures 
of teachers to “grow up” served as a perpetual reminder of the inability of 
education to help people achieve their aspirations and, thus, unraveled this 
telos of hope.
Another teacher, Isaac, had a similar story to Paolo’s. Isaac, interestingly, 
was not a service teacher but instead had been an elementary school teacher 
who had been given the opportunity to get further training and, at the time 
of my research, was a Junior Secondary School teacher. He had achieved 
some professional mobility through teaching, but despite this, he believed 
that teaching was holding him back and keeping him in a low-status position:
Isaac: We Eritreans, we always think about how to get money. We 
work. But the problem is this work—teaching—doesn’t have 
any value. We can’t pay for our houses. To tell you the truth, if 
you are a teacher, you are not going to get a wife. In this coun-
try, [being] a teacher means having a totally lower status. The 
teacher has full-time work, but when you ask to get a wife, it is 
a difficult.
Jennifer: But you have a wife.
I: Yes. It took a lot of time to convince her to marry me. I had to 
tell her I will leave education to find another job. In general, a 
teacher is very poor in our country. The construction worker 
is better than the teacher, because they make more money. We 
work hard, but no one cares about us.
According to Isaac, the markers of growth—money, a house, and a 
wife—were not possible for teachers. Effectively, teachers were stuck in a 
liminal place—no longer students, but also not having the stature expected 
of educated people.
This failure to grow up is a common theme in the literature on youth in 
Africa (see, for example, Argenti 2007). The category of “youth” in Africa 
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more often than not refers to status rather than age. Indeed, official catego-
ries of youth often contain an age range that is wide. Although the category 
of “youth” in Eritrea was somewhat variable, it typically included people up 
to age thirty-five and often up to forty-five, the age at which one was no lon-
ger eligible for National Service. But many more attributes might determine 
whether someone could be categorized as youth. For example, if someone 
(male or female) was married and/or had children, he or she was likely no 
longer thought of as youth. Youth also reflected wealth, professional status, 
and birth order in families. Older siblings tended to be regarded as “grown 
up” more readily than younger siblings, but they also tended to be saddled 
with financial responsibilities for their families as well. Growing up in gen-
eral was thought to reflect the ability to hold down a lucrative job and to 
save enough money to get married; however, everyone hoped to grow up 
even further and perhaps own property, start a business, or acquire further 
wealth and stature.
In many parts of Africa, one can grow old (“grow up” in Eritrean termi-
nology) only by acquiring wealth and status (Argenti 2007; Bayart 2009). 
“Youth” itself is equated with powerlessness and lack of status, while “age” is 
linked with status and power (Bayart 2009). In many parts of the continent, 
youth growing up is linked with client-patron relationships and produces 
the permanent dependence of a large group of youth on a small number 
of wealthy and powerful “big men.” However, in Eritrea, state institutions 
allocate power to leaders who are empowered through the centralized sin-
gle-party system itself rather than to a more decentralized network of “big 
men.”5 As a result, in Eritrea, the failure to grow old/up was less about vul-
nerability as a result of permanent dependence on “big men” as it was else-
where in Africa; however, perhaps ironically, youth were vulnerable because 
of government policies that placed them in a sort of clientilistic relation-
ship with the party/government/state as a whole, rendering them effectively 
dependent on the state/party. The failure to grow up mainly manifested 
itself in dependence on the government, a condition that the government 
itself produced through conditions of National Service.
Isaac, Paolo, and others specifically noted the linkage between the failure 
of teachers to grow up and the ongoing condition of National Service. Later 
in my conversation with Isaac, he noted, “If someone works somewhere, he 
should have money. But we worked for four years in National Service with-
out payment. We became fed up.” Isaac complained that other civil servants 
doing National Service actually were better cared for than teachers. Although 
teaching was thought of as a low-status position to begin with, National Ser-
vice even more severely flattened any stature that teachers once had.
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Furthermore, there was a sense that being a teacher was somehow on 
par with being a soldier, but slightly better than being a soldier (a concept 
discussed in Chapter 2 and also illuminated in Paolo’s comments). Paolo 
complained that Assab was like a big military camp, where there was no 
opportunity and everyone was in a common position of dependence on 
the government. And yet, while being a soldier was, in many respects, the 
Eritrean condition and equated with being a teacher, it was also seen as 
worse than being a teacher and something to be strategically avoided, as 
Paolo did when he chose to study geography rather than go into business. 
Another teacher, Gebre, told me, “I never wanted to be a teacher, because 
it is not a good job, but when we were in military training, we hoped to 
be teachers. Now, sometimes I become angry because I am a teacher, and 
then I start to think about the soldiers and the hardship they face, and it is 
better to be a teacher. I say thanks to God.” Paolo, Gebre, Isaac, and others 
articulated a sentiment that both teachers and soldiers were stuck in a limit-
lessly liminal condition—they could not grow up—and yet being a teacher 
was preferable only because it involved less physical suffering and hardship.
Teachers were in a limitless liminal phase in several ways. Their pro-
fession itself inculcated in them the ideals of growing in status by virtue 
of one’s education, but the relatively low status of teaching left them with 
aspirations they could never achieve. Furthermore, many of them believed 
that the government was complicit in depriving them of the opportunity 
to grow up. Many teachers stated that they were not allowed to quit teach-
ing. Indeed, if they hoped to get another job, they would have to acquire a 
letter of release from the Ministry of Education, something that was hard 
to come by even if they had completed National Service. National Service, 
which blurred the categories of professional and service teacher, exacerbated 
this sense of being “stuck.” While in National Service, teachers could not 
leave teaching or seek another job. They were unsure of when they would be 
released from service and had no money or ability to get married or change 
their status.
This failure for teachers, who were supposed to be in positions of author-
ity, to “grow up” had a significant impact on relations between teachers 
and students. Those in the liminal phase are supposed to submit to the 
(often totalizing) ritualized authority of those in charge of their initiation—
authority figures responsible for sacred teachings. In this case, teachers 
should have been those authority figures, but because of National Service, 
teachers were stuck in a liminal phase and could not fully take on their 
proper positions or roles of authority. Instead, students often saw teachers as 
being more like their equals, their friends. Initiates in a liminal phase forge 
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an egalitarian and communal bond with each other, which Victor Turner 
(1969) calls “communitas.” While teachers should have been the authority 
figure, because both teachers and students were in an endless “in between” 
together, they formed communitarian bonds of a sort with each other, blur-
ring, but not erasing, notions of authority. This relationship had significant 
implications for creating order in the schools.
There was also the sense that because no one was growing up, the nation 
was not developing. This sense of being stuck played out at the macrolevel 
of the nation and the microlevel of schools. Previous nationwide “macrori-
tuals” through which educated persons were supposed to move up to new 
status positions changed beyond recognition or ceased to exist. Examples 
of these macrorituals were selective national examinations, including the 
matriculation exam, and university graduation. Instead of taking these 
selective exams and moving on to university, as of 2003, students were to be 
unceremoniously shipped off to Sawa and then kept in service indefinitely, 
not unlike teachers. Peter McLaren’s (1986) work on schools in the Unit-
ed States notes that macrorituals that demarcate status change align with 
everyday microrituals of schooling.6 In Eritrea, just as these macrorituals, 
which were supposed to transform the status position of educated people, 
broke down, the microrituals that punctuated the school day and year were 
also disintegrating. This was most clearly illustrated in the fact that schools 
had a very difficult time actually getting started at the beginning of the 
school year. The sections that follow look at this breakdown of authority as 
well as microrituals of schooling.
Liminality, Disorder, and Schools  
That Never Really Started
Monday, October 6, 2003, was my first day of fieldwork in the Senior 
Secondary School and was supposed to be the first official day of school, 
according to the school director and signs posted around the school. At 
7:15, I walked through the school compound in the blistering late summer 
morning sun toward the classrooms. Thinking I was late for a school day 
that began at 7:00, I rushed as much as I could in the heat with the wind 
pressing against me. Sweat dripped down my back. Crows cawed. I was 
struck by the emptiness around me. Where the shouts of students should 
have filled the air, I could hear only wind and crows. The wide playing field 
was an expanse of dust devils and blowing scraps of paper. I could even hear 
the sea, which lay some three or four hundred meters away, just out of sight 
on the other side of a concrete wall.
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Reaching the end of the playing field, I turned a corner, and on the 
other side of the main office building, where there should have been hun-
dreds of students, I saw the school director standing in front of a cluster of 
about twenty students. The director shook his head, said good morning, 
and mumbled, “No students. No teachers.”
“Maybe they’ll come in fifteen minutes?” I suggested weakly. I sat on 
a bench in front of the staff room, fanning myself with my notebook and 
watching as he oriented the students.
Teacher Fitwi was the first teacher to arrive. He joined me on the bench 
and raised his eyebrows in surprise when he saw so few students. “We have 
to start today,” Fitwi told me earnestly. “We have to give them something 
to do, so they will tell the others to come.”
Several other teachers arrived and pulled chairs out of the staff room 
into the breeze, gazing at the spectacle of the director and his two dozen 
students. One teacher started laughing as soon as he saw the students and 
joked, “Today we are going to teach students one on one!”
Around 7:45, the students trickled off to their classrooms, which were 
so full of dust that there was nowhere for them to sit. Swooshing noises 
ensued as students attempted to dust off their seats with scraps of paper 
that they had found on the classroom floors and clouds of brown dust bil-
lowed through the open windows. Teachers walked into the rooms with 
attendance lists but shortly after they took attendance, they returned to the 
staff room for a spontaneously called meeting. The students went home.
The first two weeks of school, I knew from my experience teaching 
at the school in previous years, were typically a sort of “warm-up” time, a 
liminal phase during which teachers and students adjusted to being teach-
ers and students and prepared themselves to reenter the school year with 
its rigid routines and rituals. This warm-up period served as a transition 
between the no-school summer and the school year. As a liminal phase, it 
both was and was not school and, as such, was “betwixt and between” and 
marked by “anti-structure” (Turner 1969). Anti-structure is not an absence 
of structure but the spontaneous and unpredictable oscillation between 
kinds of structure—formal and informal (Turner 1969). In these spaces, 
social rules and hierarchies break down, and alternate types of relation-
ships, marked by a more communal orientation, surface. In this space of 
anti-structure and disorder, new ways of thinking, imagining, and relating 
begin to emerge. Anti-structure also relates to categorical blurriness and is a 
key reason why those who cannot be clearly categorized (including those in 
a liminal phase) are often regarded as dangerous, taboo, or impure (Douglas 
[1966] 1984). 
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During this liminal period of “warm-up” school, students and teachers 
mingled and interacted in a relaxed manner and lackadaisically enacted 
routines. The few teachers and students who were present would go through 
the motions of the school routines, but schedules were not followed, little 
teaching or learning took place, and the school day was often abbreviated. 
Instead, teachers would casually drop into classrooms, write a few introduc-
tory notes on the board, and leave after a few minutes. Teachers spoke of 
“giving students something to do,” meaning they would give them some 
information, usually in the form of notes written on the blackboard, so that 
they would go tell other students that school was beginning. “Giving them 
something to do” was a means of transition from the “summer state” to the 
“school state”; however, “giving them something to do” did not constitute 
“school” and was therefore a liminal, in-between, transition phase. No one 
expected things to go according to schedule or plan because teachers and 
students were performing the everyday rituals of schooling in a somewhat 
erratic way.
When a critical mass of students and teachers had arrived at the school, 
as if someone had given an invisible signal, a series of ritualized practices 
began that signaled that the school year was about to truly begin. At this 
point, teachers began to talk about “controlling” the students.7 Controlling 
the students signaled a change in attitude and authority relations between 
teachers and students. The first practice that signaled control was making 
students clean the classrooms, in effect transforming the space of the class-
room from chaotic to orderly. Control also consisted of homeroom teachers 
taking attendance, creating a rotation of students to clean the room on a 
daily basis, and appointing class monitors whose duties included, among 
other things, managing student behavior when the teachers were not in 
the room.8 Once all of this had happened in the majority of classes, then 
all teachers would begin to follow the school’s schedule, a bell would ring 
in between periods to demarcate specific times for specific periods, and the 
director would enforce rules around lateness for both students and teachers. 
The director would also, at this point, expect students and teachers to stay 
in their classrooms throughout the entire class period. Students who had 
uniforms would be expected to wear them. Teachers would begin to give 
tests and assignments for marks. All of these cues, which occurred tacitly, 
indicated the true beginning of the school year.
What was surprising about the start of the school year during the years 
of my fieldwork was that after the first two weeks went by, the school seemed 
no closer to starting than it had been two weeks earlier. A ritual demarcating 
the actual start of school should have followed the liminal phase, but that 
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liminal warm-up phase seemed to take over. The transition from summer 
state to school state extended well beyond its typical length of a week or two. 
In fact, at several points throughout the year, it felt like schools would never 
really begin. Every semester when I conducted fieldwork between fall 2003 
and spring 2005, it was not until about a third to halfway through each 
semester that school really got up and running. Additionally, examples of 
uncontrolled activity, such as chronic truancy, excessive lateness, and ongo-
ing behavioral problems (issues that previously would have occurred at the 
beginning of the year or in isolated cases) continued throughout the entire 
semester. Just as teachers (and students) believed that they were increasingly 
stuck in a permanent state of “growing up” (never grown), schools seemed 
to be permanently poised to start but never quite did.
When I asked teachers and students why the school year was so late to 
start, teachers said they were not showing up to school because students 
were not showing up, and students said they were not showing up because 
teachers were not showing up. Teachers and students were tacitly complicit 
in producing this disorderly start to the school year, as their lateness influ-
enced each other.9 In fall 2003, I recall sitting around the bars and tea shops 
in Asmara, feeling anxious that I should be in Assab to start my fieldwork 
when, indeed, most of my interlocutors remained in Asmara, where most 
of them spent the summer visiting family. For weeks, Assab’s teachers rou-
tinely met in Asmara and exchanged thoughts on when they would return. 
Their decisions hinged on speculating as to when the students would arrive 
for school, gauging how many teachers had returned, and knowing that as 
long as a critical mass of teachers remained in Asmara, there would be no 
consequences for their lateness. Occasionally, we would run into teachers 
from other remote regions who were having similar conversations. Around 
the country, everyone seemed to be waiting for a cue to start school that 
was slow to come.
There were several practical reasons for this extended foot dragging. 
Teachers, almost all of whom were now in National Service, were dis-
gruntled; since they did not receive a salary, they knew they could not 
be penalized for late arrival, so they made it a point to return to Assab as 
late as possible. The Ministry of Education was also implicated in student 
lateness through some of its actions and lack of organization. For example, 
in 2004, the government-sponsored boarding school, a home for students 
whose families lived in the villages outside Assab, was not prepared with 
supplies and equipment, so approximately 50 percent of the Senior Second-
ary School students who lived in the boarding school could not come at the 
right time. Additionally, a shortage of seats on public buses to Assab meant 
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that teachers had to wait to find a seat on a bus, and fuel shortages meant 
that private or government vehicles that teachers might catch a ride on were 
delayed in leaving Asmara. But the main reason for the late start of school 
was a collective lack of will to show up.
It is significant that just as National Service, which had recently been 
indefinitely extended, was merged with schooling, both teachers and stu-
dents appeared to give up on maintaining the rituals that made schooling 
formal and formulaic. What was happening beginning in fall 2003 was an 
expansion of the liminal, until everyone existed in a permanent condition 
of “in-between-ness.” Liminality, in the traditional sense of the liminal as 
a ritual stage, is supposed to be a contained, powerful, and volatile state. 
Although Turner (1969) has noted that liminality may be an extended state, 
I think it is important to explore some of the idiosyncrasies of permanent 
liminality. The late start of school was the clearest manifestation of these 
idiosyncrasies. During the “warm-up” weeks of school, rigidly hierarchical 
relationships between teachers and students tended to be more relaxed. This 
liminal phase at the beginning of the school year, with its more relaxed 
sociability and relationships between students and teachers, was supposed 
to end and give way to more structured schooling and relationships wherein 
students and teachers acted predictably and adhered to their proper roles, 
but this did not happen. As I explore in the next section, lines of authority 
and hierarchies in the classroom blurred as teachers and students increas-
ingly started questioning the purposes of education. The rigidity of the 
categories of teacher and student became more flexible, contributing to a 
climate of disorder.
“Playing with Us”: A Tale of Two Teachers 
As the overarching “macrorituals” of schooling were changing (and being 
merged with the macroritual of becoming part of the military), the lines of 
authority between teachers and students began to blur, and schools became 
less ordered. A sense of community and intimacy arose between students 
and teachers, which can be explored using Turner’s (1969) concept of com-
munitas. In the classic sense, subjects in the liminal phase experience a 
sense of egalitarianism and communion with other initiates but continue to 
submit to authority figures. One way to make sense of the changing author-
ity relations between teachers and students is that the sense of communi-
tas, typically limited to feelings of solidarity with other students, began to 
expand to include teachers, who were increasingly seen as being similar to 
their students. Both teachers and students were, in many ways, the same vis-
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à-vis National Service—all received the same treatment in military train-
ing, all were required to perform the same National Service, and no special 
accommodations were made for those who had more education. Here I talk 
about how this flattening of relationships affected the classroom in different 
ways by looking at two service teachers, Aron and Yesob.
Aron, a biology teacher, was in his second year of teaching. He always 
looked very uncomfortable in front of the class and struggled to gain the 
respect of his students, as the following excerpt from my field notes illus-
trates:
Aron walked in, unnoticed by the students, and erased the black-
board by himself instead of asking a student to do it, as was cus-
tomary. Students were talkative, but when Aron told them to stop 
talking, they became quiet for a few minutes. The students did not 
stand to greet him as they would have for other teachers, and he did 
not ask them to. He began to quietly copy from a textbook onto the 
board. When the students became too loud, he interrupted his writ-
ing on the board to silence the students again. Students continued 
to chat in low voices quietly while they took out their books and 
began to copy what he had written. After a few minutes, many of 
them started to shuffle papers noisily and move around the room. 
A group of boys in the back of the room were laughing and talking 
loudly in Amharic. About nine students in the back few rows were 
not writing notes at all. The ones who were writing were talking to 
each other while they wrote. There seemed to be a shortage of pens 
in the back of the classroom, and the students were quarrelling over 
a few pens that they attempted to share between them, grabbing 
them from each other and laughing. Aron ignored this behavior.
After giving the students some time to copy these notes, he 
called their attention to the board and read over the notes he had 
written. In contrast to their rather disruptive behavior while Aron 
was writing up the notes on the board, the students were quiet while 
he was talking. One boy was sleeping on the desk, but not disturb-
ing anyone.
Aron left the room to clean his eraser and then returned. He 
erased the board and wrote up a second set of notes. As with the first 
time he wrote the notes and had the students copy [them], students 
were increasingly noisy while he was writing, but when he finished 
writing the notes and turned to face them, they were immediately 
quiet. Aron then read over the notes and checked to make sure that 
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students understood all the words. He then left the class ten minutes 
early. However, he noticed that students were beginning to leave the 
room and returned but did not attempt to teach again.10 He spent 
the remainder of the period pacing up and down the aisles, assum-
ing, or perhaps hoping, that the teacher’s presence would keep the 
students from leaving the room and disturbing other students. The 
students were increasingly noisy and disruptive and, except for stay-
ing in the room, did not seem to behave as if there was a teacher in 
the room at all. When the students got too noisy, he left with five 
minutes still remaining in the period.
In Eritrean schools, certain classroom rituals were supposed to delin-
eate hierarchies and single out the teacher as the authority figure in the 
classroom. I often stayed in classrooms for an entire morning and observed 
the radical and immediate shift when a teacher walked in (and conversely, 
when certain teachers walked in, the complete failure of students to make 
this transition).11 When there was no teacher in the room, students would 
walk around, talk, and yell in loud voices, often chasing each other around 
the room or throwing things. As soon as a teacher walked in, students were 
supposed to sit quietly and attentively, ready to begin. When the teacher 
turned to face them, they would stand together and chorus, “Good morn-
ing, Teacher.” Then one of them would take the eraser from the teacher and 
erase the board. Indeed, students often did stop their raucous behavior when 
a teacher walked in if it were a more senior teacher, and in previous years 
they had done so even for more junior teachers.
From the beginning, Aron failed to make use of these rituals. He did 
nothing to indicate that the students should change their behavior, yet they 
did begin to settle down on their own and start to perform like students, 
somewhat. In many ways, Aron assumed that students would know how to 
act, but he did not assert his authority. I knew from conversations with Aron 
that students did not see him as an authority figure. He complained that 
students were overly familiar with him and tried to talk to him outside class 
and befriend him, a line he did not want to cross. But while he did not like 
students treating him like a friend, he did not assert himself as an authority 
figure either. In response, the students were not completely out of control in 
Aron’s class, but they did not quite act as they should either. Aron’s classroom 
both was and was not proper “school.” Students and teacher went through 
the motions of schooling, but the balance of power was compromised.
I often asked students why they behaved properly for some teachers 
but not others, and they invariably described the teachers they showed no 
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respect for as “playing with us,” meaning that these teachers were not taking 
their education seriously, so the teachers, in turn, did not deserve to be taken 
seriously. After one of Aron’s classes, I asked his students why they did not 
behave properly for him and whether he was playing with them. A debate 
ensued, with some of them saying that he was playing with them and oth-
ers saying that he was a “very nice teacher,” the opposite of a “playful” one. 
Aron was in a liminal role—he was almost as young as his students, but he 
was in a position of authority. Students complied but did not treat him as 
an authority figure. A tacit agreement, a sense of communitas, existed in his 
classroom. As a result, his power was tenuous and contingent on whether 
the students would agree to let him teach them.
While Aron resented the communitas with his students foisted on him 
by their failure to respect his authority, another young teacher, Yesob, actu-
ally embraced the sense of communitas he had with his students. Yesob had 
a few more years’ experience than Aron but still very much looked like a 
service teacher. Like many of the service teachers, he showed up to teach 
in baggy blue jeans, a worn-out T-shirt, and flip-flops (professional teach-
ers tended to wear button-down shirts, “dressy” jeans or khaki pants, and 
lace-up dress shoes or good-quality leather sandals). I recall observing him 
teach one morning. He walked into a very talkative and rowdy class, smil-
ing, slouching, and shuffling a little. A few students in the front row cheered 
a little when they saw him. A handful of them stood up and nodded, and 
he told them to sit down. He grinned at them, walked to the middle of 
the blackboard, waved his arm dramatically, threw a piece of chalk at the 
back of the room, and yelled, “Hey!” grinning the whole time. Much to my 
surprise, the students were immediately quiet. He handed the eraser to a 
student to clean the board and immediately began teaching.
On another occasion, I recall Yesob sitting on the bench outside the 
staff room with two girls from his class. They had exercise books and he 
was ostensibly helping them, but they giggled and laughed as they leaned 
over him and he smiled up at them. They called him by his nickname, 
and they clearly were flirting with each other, something that was typically 
thought to be wildly inappropriate for teachers and students. While Aron 
was uncomfortable with students’ efforts to be familiar with him, Yesob 
seemed to actually like it. He cultivated these kinds of relationships with 
students and used them to solidify his authority in the classroom. Judging 
by the attentiveness of his students, Yesob’s approach seemed to be working. 
I asked some of Yesob’s students why they behaved in different ways when 
different teachers were in the classroom. They told me some teachers were 
“playing with” them. I specifically asked whether Yesob was playing with 
142 | CH A P T ER 4
them, remembering his teaching style, which seemed playful to me. “No,” 
they told me emphatically. “Teacher Yesob is very brilliant!”
While some classes, like Aron’s, arrived at a negotiated in-between and 
some, like Yesob’s, at a playful brilliance, still other classes fell apart entirely 
due to a lack of teacher authority. In the following section, I discuss one 
such example of a class that disintegrated into complete disorder and the 
implications of this. It is also important to recognize that while younger 
teachers had a harder time controlling their classes, even the more senior 
teachers were struggling with similar issues, albeit to a lesser degree.
Running for President: Performing  
Democracy and Disorder
The changing relationship between teachers and students had some interest-
ing side effects. As formal and hierarchical relationships between teachers 
and students began to flatten, disorder emerged. Students talked loudly and 
joked around with each other, both in and outside the class, at times even 
when a teacher was present. They frequently walked out of their classrooms 
if a teacher was not present or was late. They then heckled students in other 
classes through open windows. All of this created a climate we can better 
understand using Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1984) concept of the “carnivalesque.” 
This notion shows how conditions in which people are out of control are 
not just the absence of order but important political spaces that allow for an 
inversion of hierarchies. Bakhtin’s concept allows us to explore how power 
becomes inverted through disorderly conditions.
Even more significantly, amid this disorder, spaces to rethink and rework 
how to be national began to open up. The disorderly flag ceremony that I 
began this chapter with was one such example, but other examples could be 
found, most significantly, in classroom debates and other interactive activi-
ties. Communicative and learner-centered activities in the classroom, such 
as debates, discussions, and mock elections, were encouraged by the 2003 
policy reforms and, thus, became more common in classrooms at this point. 
These types of activities resulted in disorder and an unusually out-of-control 
climate in the classroom, during which it was more difficult for teachers to 
maintain authority, but communicative activities also created an opportuni-
ty for students to think through some of the core tenets of Eritrean national-
ism. For example, elsewhere I have written about how the animated climate 
of classroom debates enabled students to think through how to be a good 
Eritrean citizen by leaving the country (Riggan 2013a). These instances of 
the disorderly reworking of the nation were both intentional and uninten-
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tional, but regardless, they forged the beginnings of a new way of thinking 
about the nation and citizenship. Teachers and students together opened up 
spaces in the classroom to critique and debate dominant ways of thinking 
about Eritrea and being Eritrean. Here I focus specifically on an activity 
in an English class in which students were asked to pretend that they were 
running for president and give a speech that explained why the class should 
vote for them.
Simone, the grade 10 English teacher who introduced this particular 
activity, struggled with teaching. He was awkward in the classroom, spoke 
with a slight stutter, and was routinely ridiculed by his students. His dif-
ficulties came mainly from inexperience, but, like many of the younger 
“service” teachers, he also lacked motivation to improve his skills, and when 
I was not watching, I suspect he was merely trying to fill the time in the 
classroom. The students often complained that he was a joke, noting that 
he was “just playing” with them and not really teaching.
I spent several days shadowing Simone exclusively. Unlike many of 
the more senior teachers, who enjoyed explaining what they were trying 
to accomplish in the classroom when I spent the day with them, Simone 
was clearly uncomfortable having me around so much. During this time, 
he gave a grammar lesson and a test and engaged the students in what he 
called a “debate.” Both the topic of the debate, “if you were president,” and 
the design of the activity were vague. It was unclear to the students and to 
me whether the students were supposed to be pretending that they were 
running for president of their class or of the nation. When I asked him for 
clarification after the class, Simone told me that they were supposed to be 
running for president of the class, but I thought that all of his prompts were 
intended to get students to talk about what they would do for the nation, 
and the students themselves approached the activity this way. Although 
the students’ unruly behavior and Simone’s awkwardness prevented them 
from engaging deeply with the issues that surfaced during the course of the 
debate, this disorderly attempt to simulate democracy included a complex 
performance of nationalism. The class I describe below was the second of 
two sections in which I observed this activity. As with the first section, 
Simone’s inability to manage the class quickly became apparent. The stu-
dents were immediately playful and irreverent. What became clear in both 
sections, however, was that amid the carnivalesque environment created 
by students pretending to run for president, specific political commentary 
circulated.
It was close to mid-day when this class met. The school day was almost 
over, and the classroom extremely hot. Ceiling fans clattered noisily and 
144 | CH A P T ER 4
did little to cool off the room. The students were restless. Simone wrote the 
topic “Running for President” on the board and told the students that he 
would select five of them to debate.
“About what?” one student called out.
“About the topic,” Simone said. “About who will be the president of this 
year. If you don’t do it, I will choose myself.” No one volunteered, forcing 
Simone to choose one student to stand up. The student stood and then sat 
down again without saying anything.
Another student stood and started to say, “I . . . think. . . .”
Simone interrupted and prompted him, saying, “I would like to be a 
president.” The student mimicked the teacher in a falsetto voice and talked 
about creating peace within boundaries and economic success. One student 
clapped slowly and loudly when he finished.
Simone made another student stand, but he promptly sat down again, 
like the first student. One boy left the room abruptly without permission. 
Simone then called on a girl. The boys in the back of the room were talk-
ing loudly among themselves, and the one who left the room came back in.
The girl Simone called on began in a loud, bold voice: “I don’t want to 
be president of Eritrea. Because this president makes a good one.” She then 
looked nervous and covered her mouth with shaking hands and continued, 
“I support this president because . . . eh . . . eh.”
As soon as her words begin to falter, the other students immediately 
mimicked her, saying, “Eh . . . eh . . . eh . . . eh.” Embarrassed, she still man-
aged to continue. She talked about the WYDC, which engaged students 
in the process of building villages, and noted that these were good things. 
She then talked about the president’s wanting democracy and peace. She 
hesitated often in her speech but managed to get out, “The president wants 
this, this peace agreement.”
Other students mimicked her, saying, “This, this.” At this point, she sat 
down giggling and could not go on. It clearly took a great deal of courage 
for her to stand up and make this statement, and she worked very hard to 
present it with as much decorum as she could muster. But in the end, despite 
her show of confidence, her bold attempt to get past her nervousness, and 
her obvious sense of conviction, which was markedly lacking in the contri-
butions of other students, she was reduced to nervous giggles and compelled 
to sit down. Effectively, the raucous environment in the classroom silenced 
this student and her bold endorsement of the president.
After the heckling of the girl who supported the president, Simone 
walked around the classroom, looking stern and being ignored by the stu-
dents. Another student stood and then called Simone over to him. They 
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talked quietly for a few seconds, and then the student went to the front of 
the room. Simone gave him a cue to go on, saying, “I would like to be. . . .”
A boy in back mimicked Simone in a loud high-pitched voice, “I would 
like to be a president.”
A girl in front similarly mimicked, “I would like to be Eritrean govern-
ment.”
The student at the front, seemingly earnest, began, “Okay. Students,” he 
said in a loud, clear, booming voice. “My name is Abdu, and I would like 
to talk my life.” All students laughed raucously and mimicked him, and he 
sat down instantly.
Another student then stood up and talked quietly. This time, the stu-
dents did not mimic him. No one interrupted or heckled him, but it was 
quite possible that this was because no one could hear him. In contrast to 
the previous student, he spoke so quietly and the rest of the class was mak-
ing so much noise that it was impossible to hear what he was saying.
Another boy stood up and made his contribution. Although there was 
noise in the class and it was hard to hear him, he was able to finish. He said 
that a president should focus on peace and development; however, he made 
his own stance on the current president clear by differentiating himself with 
his concluding words: “I wouldn’t like to be president, but I would like to 
say to this president that he [should] build schools and clinics in this coun-
try and to use properly natural resources and to import or export things.” 
This student’s rather direct critique seemed to change the tone of the class. 
His words seemed to encourage some students to resist participating even 
more, but they also led a few others to abandon the façade of “running for 
president” and instead to simply critique the current president.
The remainder of the class oscillated between student reticence, loud 
talking, and mockery and outright critique of Eritrea’s president. Students 
continued participating when compelled to. Simone continued trying des-
perately to get them to contribute to the class. Some were sleeping on their 
desks. He was having a very difficult time getting anyone to say anything. 
One student directly refused to participate, saying, “The question is who will 
be the president of this year? I don’t think I will be the president of this year.”
Finally, after much effort on Simone’s part, one boy stood and read 
from a paper, “I don’t want to be president, but I would like to say to [the] 
president that the country needs more knowledge and there are no schools 
in many villages.”
Another student followed him, and, after much imploring from Simone, 
said, “When we see the days and years of [President] Isaias [Afewerki], it 
is thirteen years, but when we think of this, these are very important days. 
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These thirteen years, there are more different problems—lack of medicine 
and hospitals and foods. We see so many travel from our country to our 
boundaries because of lack of food and water. So, I say to the coming presi-
dent to see what is very bad and to make it better.” As with the previous few 
students, this student seemed to level a critique at President Isaias rather 
than advocate for himself as president.
Simone seemed to realize the turn that the class was taking and tried 
to get the activity back on track, saying, “Try to talk about yourself. About 
what you will do as a president. Talk about the economy.”
In response, a student answered, “Yes, we talk about the economy over 
the last years.” Some students laughed, but many ignored him. The bell 
rang, and the class ended rather abruptly. Students barely gave Simone and 
me a chance to leave the room before crowding out behind us, some of them 
jumping out of the open windows.
It is impossible to fully ascertain the motivations of the students through 
the course of this debate, and clearly many things were going on simultane-
ously. Students were critiquing the president and the economic and political 
conditions in the country. At the same time, their ridicule of the activity 
itself likely reflected their amusement at the fact that they were being asked 
to “run for president” in a country that was decidedly not a democracy. Many 
students were also simply taking advantage of a teacher with poor classroom-
management skills to have some fun at the end of the day. This was a mock-
ery of the class, the teacher, the activity, and the president himself.
Whether the heckling students intended to mock President Isaias or to 
make fun of their English class or teacher, what is significant and clear here 
is that what should have been sacred—the order of the class, a mock election 
for president, and especially a commentary on the president himself—was 
no longer sacred. What Teacher Simone accomplished here, albeit unwit-
tingly and by virtue of his novice performance as a teacher, was to create a 
classroom climate in which the person of the president and the performance 
of political debate could be transformed by students into a subject of mock-
ery and ridicule. Indeed, the disorderly climate of the classroom and the 
fact that the teacher had no authority enabled a mockery of the president, 
whether it was intentional or not. These disorderly conditions made it pos-
sible for students to undermine the teacher’s authority and the sanctity of 
the classroom as a space of orderly hierarchies. They inverted power and, in 
the process, challenged the president’s authority.
While it was a somewhat extreme example of disorder, Teacher Simone’s 
class was certainly not unique. As I noted above, a carnivalesque climate had 
taken hold across the school. In this particular “carnival,” typical norms 
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of classroom behavior altered to produce a chaotic environment, but these 
radically changing norms also emboldened students to say things that may 
not have been “safe” to say in other contexts. Bakhtin’s (1984) notion of the 
carnivalesque illuminates the social and political work enabled by disorder. 
Bakhtin (1984) and others have noted that the carnival locates its partici-
pants in a space where norms, rules, and authority are overturned (Mbembe 
2001; Woldemikael 2009). As I noted above, a celebratory atmosphere tend-
ed to accompany communicative activities. Students became very enthu-
siastic and engaged, and, as the activity progressed, behaviors tended to 
get more and more raucous until the teacher or moderator typically gave 
up any attempt at control. Debates created a space in which the norms for 
student behavior were more flexible, but they also created a space where 
broader power relations could be commented on. As the classroom atmo-
sphere became more out of control, students’ comments became bolder and 
more outrageous, as if the suspension of classroom-based rules and hierar-
chies enabled students to suspend other forms of social censure. Drawing on 
Bakhtin, Achille Mbembe (2001) shows that quite often under conditions 
of authoritarianism in Africa, ruler and ruled render each other impotent 
as the ruled engage in practices of vulgarity, ribaldry, and ridicule oriented 
toward mocking the ruler, but doing so in a manner that will be largely 
imperceptible. Similarly, the activity described above turned the president 
from a sacred figure into an object of laughter. In this process, official power 
is transformed into something ridiculous but not stripped of its power. At 
the same time, while stripping power-holders of their sacredness and legiti-
macy, those engaged in this mockery are not particularly empowering them-
selves. A condition of mutual impotence in which neither the power-holders 
nor the disempowered have legitimacy or moral authority ensues.
At the same time, serious opinions were conveyed in the midst of this 
carnivalesque climate. Whether or not students intended to do so, this activ-
ity revealed the reworking of Eritrean nationalism in several ways. First, the 
activity provided students with a forum in which they could critique or praise 
the direction the country was going in. Students were given a rare public 
chance to be engaged civic actors. But at the same time, students knew that 
the idea of running for president in a nondemocratic country was a game. 
The activity itself highlighted this. Students mocked the performance of 
being democratic because the possibility of real democracy was ridiculous 
in the context of a country where unquestioning obedience was clearly the 
operable expectation for how one should enact sacrificial citizenship.
Students also reworked the meaning of being Eritrean by critiquing the 
president himself. In many respects, nationalism was articulated through 
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their attitudes toward President Isaias. In many dictatorships, a cult of per-
sonality emerges such that the nation’s ruler symbolically represents the 
nation itself (Wedeen 1999). The leader not only leads the country but 
also embodies it. In Eritrea, as I have noted earlier, there does not exist the 
same extreme cult of personality that is found in many other dictatorships. 
One does not see pictures of Isaias Afewerki in every home or monuments 
depicting the president’s figure. As I noted in Chapter 1, the president has 
always depicted himself and been depicted as a sort of everyman, but being 
seen as one of the people does not preclude his being sacred. Even in the 
absence of a cult of personality that would exalt the image and the body of 
the president, the stance that one takes toward Isaias Afewerki defines one’s 
stance toward the country, and, more specifically, the ruling party. To this 
day, many Eritreans (particularly in the diaspora) continue to admire him 
and trust him to take care of the country. Others may be disillusioned with 
the president and ruling party but still have a “grudging admiration” for his 
skill at consolidating the state and maintaining a certain kind of stability 
(Reid 2009; see also Müller 2012a, 2012b). But still others are tremen-
dously angry with him and express a sense that he has betrayed the nation. 
Expressions of anger or even outright hatred toward the president were not 
unheard of during the course of my fieldwork. Even in the absence of a 
reverent worshipful stance toward the figure of the president, to most Eritre-
ans, Isaias Afewerki is the face of The Struggle, the party, and the nation. 
He is the essence of the tegadalai. Thus, to critique President Isaias is not 
only to critique the party and its version of nationalism but also to dislodge 
the centrality of The Struggle itself. To critique him under the auspices of 
a mock election is to critique his self-proclaimed right to rule the country 
without being duly elected and to critique a version of nationalism that 
asserts the legitimacy and necessity of his doing so. Interactive and com-
municative activities, such as the one described in this chapter, thus enabled 
students to question meanings of Eritrean nationalism by questioning the 
authority of the president, who stood in for the nation itself. However, dis-
order, which both enabled the critique and left the meaning of the critique 
ambivalent, was also a significant factor. The debate raised questions and 
challenged the tacit notion that being Eritrean could be equated with tacit 
support for the president, the party, and fighters.
“Civics Is a Very Nice Subject”
Another way in which national narratives were reworked was through teach-
er commentary on the teaching, or rather nonteaching, of civics. Like the 
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instances of the classroom debate above, conditions of disorder are integral 
to the critique of civics. If we see schooling as part of the process of ritually 
producing national citizens, then we might see the civics curriculum as the 
sacred teachings of the nation. As I noted in the last chapter, when I asked 
administrators in leadership posts in the Ministry of Education, who were 
often former fighters, how education instilled national identities in stu-
dents, they often immediately referenced the civics curriculum. However, 
the actual teaching of civics was befuddled by disorderly conditions, and 
teacher attitudes toward civics were less than reverent.
When I asked the social science teachers about the civics class, they 
would invariably say, “Civics is a very nice subject” and then break out into 
laughter. The answer did not vary much, nor did the laughter. Civics, it 
appeared, had become a collective joke among teachers. During the two 
years of my fieldwork, I tried many times to observe a civics class. Civics, 
after all, was the subject that contained the most explicit messages about 
nationalism and citizenship, but, somewhat ironically, it was one of the least 
consistently taught subjects. The civics curriculum defines the attributes of 
Eritrean national “character,” describes the structure of government that 
should be in place, and clearly details a role for students in building the 
nation. Given this, it was striking that civics was a joke among teachers and 
seldom taught.
Textbooks play an extraordinarily powerful role in defining national 
narratives and creating a blueprint for national identity; however, to truly 
understand the production of nationalism, national duty, and national sub-
jects in schools, it is also necessary to go beyond the written text and explore 
what is done, or not done, with these texts. In Assab, I found not only that 
it was impossible to observe a civics lesson because the subject was so seldom 
taught but also that the only available copy of the civics curriculum was a 
dog-eared photocopy that a teacher agreed to lend to me for a few hours for 
research purposes. Text can be a powerful tool to shape collective historical 
memory and a common sense of national belonging and character, but it is 
important to explore not only what texts say about the nation but also how 
they are taught or, in this case, why they may not be taught.
In Chapter 1, I discussed parts of the grade 6 civics curriculum in more 
detail. It outlines the Eritrean national character and orients it around quali-
ties of “fortitude” and willingness to sacrifice and be an obedient and dis-
ciplined child, student, and worker. The grade 7 civics curriculum reprises 
many of the characteristics of being a good, patriotic Eritrean but deem-
phasizes elements of character somewhat and, instead, focuses on educat-
ing students about government and governance. Among other things, it 
150 | CH A P T ER 4
includes a unit that outlines various civil rights that are “commonly put into 
constitutions,” such as freedom of assembly, the right to vote and run for 
election, the right to leave the country, the right to live and work anywhere 
in the country, the right to due process, and the right to equality (Ministry 
of Education, CRDI 1995).
The irony of these rights being listed in the Eritrean civics curriculum 
is not lost on teachers and students, who are, of course, well aware that 
most of these rights are not guaranteed in Eritrea. Given the content of the 
civics curriculum and the political realities of Eritrea, it seems obvious why 
teachers would laugh knowingly and say, with irony, “Civics is a nice sub-
ject” every time I asked about the curriculum. But the humor they derived 
from the question about civics teaching and the statement “Civics is a nice 
subject” had a number of additional meanings.
The following excerpts from my field notes convey the general senti-
ments that teachers had about the civics curriculum:
In the staff room, when I ask about the civics curriculum, Beraki 
says, “Civics is a very nice subject” in a tone that I can’t quite read. 
Haile passes through and hears what we are talking about and says, 
“Oh, civics is a nice subject” and exchanges a glance with Beraki. So 
finally I ask what makes it nice. They laugh and exchange knowing 
glances again. Beraki says there are some stories that the students like. 
He tells me that the things they learn are things they already know, 
like respecting your elders. Then he says that there are also some 
political things, “a lot of things about ‘The Struggle,’ but you can just 
ignore those and teach the other things.” (Field notes, April 2005)
On another occasion, Paolo articulated the political nature of his feelings 
about teaching civics even more clearly:
When I ask Paolo about teaching civics, he laughs and says, “It’s 
very nice, but not realistic.” I ask why it is that every time I bring 
up the civics curriculum, everyone says, genuinely, “Oh, civics is 
very nice,” and then they start laughing. Paolo tells me that the 
subjects—democracy, elections, the constitution—are very nice in 
theory, but everyone knows that it is not realistic now, which is why 
they laugh. “The theory is nice and it is nice to teach the theory, 
but it isn’t done in practice, so they laugh.” Then Paolo says that he 
doesn’t even know what the election and parliament system in this 
country is supposed to be. (Field notes, April 2005)
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The statement “Civics is a nice subject” had several meanings. At one level, 
teachers actually thought that civics was nice for the students. The idea 
of teaching about patriotism and how to be a good student and citizen 
appealed to them. They noted that “students enjoyed” the subject, and that, 
unlike the other subjects, it was easy, familiar, and fun for the students. It 
resonated with their identity and felt good. But the statement “Civics is a 
nice subject” was also deeply ironic. On the one hand, the civics curriculum 
articulated the official stance that the root of Eritrean national character 
emerged from The Struggle and its preoccupation with sacrificing for the 
nation. The fact that reverence for The Struggle was waning and that people 
were tiring of hearing about sacrifice was reflected in Beraki’s comment. 
Some parts of the curriculum were “nice”—the ones about values and disci-
pline and student character—but some should be skipped, such as the ones 
about The Struggle. Meanwhile, the civics curriculum was also a living 
testament to where the nation should have been on its trajectory toward 
political development. It outlined an ideal of democracy and civil liberties 
that everyone had hoped for but saw little evidence of. The curriculum still 
existed, even though the trajectory toward elections and implementation of 
the constitution had been abandoned. Teaching these topics only served as 
a reminder of this abandoned trajectory.
The statement “Civics is a nice subject” also reflected the irony that 
little priority was given to the actual teaching of civics, despite the fact that 
its messages were so integral to the party’s understandings of how students 
would learn to be national. Civics was seldom taught, and, in fact, teachers 
often refused to teach the subject. In the Senior Secondary School, civics 
seemed largely forgotten and did not even appear on the course schedule. In 
the Junior Secondary School, students in grades 6 and 7 were scheduled to 
take civics, but teachers refused to teach it because it was not their subject 
and their workloads were already too heavy. Most teachers at one point or 
another had been compelled to teach civics but later refused. For example, 
in the Junior Secondary School in 2003, math and history teachers for 
grades 6 and 7 taught civics for several weeks, but they promptly decided 
to stop teaching it in protest when a new teacher was assigned to the school 
and had a lighter course load but was not assigned to teach civics. Thus, 
when teachers laughed about civics, they were laughing, somewhat defi-
antly, at the circumstances that surrounded the teaching of civics itself and 
complaining that no teacher was designated to teach it. No one was willing 
to take responsibility for teaching civics. Indeed, teachers all believed that 
it was not their duty to teach the subject, given that many were overloaded 
with teaching classes in their regular subjects. Laughter was a form of defi-
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ant distancing from the responsibility to teach a subject that, while impor-
tant in theory, was thought to be rather worthless in practice.
Given that the civics curriculum was intended to define the nation-
al character, culture, and moral bearing; spell out citizenship rights and 
duties; and articulate the values—sacred teachings—of The Struggle, we 
might expect more reverence for civics either from teachers themselves or 
from administrators responsible for ensuring civics was taught. The civics 
curriculum instead was a place where the disorder of things was clearly 
revealed. Everyone seemed to have abandoned it. Civics was at once an 
embodiment of the Struggle-centric nationalism of the party and an ironic 
joke. It presented “nice stories” about the nation, but these stories were selec-
tively taught within a disorderly context in which there was no textbook, 
no teacher allocated permanently to the subject, and seldom a teacher who 
could be convinced to teach. This combination of disorder and irreverence 
for the narratives of The Struggle became reflective of the overall condition 
of disorder in Eritrean schools and, indeed, a sense of impotence in the 
nation overall.
Communitas and the Negotiated Production 
of the Educated Citizen
Throughout this chapter, I have given several examples of the ways in which 
schools produced the nation but not reverence for it. Schools were supposed 
to produce a sense of reverence, worship, awe, and love for the nation, and 
yet students refused to comply with the rituals. At the same time, teach-
ers—the state actors assigned to enforce compliance with these rituals and 
ritualized structures—were often complicit with students in their refusal to 
comply. In this process, disorder created openings through which to rethink 
the nation in schools.
If National Service/schooling was supposed to be a liminal space in 
which young people were transformed into ideal Eritrean educated persons/
citizens/soldiers, this process failed when it was no longer clear that National 
Service was something that was passed through and, instead, became an 
endless stage of subservience to the government. At the time of my field-
work, limitless liminality had captured the lives of teachers and would soon 
subsume the lives of their students, who would not pass through National 
Service but rather get stuck in it. In such a situation, it is hardly surprising 
that the microrituals of schooling also fell apart, making the very process 
of becoming national a mockery of itself. As schools were coopted into the 
machinery of conscription, they also became spaces of limitless liminal-
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ity, something shown most clearly through the difficulty they had actually 
starting each year. Liminality played out in more subtle ways in the every-
day life of schools as well and was manifest in student lateness, truancy, and 
chronic misbehavior. A sense of communitas between students and teachers 
(sometimes cultivated, as in the case of Yesob, and sometimes imposed on 
teachers by students, as in the cases of Aron and Simone) partially replaced 
the hierarchical authority that should have enabled teachers to maintain dis-
cipline and order. This sense of communitas between teachers and students 
was encapsulated through student comments that teachers were “playing 
with” them. In turn, students “played” with their teachers, a behavior that 
altered the classroom climate from disciplinary and ordered to disordered. 
Disorder and the carnivalesque environment it produced enabled students 
to take what was sacred—lessons, learning, teacher authority—and profane 
it by mocking it. In the classroom, power was inverted, but when power was 
inverted in these contexts, other sacred objects, such as the president of the 
country himself, were also subject to mockery, giving rise to an open politi-
cal critique. Another inversion was present in teachers’ refusal to teach civics 
and their jokes about civics being a “nice subject.” Just as a political com-
mentary that made the president less than sacred emerged from students’ 
comments about running for president in their English class, a commentary 
on the values of The Struggle and the party version of Eritrean nationalism 
emerged from teachers’ comments on the teaching of civics.
The condition of limitless liminality was itself a by-product of National 
Service and the government’s nation-making project. But instead of produc-
ing national subjects willing to sacrifice and suffer obediently for the state, 
the effects of this nation-making program were inverted. Just as Eritreans 
tried to escape the coercive reach of gifa, when schools became a mecha-
nism to conscript, teachers and students began evading schooling. This does 
not mean that schools failed to produce national subjects, but rather that 
they produced national subjects differently than the official nation-making 
project required. Just as imaginaries of the punishing state erased national-
ist discourses of honorable sacrifice and service, thereby undermining the 
government’s nation-building project, resistance to school-based rituals and 
routines recast the official version of the nation as something other than 
what was intended.
This negotiation, subversion, and mocking of rituals transformed being 
an educated, national subject into something fundamentally different. At 
the same time, mocking sacred national ideals ultimately left the state proj-
ect intact, if illegitimate. Lacking legitimacy, the project became coercive, 
revealing, once again, the vicious cycle of coercion, evasion, and impotence.
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It is particularly significant that this vicious cycle of coercion and evasion 
played out in schools, which are the state institution best situated to pro-
duce national subjects and socialize citizens. The increasingly carnivalesque 
nature of the classroom and school reflected not an outright rejection of the 
ideal of becoming an educated citizen but a confused renegotiation of the 
meaning of doing so. Through this renegotiation, the meaning of being 
national turned from a statement—Eritreans are like this—into a question: 
What are we like? The assumption that students should serve and sacrifice 
for their country embedded in official narratives of being Eritrean were 
turned into a sometimes-comical conversation about the appropriateness of 
service, the validity of the stories of The Struggle, and a critique of the presi-
dent’s job. Meanwhile, teachers did have a vision for what educated people 
should be like; even while teachers themselves were undermining authority 
in schools, they were also seeking to reinforce this vision through a series of 
coercive and even violent processes that are the subject of the next chapter.
5
The Teacher State
Morality and Everyday Sovereignty over Schools
A Tale of Two Walls
The Junior Secondary School compound was surrounded on three sides by a wall topped with broken glass and by the Red Sea on the other. This was a relatively small compound, and most of the 
school and students were within eyesight of a teacher, guard, or administra-
tor at all times. Yet the wall had not been doing a particularly good job of 
keeping students in place. Large numbers of students had been drifting in 
late or fleeing from the school compound during the day. Students in the 
Junior Secondary School were supposed to not only remain in the school 
during school hours but also have their time and behavior regulated. In early 
November 2004, teachers could no longer stand the lack of control they had 
over students. For a week, they warned students that they would lock the 
school gate promptly at 7:20 and that any latecomers would not be allowed 
in. On the appointed day and time, the school gate was locked, preventing 
approximately forty students from entering. The students who were locked 
out were in an uproar. They began yelling and banging on the gate. Some 
threw rocks at the school. Determined not to let them in but knowing he 
could not allow this disturbance to continue, the school director called the 
police. When the police arrived, the students dispersed, but a handful were 
arrested and spent up to two nights in jail.
While the director and teachers of the Junior Secondary School were 
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barring its gates against latecomers and calling on the police to help defend 
the school walls, down the road, the Senior Secondary School was having 
its own struggles over walls. This school’s compound was not enclosed, 
a situation that had become a source of great frustration for teachers. It 
was a large compound containing two football fields, a basketball court, 
and several unused buildings. The school could not afford to enclose the 
compound with the type of concrete wall that surrounded most Eritrean 
schools, so students and others could move freely in and out. Teachers con-
stantly complained that because of the lack of enclosure, they could not 
enforce rules about arriving on time or attending classes. Students often cut 
class or disrupted other classes. The school director came up with a possible 
solution: Used shipping containers were donated to the Senior Secondary 
School and set up to enclose the compound. However, teachers quickly 
realized that they did not solve the problem. The makeshift walls were easy 
to climb, students could slip through gaps between the containers, and the 
compound’s large size made it impossible to police. The walls were porous.
Both scenarios reflect teachers’ preoccupation with containment and 
enclosure and with having the power to determine who belonged inside 
and outside. In the former case, teachers’ preoccupation with containment 
was so powerful that it led teachers, who were themselves subject to state 
coercion and the arbitrary use of force by the state, to subject their students 
to a similar type of arbitrary force. This action, while clearly relying on the 
force of law (the police), was extra-legal and, therefore, a good example of 
Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) notion of the state of exception. In the latter 
case, teachers’ preoccupation with containment led them to extreme, but 
ultimately futile, ingenuity. Both cases were responses to teachers’ decisions 
that it was time to retake control of their schools.
This preoccupation with enclosing school compounds was reflective of 
the logics of encampment. The camp, according to Agamben (1998), is a 
political space that is contained for the purposes of disciplining individuals 
and managing populations (see also Gupta 2012). The entire country of 
Eritrea functions according to these camplike logics, contained—its borders 
sealed—to biopolitically produce a mass of soldier citizens.1 Camps are a 
particular manifestation of sovereign control over population and territory 
that is demarcated by a space of exception, in which the full force of the law 
exists under conditions in which there is no law (Agamben 2005). Indeed, 
Eritrean citizens enclosed within the country had few rights guaranteed by 
law at the time of my fieldwork.2
Within the larger national camp were a series of smaller camps—for 
example, the military camps that dappled the entire country. Furthermore, 
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the prohibitions on moving freely throughout the country meant that each 
town often felt very camplike. Like military camps and the nationwide 
camp, school spaces were enclosed for the purpose of discipline, but dis-
cipline to a very different end—to produce educated citizens. One of the 
logics of many types of camps, including schools, is that force can be used 
against those within the camp with impunity. Building on Carl Schmitt 
([1922] 2005), Agamben (1998: 173) notes, “The camp is the space of this 
absolute impossibility of deciding between fact and law, rule and applica-
tion, exception and rule, which nevertheless incessantly decides between 
them,” and yet someone has to make these impossible, incessant decisions—
the one who “decides on the exception” is the sovereign. Within the space 
of Eritrean schools, teachers decided on these exceptions and were sovereign 
over school space and student bodies.
Many scholars have begun to reexamine sovereignty from an actor-cen-
tered perspective, arguing that the conventional definitions of sovereignty 
need to be expanded to look at the work of particular agents in producing 
sovereignty in a variety of specific locales (Chalfin 2010; Gupta 2012; Herz-
feld 1997). Conventionally, sovereignty references the state’s right to exert 
control over its territory and population. It demarcates a nation-state as a 
distinct entity and sets the terms for its interactions with other nation-states. 
Sovereignty allocates the right to delineate borders and to control what hap-
pens to populations residing within those borders. But, as with other func-
tions of the state, sovereignty is performed in everyday encounters between 
subjects and citizens. One omission in Agamben’s analysis of devolved sov-
ereignty is that it does not allow for an examination of the agency of actors 
to whom sovereignty devolves.3 His work falls short of explaining how and 
why everyday sovereigns enact sovereignty the way they do. As Caroline 
Humphrey (2007: 433) notes, Schmitt and Agamben’s notion of sovereignty 
“fails to take account of what the ordinary participants bring to the equa-
tion. Their everyday life ‘throws in’ its own exigencies and excitements. 
These burst beyond the confines of the notion of sovereignty and qualify it 
by responding to a different logic.”
Exploring teachers as sovereign over school space and student bodies 
complicates Agamben’s framework of devolved sovereignty, because teach-
ers bring their own morality, beliefs, and experiences to bear on their deci-
sions about how schools should run. In seeking to contain and discipline 
students, teachers tried to transform students into their ideal of educated 
citizens.4 Their decisions to use coercion, violence, and force, while not 
quite the same as those of other state actors, may illuminate and help us 
understand the confluence of prejudices, stereotypes, ideologies, and beliefs 
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that frames decisions to use violence and force among other types of state 
actors, such as police, military personnel, and bureaucrats. My exploration 
of teacher sovereignty shows that debates over what it meant to make moral 
subjects and how to produce such subjects were central to their processes of 
deciding on the exception—or, in other words, deciding on the appropriate 
use of force. Building a makeshift wall, locking students out, and calling the 
police on students were extreme actions that teachers viewed as necessary 
because they believed that schools were facing a moral crisis that they had 
little support from the Ministry of Education and parents in resolving. The 
preoccupation with walls reflected anxieties about their loss of sovereignty 
at a time of moral crisis. At times, it appeared that teachers believed that 
their efforts were all that prevented society from falling apart.
In their efforts to claim sovereignty over school spaces and student 
bodies, teachers were the state, but their being the state was shaped by the 
intersection of how they saw or imagined the state (often as inept and at 
other times as punishing), saw like the state (or imagined order, civiliza-
tion, progress, and their role in bringing it about), and were seen as the state 
(or, in other words, were imagined to be the state by students and parents). 
The fact that teachers acted as the state but not for the state raises ques-
tions about the locus of the state, even, or perhaps especially, in a place like 
Eritrea, where the state is thought of as centralized and all-powerful but 
often operates on the basis of personal decisions by state actors themselves. 
When acting as the state, teachers responded not only to their own sense of 
morality—a morality deeply wrapped up with their sense of duty to build 
a better nation and the ideals of discipline, obedience, and authority—but 
also to their sense of being abandoned by the state. Additionally, their being 
the state was in constant tension with parent and student imaginaries of 
what the state should be.
Much of this book has focused on how teachers were coerced by other 
state actors, policies, and processes. As a result, teachers behaved evasively 
along with students and thus were complicit in producing the disorder that 
they found so problematic. Teachers also attempted to reorder the school 
in the face of disorder and felt a moral imperative to do so. This chapter 
specifically sheds light on how and why teachers chose to use coercion, 
force, and violence when acting as the state. One of my key emphases here 
is that teacher debates over what constituted this moral imperative were 
built on clashing notions about obedience and authority over young people. 
The first half of this chapter shows how the preoccupation with containing 
school space reflected that moral imperative. Walls not only served to pro-
tect and defend sovereign space—in this case, sovereign school space—but 
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also enabled processes of categorization and sorting. Walls also demarcated 
spaces in which teachers had authority and could set the rules, define appro-
priate behavior, manage their students and classes as they saw fit, and, if 
need be, punish. But despite the fact that within this enclosed space of the 
school teachers acted with impunity, they still responded to moral logics—
logics that often varied among teachers and required debating and negotiat-
ing what it meant to produce educated citizens. With this in mind, the latter 
half of the chapter turns to a discussion of corporal punishment, where 
these debates became particularly pointed, to show how competing notions 
of punishment, obedience, and authority were contested among teachers. 
As teachers debated what was “good” for students, they attempted to act on 
an ethos of care, but some students and parents experienced what teachers 
took to be forms of caring as arbitrary acts of violence. The intermingling 
of—and ambiguity between—caring and violence is not only reflective of 
a state of exception where no clear laws or policies govern the use of force 
but also manifests the maddening state in which the benevolent state is 
inextricable from the malevolent one.
The Work of Walls: Controlled Spaces
There were several interrelated components of the work of walls. Walls 
enabled control by creating spaces that could be contained and enforced. 
Walls created clear divisions between and around spaces, which was essen-
tial because space indexed and defined morality, discerning good from 
bad spaces and people. Walls were also tightly linked to notions of sorting. 
Below, I talk about each of these components of the work of walls: control, 
morality, and sorting.
In the quotation below, Teacher Woldemikael reminisces about his own 
schooling and the value placed on a well-contained, well-controlled school:
[My high school] in Addis [Ababa] was very nice compared to this 
one. . . . [T]here was a lot of staff. There is the director, unit leaders, 
typists, secretaries, storekeepers, guards, many people. The school 
was well fenced with good classrooms. Many classrooms. It was 
guarded. A guard by himself has great authority. He has the power to 
let you in and out. He can even punish you. He had that power even. 
If you are beaten by a guard, you will not say anything. Unit leaders 
are highly respected. You will not stay in front of them. He controls 
the students . . . the whole students. We have two campuses in our 
school, and he could control the whole campus. We had three [unit 
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leaders]. They were all very respected. If you see him in the street, you 
will run away. Run away! If they see classes not occupied by teachers, 
they will do something. (Interview, Woldemikael; emphasis added)
A “nice” school, according to Woldemikael, was a school that had resources 
devoted to keeping students in and making sure that they behaved respect-
fully while inside. There was not only a fence but also a whole range of 
school personnel situated as authority figures. Even the guard, typically 
a powerful but uneducated and, therefore, lower-status school employee, 
had the power to make determinations of who could get in and who could 
not, thereby regulating and determining who was and was not worthy of 
being inside school space. Students knew that it was their role to obediently 
accept and respect this wide array of authority figures. As we can see from 
Woldemikael’s description of his own “nice” school, the notion of a con-
tained (fenced and guarded) school is closely linked with notions of control, 
respect/fear, and punishment, which are, at one level, prevalent in all forms 
of modern schooling but are also culturally specific principles in Eritrea.
The management of space was thought to be central to maintaining con-
trol. Properly managed spaces, such as those described above, were thought 
to enable control and thus were key to socializing students properly. Teach-
ers idealized the concept of “control,” which referred to specific practices of 
managing and regulating students. “Control” referred to a process of mak-
ing expectations about behaviors and norms clear and finding persuasive 
ways to hold people accountable to those expectations. One teacher defined 
control as denoted by the pairing of “expectations” and “inspections”—or, 
in other words, clear rules and policies and a means to monitor and hold stu-
dents accountable for these expectations. In Tigrinya, the concept of “con-
trol” links two interrelated words, both of which translate into “control” in 
English—m’kutsitsar and m’elay. M’elay means “to manage” or “to guide” 
and has the more positive connotation of guiding a flock of sheep. Thus 
m’elay tends to refer to the positive, “guiding” work, such as the gentle regu-
lation and management of school space, students, and classrooms. It would 
be considered ideal practice under “normal” conditions. M’kutsitsar, on the 
other hand, literally means to check up on, thus addressing a more assertive 
form of control, as one research subject told me. The meaning embedded in 
m’kutsitsar assumes that something is going wrong, or will go wrong, that 
needs to be corrected through “controlling” activities. M’kutsitsar as a more 
active form of control refers to actions that must be taken when there is a 
problem to correct or to prevent a problem from arising. Taken together, 
the two forms of control refer to practices of good management. Teachers 
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suggested that, just as students needed to be controlled to behave appropri-
ately and therefore learn, teachers themselves also needed to be controlled 
by the administration. Through talking about the ways in which schools 
and teachers ought to be controlled, teachers constructed a set of ideals of 
how schools should function through clear and consistent hierarchies and 
systems of accountability. Walls were key to making this happen.
In contrast to Woldemikael’s idealization of the resources devoted to 
containment in his own childhood, below Iyasu describes the problems 
caused by the lack of a wall in the Senior Secondary School. The lack of a 
wall indicated that the school was not attractive or controlled. He complains 
about the lack of a wall in the quotation below and explains what it indicates 
about the school:
Still, the school doesn’t have any wall around the compound, and 
the number of students coming from rural areas . . . is increasing. 
So we cannot treat those students with the experience we have or 
with that infrastructure of the school. Our canteen, if you observe, 
should be good, and there should be some kind of gates that can 
keep the students in the compound, and actually we are lucky in 
that aspect. We have a lot of space, but we should rearrange these 
things and motivate the students to use this compound. Making 
the school compound more attractive would motivate the students 
to not go outside. My belief is that this will help the good environ-
ment. Then I believe that no one would be motivated to go outside. 
(Interview, Iyasu)
Iyasu linked motivating students with having an attractive space as well as 
having a “gate,” better “infrastructure,” and a contained compound. Inter-
estingly, he also suggested that these provisions were particularly neces-
sary in light of the increased number of students “from the rural areas,” 
which was a reference to the Afar students in the schools. As I discuss in 
more detail below, Afar/rural students were thought of as less socialized 
in the ways of schooling and particularly in need of controlled space. As 
Iyasu suggested, many teachers believed that, due to the large number of 
students “from the rural areas,” containment and a positive school space 
were essential to control them because teachers did not have the experience 
to “treat” or teach them. Similarly, at the time of my fieldwork, in light of 
the lack of “bright future” for the students, teachers generally thought that 
self-discipline was on the decline and that external discipline was necessary. 
Walls, thus, were thought to be essential not just to keep students in the 
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school but to regulate external influences. One component of the work of 
walls thus was to create not only a controlled and controllable space but also 
a nice, motivating space, a civilizing space of sorts. Teachers’ attitudes about 
space and order here were reminiscent of James Scott’s (1998) discussions 
of the production of orderly spaces as one component of what he calls high 
modernist ideology and “seeing like a state.” Similar to the state-planned 
cities and villages that Scott (1998) discusses, teachers derived their under-
standings of space, order, and control from ideological assumptions of what 
constituted modernity. Space for teachers was also a means to index and 
define morality; “good” people were in “good” spaces, or in spaces where 
they belonged. To do their work, schools needed to both be “good” spaces 
and keep students in, protecting them from bad influences, so that they 
would become “good” people.
Good and Bad Places: Moralizing Space and Spatializing Morality
Space was deeply moral and moralizing, as I describe below. Morality, as it is 
understood in Eritrea, is not so much about moral lessons, language, or con-
tent but is embodied in practice (Mahmood 2005; Zigon 2008). Resonating 
with Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron’s (1990) notion of habitus 
and Michel De Certeau’s (1984) conceptualization of the “practice of every-
day life,” Jarrett Zigon (2008) depicts morality as “embodied dispositions” 
(see also Bourdieu 1977). One’s morality is apparent through the way one 
behaves rather than through one’s beliefs. One is moral because one acts in 
the right way. Teachers envisioned moral students as embodying discipline, 
diligence, and hard work, but moral students also knew how to maintain a 
particular set of relations with authority and understood how to engage in 
everyday performances that indicated respect. These performances required 
knowing where to be and not to be and how to act in particular places and, 
thus, were highly spatial.
Teachers’ moral coding of space and the morally transformative power 
they ascribed to certain spaces resonated with Mary Douglas’s ([1966] 1984) 
notions of purity and impurity. Anxieties about purity often emerge at times 
of categorical indistinctness—for example, during the liminal phase, which, 
as I illustrated in the previous chapter, had become an endless condition in 
Eritrea. Morality is also incarnated through notions of cleanliness that are 
equated with order and care versus uncleanliness that is equated with dis-
order and chaos. The profound moral distinctions between states of purity/
cleanliness and impurity/disorder index a much broader array of concepts 
(Douglas [1966] 1984). For example, as Douglas notes, that which is clean 
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or pure often comes to represent hope, development, civilization, and prog-
ress. According to Eritrean teachers, “good” spaces for students were ordered 
spaces that were well cared for and controlled, as I noted above. In contrast, 
“bad” spaces were spaces where disorder reigned and where no one was 
“controlling” students. The space of the school was supposed to be not only 
ordered and clean but also emblematic of progress. In contrast, in other 
spaces, students were not monitored and “good things” were not taught to 
them.
Teachers’ imagined geography of the town of Assab illuminates these 
categories of moral and immoral spaces and makes clear which categories of 
people were allowed to be in certain spaces. Through this imagined geogra-
phy, teachers effectively articulated a sense that there were clear, student-free 
zones. Morality was articulated through the ascription of value to particular 
spaces, but this was only one valence of the imagined morality of space. 
Space was also thought to have the capacity to make people moral or immor-
al largely because certain spaces were more controlled. Teachers’ memories 
of their own schooling or their earlier years of teaching more often than 
not provided an outline of their moral imaginary of school space. These 
accounts, in most cases, tended to create a somewhat idealized portrait of 
a time when schools were better controlled and students were acting like 
students.5
Teacher B’ruk, who grew up in Assab, depicts this imagined geography 
of moral and immoral spaces and explains the implications of students find-
ing themselves in the “wrong” space in response to my asking during an 
interview about the school he attended:
When I was grade 9, we were very disciplined. Up to grade 11 and 
12, I would not enter into any tea room that had a teacher in it. 
Especially in Campo Sudan or Assab Kebir. No student would go 
to that area. Because of the bars and tea rooms, that area was a 
bad area. No lady was wandering around that area. So you would 
never see a student either. The teacher didn’t do anything if he saw 
a student, but the student would feel bad. At that time, not only 
my mother controlled me, but the place, the society controlled me. 
But now it’s different. Then, I didn’t observe students going to [tea 
shops] in Seghir or anything. Then, no one would sell students tea, 
because they knew. But now, they sell them tea. (Interview, B’ruk)
B’ruk equated discipline with avoiding certain spaces, thus drawing a clear 
line between a moral imaginary of a disciplined student and a division of 
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public space. The disciplined students would not find themselves in a public 
space with their teacher. Furthermore, B’ruk articulated an imagined geog-
raphy of the town of Assab, distinguishing its “bad” areas. These bad areas, 
Campo Sudan and Assab Kebir, are neighborhoods in Assab noted for hav-
ing many bars and tea rooms. Although many students lived in these areas, 
they had a bad reputation because sailors and truck drivers frequented them 
when Assab still functioned as Ethiopia’s main port; they had a reputation 
as places where people drank too much, got into fights, and could find pros-
titutes. Magnus Treiber’s (2010) comparison of good and bad bars in the 
capital city, Asmara, and the different social groups attracted to these bars 
reflects a similarly imagined spatial geography. According to Treiber (2010: 
11), so-called clean bars are typically recently renovated, more expensive, 
and places where people go to socialize rather than to drink heavily. Clean, 
therefore, is often equated with civilized, tempered behavior and modernity. 
In contrast, “bad” bars are not renovated and, like Assab’s bars in Campo 
Sudan and Assab Kebir, are reputed to be dangerous, dark, and in a state 
of disrepair.
B’ruk also noted in his response to me how this separation of spaces was 
maintained. It was not teachers who upheld this moral ordering of space. 
Indeed, he went out of his way to note that a teacher “wouldn’t do anything” 
if he saw a student. Rather, a student behaving improperly would have an 
internalized sense of shame for entering the same space as a respected adult. 
Similarly, other teachers commented that if students saw an authority fig-
ure, like a teacher, while outside in a public space, they would be “afraid” 
and would “run away.” In Tigrinya, the notion of fear is often linked with 
shyness or embarrassment and is a characteristic that is often valued, par-
ticularly for those that are supposed to be subservient, such as students. Stu-
dents should be appropriately fearful, or shy, when they encounter teachers 
in public spaces. Fear not only indicates respect and deference for authorities 
when a student encounters them in unexpected spaces but is also produced 
through notions of authority based on maintaining hierarchies and distinc-
tions between student and nonstudent spaces. Another key point that B’ruk 
made was that a properly functioning society would help keep students “in 
their place” by not selling things to them when they were out of place (i.e., 
not in school). B’ruk lamented that shop owners sold students tea, which he 
saw as a violation of the separation of spaces and an indication that society 
was not helping students understand where and what their place was.
This same moralization of space applied to teachers as well. Some teach-
ers described their own moral transformation when they became teachers. 
This transformation involved not only changing behaviors but also, more 
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importantly, choosing to occupy only certain spaces that were regarded as 
morally appropriate for a teacher. Woldemikael noted that when he became 
a teacher, he could no longer “go everywhere.” Because he had to be respect-
ed as a teacher, he had to limit the kinds of places that he frequented. 
Instead of going to smaller bars in some of the seedier areas of town, he 
went to the “big hotels,” which were thought to be more respectable and 
were places where he was not likely to run into his students. Woldemikael 
also noted that as a teacher, he had to start spending more time at home as 
well. Home, of course, is the most moral space of all. Students are supposed 
to spend most of their time in the home engaged in the moral activities of 
reading and working. Woldemikael had become “like a student,” mostly 
staying home and engaging in these activities.
Schools not only were coded as good, moral spaces where “good” stu-
dents could be found but were also thought to have a moralizing influence. 
As Iyasu notes:
The longer you stay there [in the school], the longer you learn some-
thing from the school. You meet with your fellow students and with 
your teacher. You might ask him something and you look at the 
walls and you might see the [educational] pictures on the walls. . . . 
If you stay in the school, you learn something. If you stay out of 
the school, you learn something different, especially staying in the 
bars. What do you do when you see a student sitting in a bar with 
a bottle of beer? You don’t feel good. So if you make the school 
attractive, you can keep students in the school longer, and they can 
learn more academic things. They learn a lot from the society. But 
if the students stay in the school, they learn more academic things. 
(Interview, Iyasu)
The school compound was filled with positive educational and social 
influences, so it would motivate the students to become the type of moral 
person that teachers sought to create.
Despite the fact that teachers idealized certain spaces as appropriate 
for students and other spaces as inappropriate, the behaviors of those who 
inhabited them were inevitably blurred and, in reality, always had been. For 
example, while teachers may have categorized certain kinds of recreational 
spaces as “good” and “bad,” there was no shortage of teachers recreating in 
“bad” bars, particularly given that a teacher’s salary seldom allowed them to 
frequent the more expensive, modern “hotels.” Additionally, the perceived 
clear-cut distinction between good and bad spaces shifted over time as eco-
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nomic realities changed. Campo Sudan, once thought to be the roughest 
neighborhood in Assab, especially at night, was far less raucous once the war 
began and the port and truck route to Ethiopia closed. At the same time, 
the clean, “good” bars and more upscale hotels fell into some disrepair as 
the economy, and their businesses, floundered.
Similarly, teachers often encountered students in spaces where they 
“should not be.” Ideally, if this were to happen, students would show some 
sort of “fear,” manifested through the type of shame or embarrassment that 
Woldemikael mentioned above or by running away and avoiding meeting 
their teacher in a public space, as many teachers noted was the correct reac-
tion. In blurred spaces, according to teachers, students should respond with 
proper deference, respect, and fear to maintain the appropriate moral stance 
between teacher and student. Teachers noted that when students did not 
“fear” teachers, they could not know right from wrong, and they lamented 
that students did not seem to have fear anymore. As Woldemikael notes:
I mean, there is no one to be afraid of. I mean, afraid of, I mean it 
in a positive sense meaning respecting . . . a deep respect. The fear 
that comes out of deep respect, not to be shocked of someone, to be 
frightened of someone. That deep respect is not there. (Interview, 
Woldemikael; emphasis added)
The lack of fear was a by-product of the blurring of the boundaries between 
spaces where students should and should not be. Many teachers made com-
ments suggesting that students feared less because they were less controlled.
Spoiled Students and Polluting Influences
Teachers’ worries about the moral and moralizing properties of “good” and 
“bad” spaces were reflected in their anxieties about a variety of polluting 
influences that they believed to be making students “less moral.” Teach-
ers often talked about the students and the “teaching-learning process” 
becoming “spoiled.” When I asked what was causing this “spoiling,” teach-
ers described a variety of what we might think of as “polluting” influences. 
Interestingly, the elements that were thought of as “spoiling” the students 
were typically regarded as foreign, outside influences because they were 
unfamiliar to the teachers. Although these attributes of “foreignness” varied 
depending on which teacher was characterizing it, definitions of what is 
foreign, in general, differentiate between what or who belongs on the inside 
and what or who is an outsider. As such, these distinctions can be seen as a 
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means to code who, or what kind of person, belongs to the nation and the 
community of educated nationals.
For younger teachers who had spent little or no time outside the Eritrean 
highlands, the entire city of Assab was foreign due to its proximity with 
Ethiopia and the fact that historically it had had a large number of Ethio-
pians residing in the town. These younger teachers, who were relative new-
comers to Assab, often suggested that Assab’s students had picked up bad 
habits or a sort of bad “culture” from the Ethiopians that made them “not 
like the highlands,” as one teacher told me when I asked for his explanation 
of the behavioral difficulties in schools.6 Teachers who had lived in Assab 
for a longer period of time did not talk about Assab as being corrupted by 
Ethiopian influences but rather seemed to celebrate its hybridity and cul-
tural diversity (Riggan 2011).
Other teachers blamed what they perceived to be a condition of moral 
decline on the number of Afar students, many of whom came from rural 
desert areas. Afar students, most of whom came from remote parts of the 
South Red Sea region, historically had little access to schooling, something 
that the Eritrean government had been trying to rectify since indepen-
dence. Larger numbers of Afar students began attending schools in Assab 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the government expanded access 
to elementary and Junior Secondary Schools in the South Red Sea region. 
Despite the fact that Afar students were by no means the only ones who 
were misbehaving, many teachers attributed the shift in student behavior 
to Afar students attending in larger numbers. Teachers, the vast majority 
of whom were from the majority Tigrinya ethnic group and most of whom 
were raised or lived for many years in cities, tended to have a civilizational 
prejudice toward the Afar and regarded them as somewhat “backward,” 
largely because they were more rural. Additionally, some teachers, who, with 
some very notable exceptions, tended to have a fairly cursory knowledge of 
Afar culture, often took cultural differences as evidence that the Afar did 
not care about education.7 They often talked about the amount of money 
the government was spending on education in the rural areas and spoke of 
the Afar students as if they were ungrateful for what the government was 
doing for them. Furthermore, as I discuss in more detail below, teachers 
suggested that the Afar notions of respect and authority were quite different 
from those of the Tigrinya people. Tigrinya notions of respect tended to be 
hierarchical, and strict codes of behavior proscribed how children should 
behave in the presence of adults. Indeed, both the overall norms for class-
room behavior (that students should be silent, obedient, and respectful) and 
the beliefs about how students should behave in spaces where adults were 
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present derived from patterns of child-rearing and beliefs about childhood 
prevalent in Tigrinya culture. Tigrinya teachers who had worked in Afar 
areas often commented warily that Afar families were “very democratic” 
with regard to child-rearing and that “even the smallest child could speak” 
in a gathering of adults. Additionally, teachers noted that Afar families did 
not practice corporal punishment, implying that this made it difficult to 
ensure that children would respect adults. B’ruk’s reference above to stu-
dents going to “tea shops in Assab Seghir,” an Afar area, was an indirect 
complaint about what teachers interpreted as permissiveness in Afar culture, 
in which students could go where they wanted and act like adults. Teachers 
believed that the proximity of this very different culture was affecting their 
ability to control students. Their response was to contain students in the 
school so that teachers could free them from other influences.
Students having money was also referenced as a corrupting influence. 
Money and the desire/necessity to earn money took students into the world 
outside the school, with its plethora of potentially bad influences. Many 
teachers attributed blurred social spaces to conditions of economic decline, 
which, for example, led tea shop owners to sell tea to students rather than 
send them back to school where they belonged. At one level, working stu-
dents were seen in pragmatic terms. The fact that students needed to work 
meant that they did not have enough time to focus on their studies. How-
ever, students’ work was also seen as locating them in nonstudent spaces 
and exposing them to influences that were inappropriate. Working students, 
some of whom were employed as taxi drivers or in bars, had access to money, 
which gave them the capacity to engage in such practices as smoking and 
drinking. Teachers thought of students who worked as blurring the bound-
aries between student and adult spaces and behaviors. These students could 
engage with adults who might not know that they were students and there-
fore in need of protection from negative influences. Having access to adult 
spaces and participating in adult activities, such as smoking and drinking, 
would make these students see themselves as adults and would make it more 
difficult for teachers to command their respect and obedience in the class-
room. Although teachers acknowledged that students had to work to sup-
port their families, there was a perception that once a student began to earn 
money, he or she would no longer see the value of being a student. Finally, 
another less common explanation for students’ out-of-control behavior was 
their increased level of exposure to Western media. Several teachers suggest-
ed to me that the problem with students was that they listened to too much 
Western music and watched too many Western movies, which depicted 
students in America as being disrespectful toward their teachers.
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Although teachers had a variety of perceptions of what was “spoiling” 
students and education, all spoke to fears of what was foreign, different, or 
potentially uncontrollable. Significantly, all of these polluting influences 
also blurred teachers’ normative sense of the distinction between the catego-
ries of child/student and adult/teacher. Cultural patterns that were thought 
to derive from “Ethiopian” or from “Afar” culture were depicted by teachers 
as problematic because they pushed students to behave in a more egalitarian 
way with their teachers, challenging hierarchical notions of authority. Stu-
dents’ needing to work also put them in the world of adults, further blurring 
these lines. Additionally, each of these foreign influences in some way made 
it difficult for teachers to distinguish a student from a nonstudent and, in 
turn, made it difficult to know how to treat students. It is also important 
to recall that the merging of military training and education put into place 
by the 2003 policies, which I discussed in previous chapters, fundamentally 
blurred the distinctions between the roles of teacher and student. This pro-
found blurring of categories provided the backdrop against which teachers’ 
concerns about and interpretations of other forms of category blurring were 
conceptualized. Concerns about blurred roles led to deep moral anxieties 
about their ultimate inability to categorize in the face of these broader polit-
ical and policy changes.
Sorting Small from Large
Sorting and categorizing are key functions of the camp. Camplike enclo-
sures enable and require sorting. Walls themselves sorted by differentiat-
ing between students and nonstudents, keeping one group out and another 
group in. At the same time, within the enclosure, student life was ordered 
in very specific ways. I now turn to a fuller discussion of teachers’ efforts to 
sort and contain as a manifestation of teacher sovereignty that responded to 
these particular concerns about moral blurriness and the capacity of schools 
to contain and maintain categories.
When teachers in the Junior Secondary School locked out students, 
they were effectively giving them a choice to respect the rules of school 
space and time or to face consequences—to act like a student by coming to 
school on time or to fail to act like a student and be locked out. The walls 
effectively categorized those who were “acting like students” and “not acting 
like students.”
Ultimately, the “nonstudents” were locked out. They were regarded as 
a polluting influence and abandoned by teachers. Beyond the school wall, 
these nonstudents were relegated to the much more violent forms of sover-
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eignty enacted by the police or military commanders. Young people who 
were not students in Eritrea would eventually be rounded up and forced to 
join the ranks of those in National Service or, if they chose not to, would 
have to find a way to evade service by escaping the country or living as a 
fugitive within the country. Any of these outcomes—service, escape, or the 
fugitive life—effectively relegated these nonstudents to a condition that 
Agamben (2005) calls “bare life,” or life that is abandoned by and incon-
sequential to the state, rather than life that is cultivated, nurtured, and 
protected. Within the school walls, teachers made their best effort to help 
students who were “acting like students” to do well to avoid the fate that 
would befall those who were outside the wall. Teachers cultivated those who 
acted like students. However, in light of the 2003 policy changes, it became 
increasingly difficult to distinguish between who was and was not a “real” 
student, in part because students and nonstudents alike all wound up the 
same place—Sawa—and in part because many young people who were 
seeking to evade service were using school as a means to do so. This made 
it difficult for teachers to do this work of cultivation and caring. Locking 
the school gate was one attempt to clarify these distinctions. The intensive 
process of sorting students within the school that occurred a few days earlier 
was another.
Within a few days of the “lockout” of late students, grade 8 teachers 
gathered the entire grade, approximately two hundred students, in the large 
field in front of the flagpole in the center of the school compound. They 
lined the students up and walked among them, sorting them by size and 
“character.” Children who were either physically small or known by the 
teachers to be age-appropriate for their grade were placed in one group and 
asked to stand on one side of the field. Students who were known to the 
teachers or by reputation to be “repeaters and disturbers” or who simply 
appeared to be physically big or old were put in another group. Two groups 
were created for students who were somewhere in the middle. The sort-
ing was very public, and teachers openly negotiated with each other about 
which group students were to be put in. At first they had too many students 
in the “repeaters and disturbers” group and had to place some of them in 
one of the in-between groups.
Teachers were sorting students into new sections based on age and repu-
tation for behavior. This sorting, along with the lockout, was a strategy to 
regain control over the school. Teachers had decided that the overly large 
number of older, disruptive students made it impossible for them to control 
their classes and that sorting students into different sections by age, number 
of years repeated, and level of “disturbance” they caused would improve 
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the situation. Students in one section, 8A, were seen as the innocents who 
could do no wrong; if they misbehaved in class, the act was usually just seen 
as youthful exuberance rather than deviance. One section was created for 
students who were known to have repeated grades multiple times and had 
reputations for causing trouble. Indeed their section, 8D, became known as 
the “disturber section.” The other sections were somewhat ambivalent and 
created for students in the middle. The teachers’ approach to sorting was, 
effectively, to isolate the big from the small, the innocent from the poorly 
behaved, those who should be in school from those who should not.
Some context of what was going on at the time of these incidents illu-
minates why teachers in the Junior Secondary School felt the need to sort 
and categorize students at this moment. Education was, in theory, open to 
everyone through the end of the Junior Secondary School level—grade 8.8 
At the end of grade 8, all students took the highly competitive National 
Examination, which determined whether they would go on to the Senior 
Secondary School. Although a school rule stipulated that students were 
supposed to repeat grades only once, there was no consistent national pol-
icy about this. Because of this, students could keep repeating grades for as 
long as they wanted to, and increasing numbers of students seemed to be 
doing so. The Junior Secondary School teachers were frustrated because 
the regional Ministry of Education officials in Assab had not developed or 
enforced a consistent rule regarding how many times students were allowed 
to repeat a grade. Students quickly figured out that they could fail grades 
in Junior Secondary School and thereby indefinitely delay their terms of 
National Service. Ministry of Education officials, not wanting to upset 
parents by removing their children from school, tended to support this de 
facto policy that allowed students to stay in school. Teachers in the Junior 
Secondary School believed that students were using schools as a strategy to 
evade military service rather than taking schooling seriously, something that 
challenged their ability to distinguish between students and nonstudents. 
They believed that larger numbers of nonstudents were filling their class-
rooms simply because these people were using school as a means to avoid 
service. Teachers worried that older students would negatively influence 
younger students and that this negative influence would prevent teachers 
from having a positive influence on the younger students. They commented 
that classes were increasingly hard to control due to these older students. 
In addition, the number of disciplinary incidents had increased, including 
fights between teachers and students, something attributed to the higher 
number of older students.
Teachers in the Junior Secondary School were responding to exceptional 
172 | CH A P T ER 5
times, times when rules regarding student promotion were unclear. Teach-
ers both did and did not have control in their school. They did not have 
the ability to promote students into the Senior Secondary level, because 
students were promoted only when they passed a national exam, and many 
Junior Secondary students had been intentionally failing this exam for sev-
eral years. Nor did teachers have the ability to remove a student from the 
school permanently, because only the Ministry of Education could do that. 
But they could and did decide how to organize, discipline, and manage 
students within the enclosed space of the school. 
The sorting process was reflective of the state of exception in several 
ways. The state of exception is marked by a lack of clarity between law 
(rules) and the enactment of the exception to these rules by an array of state 
actors who become sovereign over citizen bodies (Agamben 2005). In the 
absence of clear rules regarding promotion policy, Junior Secondary School 
teachers created a mechanism for sorting that was an exception to Minis-
try of Education rules and policies (or lack thereof). By sorting students, 
teachers were acting of their own accord and not according to a “higher” 
authority. Tracking, ability grouping, and other forms of sorting that are 
widespread elsewhere are almost unheard of in Eritrea. When they occur, 
they are almost inevitably a school-based practice rather than a national pol-
icy. This made the teachers’ decision to sort students even more remarkable. 
In fact, the regional Ministry of Education administration threatened to 
force teachers to change the grade 8 groupings, saying that this was unprec-
edented in Eritrea, which left the director caught between his teachers and 
the administration (he ultimately sided with the teachers). Additionally, as 
the actors who were sovereign over this sorting mechanism, they made deci-
sions about the exceptions based on highly subjective, arbitrary, intimate, 
and interpersonal criteria for was good and bad. The decisions that teachers 
made about each student were based on observing students and understand-
ing their reputations. Ultimately, teachers were pleased with the results of 
their efforts and believed that these categories would make it easier to man-
age students. In fact, the sorting was perceived to have worked so well that 
the grade 7 teachers also considered sorting their students, although they 
never got around to doing so.
Although these large numbers of older, repeating students presented 
a pragmatic problem for teachers, teachers’ worries about older students 
reflected deeper moral concerns related to the purity of the student iden-
tity. Teachers worried that the blurring of adult and child categories would 
result in “matter out of place” (Turner 1969). Similarly, teachers described 
older students in their classes as being out of place. They often made such 
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comments as “How can you teach a class when you have a big man sitting 
next to a small boy?” Indeed, the age range in classes was striking. In an 
average class of sixty students, as many as half of the students might be well 
into their teens, while the other half was a grade-appropriate age. Thus, the 
problem with older students was not just a pragmatic problem of manage-
ment but a moral hazard of category blurring. Teacher sovereignty emerged 
in response to this sense of moral breakdown. When the capacity of the state 
to provide appropriate stability to schools was found unsatisfactory, teachers 
took things into their own hands.9
Similar but less extreme forms of sorting happened every day in the 
Senior Secondary School. For example, at different points in time, teach-
ers would position themselves at the school gate after school had started to 
catch late students and punish them. At some points, teachers would decide 
to crack down on students not in uniform and would stand at the school 
gate to send home or punish students who failed to show up dressed appro-
priately. However, these efforts in the high school were short-lived. The key 
reason for their failure was the lack of a wall around the school compound. 
If students were turned away at the gate, they could circle around and find 
another way into the school compound. Thus, in the Senior Secondary 
School, the preoccupation with control related to figuring out how to build 
a wall, something that was seen as essential for the functioning of the school.
Some of the Senior Secondary School teachers also talked about prob-
lems of blurred categories, but they did so in different ways. One day I 
came upon two teachers discussing a particular student. Teacher Mateos 
was noting that this student was married, had children, and despite this was 
trying to continue with his schooling. Teacher Iyasu began to laugh with 
embarrassment and then shook his head and put his head in his hands. He 
then told us that the student had come to school late the day before and 
that Iyasu had beaten him. Teacher Iyasu said he wished he had known 
this particular student’s circumstances, because if he had, he would not 
have beaten the student. Discipline was not universally applied but was 
applied differently based on understandings of different students’ circum-
stances. This “adult” student who was in school was matter out of place, 
and, because he was out of place, this teacher made what he considered the 
rather embarrassing error of beating him (that is, he should not have beaten 
an adult, an equal).
In contrast, many Senior Secondary School teachers described being 
furious when students came to school smelling like cigarettes and beating 
them for having smoked outside school. Although few teachers want their 
students to smoke, in Eritrea smoking has a particular moral value as well. 
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It is considered immoral for women to smoke, and most adults would not 
smoke in front of their parents. Students’ smoking was seen as a behavior 
that was morally out of place and inappropriate for their age. Teachers had 
similar reactions if they found love letters in students’ notebooks. Similar 
to smoking, love and romantic relationships were seen as immoral acts that 
were antithetical to being a student. Indeed, if a love letter was found in a 
student’s possession, it was often seen as such a moral aberration that sev-
eral of the teachers would come together to discuss it and strategize about 
what action to take. Romantic relationships, like smoking, were intended 
for adults and thus had no place in the school.10 When students engaged in 
these practices, they threatened teachers’ sense of moral categories, because 
they were engaged in behaviors restricted to adults.
Being Seen as the State: Part I
There was a great deal of controversy over teachers’ decision to sort students. 
Effectively, state actors (teachers) believed they were working against their 
own state institution (the Ministry of Education). Teachers faced opposition 
from students, Ministry of Education officials, and parents. Indeed, many 
teachers expected that the Ministry of Education would eventually force 
them to detrack the grade 8 students and braced themselves to fight back 
against the ministry. Teachers were criticized for these measures, but they 
defended their right to divide students and the necessity of doing so. Ulti-
mately, they were not forced to detrack the students, but this sorting (and 
their defense of it) revealed that teachers were willing to place themselves in 
an antagonistic relationship with the community and their superiors to take 
back control of the school.
This controversy illuminates the ways that teachers not only saw (imag-
ined) the state (which I’ve discussed in previous chapters) and “saw like” 
the state (by embracing their understanding of how to order schools and 
educated students); they also were “seen” as the state. In their study of gov-
ernance and governmentality in India, Stuart Corbridge et al. (2005) cap-
ture the notion that the state is brought into being through techniques of 
governance, technologies of power inherent in governmentality, and the way 
citizens themselves understand, interpret, and “see” the state. My phrase 
“being seen as the state” references this idea of people “seeing” teachers as 
the state. Although my main focus here is on the morality and beliefs that 
framed teachers’ utilization of technologies of power and techniques of gov-
erning schools (ordering, organizing, containing, sorting, categorizing, and 
punishing), it is also essential to remember that in utilizing these technolo-
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gies of power, teachers were “seen” by students and parents as the state even 
though they would not see themselves that way. These tensions between 
how teachers saw themselves, saw the state as an entity “out there,” and 
were seen as the state accounted for a number of tensions and struggles over 
legitimacy. Teacher sovereignty, as with many forms of devolved sovereignty 
in the state of exception, was always riddled with struggles and tensions 
over legitimacy and questions about the limits of the use of force. Teachers 
struggled against each other; against other state actors, such as their own 
supervisors and administrators; and against students and parents to define 
the appropriate limits to their use of force. They were seen as the state, but 
not always in a positive light. As an entry point into this examination of 
how teachers were seen as the state, it is useful to look at the reactions of 
students who were placed in the infamous section 8D, the section allocated 
for “overage students” and “disturbers.”
One of the reasons why teachers’ sorting of students was controversial 
among students and parents was because the division of grade 8 students 
coincided with other, more coercive encounters with the state—both within 
the school and in the nation as a whole. In Chapter 2 and elsewhere, I sug-
gest that despite the fact that different state institutions and actors may 
behave completely autonomously, imaginaries of the state create linkages 
between discrete actions of different state actors and institutions. These 
linkages characterize and delegitimize the state while they simultaneously 
imagine it as coherent and translocal. In Eritrea, an imaginary of the coer-
cive, punishing state plays this role (Riggan 2013b). The fact that the sort-
ing of students and the lockout occurred within days of each other and that 
many of the locked-out students had been assigned to 8D made this partic-
ular class believe they were targets of coercion and state punishment. More 
broadly, around this same time period, in an attempt to reduce the number 
of students who were enrolling in school simply to receive an ID and there-
by avoid military conscription, the Ministry of Education announced that 
grade 8 students would not be given student ID cards.11 Many saw this pol-
icy as another government effort to militarize schools and target students. 
While this was happening in Assab, a massive gifa took place in Asmara, 
during which the infamous Adi Abeto incident occurred. Although the 
events that occurred in the school, the incident of gifa in Asmara, and the 
changed Ministry of Education policy on student ID cards were not directly 
connected in any way, teachers’ actions—locking students out of the school, 
calling the police, sorting students—need to be examined as imaginatively 
and discursively linked to the larger notion of the punishing state.  
A few days after the students were locked out of the school, I spent sev-
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eral mornings in the 8D classroom, which gave me a chance to hear about 
how these students felt about the teacher’s actions. When I first walked 
into the class, I was struck by how cramped the room seemed when full of 
adult-sized bodies. Indeed, if the categorization of 8D were simply based on 
student size, it would seem that they were distinct from other classes of stu-
dents. Otherwise, student behavior during their classes struck me as rather 
ordinary. A few more students than usual appeared to have their heads 
down on their desks, sleeping. One difference I did note was that when the 
teacher left the room at the end of each period, the majority of students also 
left the room, a behavior that teachers generally regarded as problematic.
The few students who remained chatted with me. I asked them what 
they thought of this new arrangement. A few said it was good to have all 
the older students together, but many had complaints. One girl told me that 
she thought the teachers did this so the students in 8D would not copy from 
other students. Her thoughts reflected teachers’ assertions that 8D students 
performed poorly academically and needed to rely on copying from “clever 
students” to pass. A couple of other students mumbled something about 
Sawa that I could not completely make out. Then, interestingly, students 
almost immediately brought up the arrests that occurred outside the school 
wall and coincided with the separation of the classes. I did not ask them 
directly about these arrests, yet the fact that students brought them up on 
their own shows that they linked the arrests with the sorting process.
For students, being separated into age-based categories, being locked 
out of school, and having the police called on them were linked as punitive 
actions and thus reflected the broader sense that the state was punishing 
in Eritrea. They told me that the police arrested approximately twenty stu-
dents, and they narrated the events of that morning as if it were a police 
raid on the school. In contrast, teachers depicted this event as necessary to 
keep the peace and as only affecting a small number of students. Students 
described the police infiltrating the school and seeking out particular stu-
dents for detention. Students in 8D believed the police were particularly tar-
geting them. Later I asked teachers about this discrepancy between teacher 
and student narratives, and they said that only one student was taken out 
of the school, while the others were taken from in front of the school, where 
they were causing a disturbance. In contrast, the students linked sorting the 
students with locking the gate and calling the police. They imagined the 
series of events as examples of arbitrary, unpredictable, and inappropriate 
force used by teachers against students.
The story that one particular student who was taken out of his class-
room by the police told me illuminates the way students experienced being 
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the victims of state force. This student made a point of coming over dur-
ing the break between classes to sit down next to me and tell his story. He 
told me that he was only fifteen years old (slightly old for grade 8, but not 
unheard of) and “very small” (in size), so he did not know why he was 
assigned to 8D. He then told me that he was, in fact, not late the day that 
the police arrived and was already in the school when they came to arrest 
students. According to the student, one teacher brought the police into the 
classroom where he was studying and had him arrested. The teacher hit him 
and then handed him over to the police. The student told me that he spent 
two nights in jail.
The student’s story was somewhat vague. When I spoke to the teacher 
involved, he told me that he thought the student had been one of the dis-
turbers outside the school wall but that the student had managed to slip 
inside while the police were arresting the other students. To rectify the situ-
ation, the teacher brought the police to the student and had him arrested. 
Later, when the student was released from jail, the teacher realized his mis-
take. The student told me that when he got out, the teacher apologized and 
bought him a sandwich. “Now we are OK,” the student said.
Several dynamics were revealed in this incident. While teachers saw 
locking the school and calling the police as a necessary means to rectify the 
situation of moral decline in schools, students experienced it as an arbitrary 
and violent use of state force against them. This also shows that while teach-
ers thought they were being fair, the sorting mechanisms through which 
students were labeled disturber and nondisturber resulted in the arbitrary 
and exceptional use of force against students. Under a state of exception, 
where there are no clear laws or rights, exceptional force can be used sim-
ply because an authority figure wills it. Arguably, this is what happened 
to students in this school. Furthermore, students believed they had been 
categorized unjustly and singled out for punishment for a reason that they 
could not entirely fathom, thereby linking teacher actions with the broader 
coercive state.
In this particular student’s case, the teacher admitted to having been 
wrong. But it was also curious that the teacher could make it right so easily 
by buying the student a sandwich. This speaks not to the use of extreme 
force against students but rather to the rationalization of the use of force, 
which is far more ordinary and mundane. The use of punishment, includ-
ing corporal punishment, is highly intimate. It binds teachers and students 
in a particular relationship of authority that is intimate and familial in 
many ways. We see state power that is sometimes violent, sometimes nur-
turing, but always engaged in a process that brings students and teachers 
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into a close and familiar relationship with each other. Students were sorted 
not on the basis of arbitrary categories thought up in a remote office in 
Asmara. These categories were developed in the school itself, based on a 
sense of moral order, a threat to that order, and an intimate knowledge of 
the students themselves.
Teacher Sovereignty and Student Bodies
Teachers’ sense that they were supposed to act in a fair and even legal man-
ner often clashed with their sense that they had to do whatever it took to 
make students moral. This mandate to make students moral was so impor-
tant to teachers that they were willing to use their power to subject students 
to coercion and even violence, effectively punishing students much as other 
state actors punished teachers. Although technically illegal, corporal pun-
ishment was ubiquitous throughout Eritrea at the time of my fieldwork. The 
law was typically ignored. The vast majority of teachers carried sticks or 
pieces of hose with them to class, and it was common for them to have stu-
dents kneel and/or extend their palms to be slapped with the stick or hose if 
they arrived late, talked in class, failed to do their homework, or behaved in 
any other disruptive way. Teachers were positioned to decide on the excep-
tion, in Agamben’s sense. Sometimes this literally involved deciding when to 
make exceptions to the law prohibiting the use of physical violence against 
students, and sometimes this involved deciding which type of force or coer-
cion to use when the law was ignored, as it often was. But teachers’ decisions 
on the exception also drew on their sense of moral crisis. Two imaginaries of 
the state were reflected in this conflict between legality and morality—on 
the one hand, that the state should be fair, predictable, and orderly, and on 
the other hand, that the self-imposed mandate that teachers shape students 
into moral beings might transcend fairness and regulatory predictability. 
These different imaginaries often came to a head around several contested 
instances of corporal punishment, which I discuss below.
Much emphasis has been placed on the sovereign’s capacity to kill or do 
physical harm. In Agamben’s depiction, this capacity is absolute. What I 
emphasize here is how debates over the efficacy, appropriateness, and moral-
ity of using force frame and temper this capacity. The everyday sovereign 
may act with impunity vis-à-vis the law under the state of exception, but 
there are always forces and factors that shape and constrain the use of force. 
What made debates over corporal punishment complicated was the vari-
ety of perspectives on what the conditions, limits, and purpose of violence 
should be, which were infused not only by the broader political context 
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and the sense that teachers were on their own but also by a sense of fairness 
and wanting to enact “law” fairly. Several anecdotes illustrate the range of 
approaches to corporal punishment and their contested nature.
“Corporal Punishment Is the Only Way”
One morning, in between classes at the Junior Secondary School, Teacher 
Paolo struck up a conversation with me. “I’ve decided to give up corporal 
punishment,” he announced somewhat proudly. He explained to me that 
it was not fair to use corporal punishment with the Afar students, because 
they were not accustomed to it. Sometimes they would even hit the teacher 
back when beaten, and he wanted to teach and avoid fights. Paolo was a 
thoughtful teacher who seemed to grasp some of the subtleties of cultural 
differences. I told him I admired his sensitivity and eagerness to experiment 
with different approaches and that I looked forward to hearing whether he 
was successful. Although other teachers talked about limiting their use of 
corporal punishment, this was the first time I had ever heard anyone plan 
to give it up entirely.
There was a widespread sentiment among teachers that students would 
not respect them if the teachers did not hit them. Teacher Haile explained 
to me that in teacher training, they were taught that corporal punishment 
was bad for children, but once they began teaching, they found that they 
could not control their classes without it and that there was no support for 
not using it:
We had learned that corporal punishment was not allowed and not 
good for students, but the students wouldn’t take us seriously. You 
want to look like a good teacher, but you can’t do that as long as you 
avoid this corporal punishment. Students push you. Senior teachers 
tell you corporal punishment is the only way. (Interview, Haile)
Paolo eventually came to a similar conclusion. When I interviewed him 
several months after his bold declaration that he was not going to use corpo-
ral punishment and asked how it was going, he explained why his plan did 
not work: “I was not successful. I went back to physical punishment. But I 
am trying to do other things. Before I was punishing them all of the time, 
but now only when the students become crazy.”
Like many teachers before him, Paolo came around to see corporal pun-
ishment as a pedagogical necessity, but one that could and should be used 
sparingly. He learned that while a teacher could limit his or her use of cor-
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poral punishment, it was difficult to teach without it. In fact, in my own 
experience teaching in Eritrea, I admit that I inadvertently came to a similar 
realization. Although I never resorted to hitting students, I did make them 
kneel down at times and, once, when faced with a thoroughly unmanage-
able class, I called the school director, who, much to my shock and dismay, 
hit the students.
Several points are illuminated by Paolo’s bold experiment. First, it 
reflected the strength of the belief that students would not respect their 
teacher if he or she did not resort to corporal punishment. This attitude was 
so widespread that most teachers never considered not resorting to corporal 
punishment. It was a daily part of schooling in Eritrea, as it is elsewhere. But 
Paolo’s experiment also reflected a sense that there were limits and alterna-
tives to the use of force. Paolo’s attitude, like that of many teachers, was that 
corporal punishment was part of a teacher’s pedagogical tool kit, necessary 
to create an orderly climate for teaching, but to be used sparingly and stra-
tegically. There were other understandings of the pedagogy of punishment, 
however. Some teachers believed not only that corporal punishment was 
necessary to create orderly conditions in which students could learn well but 
also that violence itself would make students more moral.
“He Is a Very Stupid Boy”
Four teachers and the school director sat in a semicircle around a student 
who was kneeling on the ground in front of them. They questioned him 
sternly for several minutes, and then the director stood up and asked him 
to stretch out his arm. He hit the student several times on his palm with 
a stick. The boy, who was obviously in pain, at one point pulled his hand 
back and was roughly ordered to put it back for more blows. He cried out 
in pain, and a smile flickered across one teacher’s face. After the boy had 
been dismissed, I asked what he had done. One teacher answered, “He is a 
very stupid boy.”
Another added, “He is very bad.”
Finally, the director explained to me that the boy had disappeared from 
his home and from school for three days. His mother and sister had been 
looking frantically for him, and his mother had asked for the assistance of 
the school staff in disciplining her child. Corporal punishment was used 
here as a means to teach the student a lesson—that running away was bad. 
The assertion that the boy was “stupid” combined with the blows suggested 
that they hoped he would learn something from his punishment.
“His parents are divorced,” another teacher added, as if this explained 
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things. In this instance, teachers were rather directly being asked to stand 
in for the student’s father and were being placed in a disciplinary role by 
the student’s mother. State actors—teachers— were acting in the place of 
the parent. This suggested that the teachers’ sense of their moral role as 
disciplinarians extended beyond education and into the realm of the family. 
Indeed, the teachers’ sense of their moral mandate linked the realms of the 
home, school, and state.
This case illustrates the pedagogical role of the use of force, something 
that is prevalent in schools and other state institutions, such as the military. 
Corporal punishment was used to teach students to be better people. Inflict-
ing pain showed the punished subjects that they had done something wrong 
and trained them not to do it. Teachers and parents thought pain would 
teach young people the difference between right and wrong. The pedagogi-
cal role of state violence illuminates Begoña Aretxaga’s (2003) concept of 
the “maddening state.” In the instance recounted above, a state employee 
beat a student at the request of a mother. The state here was simultaneously 
caretaking and violent, or, more precisely, violent in its caretaking. Much of 
teachers’ work as sovereigns over school space and student bodies reflected 
a similarly maddening condition. One way to think about this is that many 
teachers assumed that beating students showed that they cared about their 
development—students needed to be punished sometimes so that they 
would learn properly. On the other hand, beatings could incline toward the 
brutal and sadistic. The maddening nature of state violence is reflected in 
the use of corporal punishment in other state institutions as well. Arguably, 
when corporal punishment is used in the military, it has a similarly peda-
gogical role. Military trainees are often beaten (or worse) for not correctly 
learning skills—for example, failing to shoot a target or committing minor 
infractions of rules. The logics of this use of corporal punishment suggest an 
attitude among military trainers that is similar to that of teachers—violence 
has a pedagogical role. However, at times, in schools and elsewhere, force 
was used to assert dominance without any specific lesson being taught other 
than the lesson that the punished subject should obey the authority figure. 
The anecdote below illustrates this.
“He Will Learn Respect”
Every day, teachers would drag chairs out of the sweltering cement tea shop 
and sit in the shade overlooking the Red Sea. Often they would call to stu-
dents to bring them cups of tea, sandwiches, sodas, or cigarettes. Students 
gave teachers a lot of space unless they were summoned. One day, a student 
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whom I recognized from one of the grade 6 classes I had recently observed 
was standing and talking, jokingly, with three teachers—Lemlem, Beraki, 
and Yakob. He was a student who was large for grade 6 but did not seem 
to act his age. He seemed very eager to participate in his classes and was 
animated, playful, and enthusiastic. Teachers often seemed annoyed with 
him even though he was engaged in his studies. The other students often 
laughed mockingly at his enthusiastic attempts to participate in class.
Lemlem, Beraki, and Yakob were trying to get the student to dance. 
“He is going to show us how Michael Jackson dances,” Lemlem said to me. 
Lemlem and Yakob explained to me that the student had been “dancing 
like Michael Jackson” in the staff room the previous day, to the amusement 
of the other teachers. I looked at the student and became aware of the fact 
that the student did not want to dance and was looking apprehensive. The 
teachers were becoming more and more insistent that he dance, and he 
was becoming more and more visibly nervous about doing so, saying that 
the other students would laugh at him. Beraki, in particular, was getting 
increasingly angry because of the student’s refusal to dance.
At this point, Weldeyesus, another teacher who was known for his lib-
eral use of corporal punishment, had arrived and became involved in the 
situation. He began talking to the student in a fairly calm voice. I became 
distracted and looked away for a minute, and the next thing I knew, Wel-
deyesus had clubbed the student on the side of the head.
“Is this because he won’t dance?” I asked, incredulous. They said yes. By 
this point, two other teachers, Ezekiel and Haile, had arrived and watched 
the situation unfolding. It became clear that they were also unhappy about 
Weldeyesus’s hitting the student. The student, who was crying by this point, 
was made to kneel down. Ezekiel, Haile, and I were furious and said, “If he 
doesn’t want to dance, why make him dance?” The other teachers ignored 
us. Beraki, Yakob, and Weldeyesus seemed intent on punishing the student. 
At that point, break time was ending, and Lemlem, Ezekiel, and Haile had 
to leave.
A few minutes later, Weldeyesus made the student run around the field. 
The student returned and sat on the wall near us, and Yacob, his homeroom 
teacher, spoke to him for a while. After some time, the student was excused.
I was deeply shaken by this experience, not so much because of the 
physical violence done to the child, which was not uncommon, but because 
of the reason for his punishment, which felt like an exception to the peda-
gogical role of corporal punishment as I understood it. The student was not 
doing anything wrong. He was not breaking a rule. He just did not want to 
dance for his teachers.
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Finally, I asked Beraki and Yakob, the only teachers who remained seat-
ed around the table at that point, “How can you expect a student to learn 
right from wrong when you give him the same punishment for not dancing 
as you do for doing something else? What will he learn from this?” My ques-
tion reflected my understanding, at that time, that corporal punishment 
was typically used pedagogically—to teach students to behave appropriately 
and to follow rules.
Yakob’s answer revealed a very different manifestation of the pedagogy 
of punishment. He glared at me and answered without hesitating, “He will 
learn respect.”
A few minutes later, I saw the student walking quickly across the school 
compound with his books in hand. He was trying to leave the school 
grounds. Weldeyesus happened to be crossing his path and saw him, stopped 
him, hit him a few times with his fists, and kicked him before sending him 
back to class.
The incident described above, like other instances of corporal punish-
ment, was an enactment of sovereign power. The teacher/sovereign com-
manded the student body. This sovereign could make student/citizen bodies 
dance, hop, kneel, sit, or stand at whim. At various times, teachers did 
all of these. Teacher power here was very much the coercive power of the 
state, with its capacity to command the bodies of its subjects. If the stu-
dent body failed to comply, the teacher/sovereign could punish it, thereby 
inscribing sovereign power on that body. However, unlike the incidents that 
I described previously in which corporal punishment was used pedagogi-
cally to teach specific lessons (do not run away from home; sit quietly and 
do not talk in the classroom), here it was used to teach absolute obedience 
to authority. The only lesson being taught was that students must obey 
teachers no matter what, even when the teacher was making an innocuous 
request like asking the student to dance. This was an empty but essential 
lesson for life in a coercive state—obey your superiors, because otherwise 
they will beat you.
There are thus two notions of corporal punishment: (1) that it should 
be used sparingly, strategically, pedagogically, and as a technique to cre-
ate order; and (2) that it should be used to assert dominance and author-
ity and produce obedience and subservience. The distinctions between the 
two are sometimes subtle but significant. In these distinctions between the 
pedagogical role of force and the authoritarian/coercive one, we can see 
two different state effects prevalent in Eritrea at play and in tension with 
one another. On the one hand, the state orders and disciplines; state actors 
might use force to produce order, but always with constraint and purpose. 
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On the other hand, the state punishes arbitrarily and with impunity, pro-
ducing the coercive state effect. These distinctions played out in debates 
among teachers, and later parents, over several controversial instances of 
corporal punishment, which I discuss below. However, the overall politi-
cal climate, the moral crisis of disorder, and a sense of threat to teachers’ 
sovereignty over school space also influenced the outcome of these debates 
over corporal punishment.
Lions versus Laws
The following controversial case of corporal punishment illustrates the dis-
tinctions between teachers’ understandings of the roles and limits of cor-
poral punishment. I became aware of this case when some members of the 
discipline committee brought it to my attention and explained it to me as it 
developed. It involved a fight between a teacher and an older grade 7 student 
who was probably in his late teens. The teacher slapped the student in the 
face in the classroom for not completing his homework assignment. The 
student raised his hand to defend himself and backed away, arguing that he 
was being punished unfairly. The teacher dragged him out of the class and 
continued fighting with him in the staff room. This particular teacher was 
known to treat students strictly and harshly. The atmosphere in his class 
was absolutely silent, and he did not tolerate the most minor disturbance. 
Several of his students commented to me that he was generally disliked and 
feared by the students, in part because of his strictness and in part because 
he often failed many students.
The discipline committee consisted of three teachers and the director. 
One of the teachers, Ezekiel, almost never hit students and was frustrated 
with the increased emphasis in the school on using force discipline. He told 
me that he had recently walked out of a discipline committee meeting in 
frustration at the teachers’ insistence on emphasizing control rather than 
learning. Another teacher on the committee, Weldeyesus, used corporal 
punishment on a regular basis and was frustrated that more of the teachers 
were not stricter. The third teacher on the committee occupied the middle 
ground. Teklay often carried a stick with him to his classes and would use it 
when he felt it was warranted, but he used it pedagogically, not to terrorize 
or assert authority over students.
Members of the committee debated whether the student or the teacher 
should be punished. Yosef, the teacher involved in the incident, wanted the 
student punished for fighting with him. In many cases if a student fought 
with a teacher, this kind of behavior could warrant suspension or expulsion 
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from school, depending on the severity of the fight. On the other hand, 
the student and many of the teachers believed that Yosef was the one who 
needed to be punished for continuing to beat the student even after he had 
stopped fighting. Punishment for teachers would include a letter from the 
supervisor that would go in a teacher’s permanent file. Teachers feared hav-
ing such a letter in their files because it could impede future opportunities, 
such as transfers, training sessions, or any other opportunities that came up. 
Yosef very much hoped for a transfer to Asmara and a chance to continue his 
education, and a negative letter in his file would have a detrimental impact 
on either possibility.
Ezekiel and Teklay initially convinced Weldeyesus that, according to the 
disciplinary rules of the school, Yosef needed to be punished because he had 
continued to beat the student long after he needed to defend himself and 
because he had been too harsh to begin with by hitting the student for not 
completing his homework. Additionally, according to the law, the student 
was in the right, since corporal punishment was officially illegal. Although 
Weldeyesus argued against this view, he could not argue against the logic 
that Yosef had broken the law. However, in a second meeting, Weldeyesus 
came across more strongly, having apparently discussed the issue with Yosef. 
He commented in this meeting that he believed that only three teachers in 
the school were “like lions.” He was clearly disappointed that more teachers 
were not willing to be “lions” and, furthermore, were not willing to defend 
the lions. He considered himself and Yosef to be among the few teachers 
who cared about correcting students’ behavior. Ezekiel held his ground, 
contending that Yosef was fundamentally in the wrong and that the rules 
of the school were very clear in this case. Teklay agreed with Ezekiel, and 
Weldeyesus, outnumbered, was forced to comply with their decision.
Predictably, Yosef was furious at this decision. In the meeting when they 
told him the outcome of their decision, he banged on the director’s desk and 
threatened Ezekiel, accusing him of defending the students. The student 
was suspended for two weeks (Yosef thought he should be expelled), and 
Yosef would have a permanent letter placed in his file. Ezekiel continued to 
argue that he was simply following the “law” of the school and upholding 
the right principles. According to Ezekiel, a teacher could not complain 
about a student fighting with him when the “law” clearly said that the 
teacher did not have the right to hit the student in the first place. This was 
an interesting instance because, although teachers often noted that corporal 
punishment was illegal, no one attempted to adhere to these laws.
I would argue that this was not a debate over the legality of corporal 
punishment itself. Rather it was a debate about the nature of teacher sov-
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ereignty, or, in other words, a debate about when and how teachers could 
make decisions about the exception. A variety of issues were at stake. Did 
teachers have the “right” to use unchecked force against students? Could 
they act with total impunity? Or were there limits to their use of force? 
As is apparent by the ubiquity of corporal punishment as well as the range 
of instances of corporal punishment discussed in this chapter, the legality 
of the everyday use of corporal punishment was not questioned, and yet 
members of the discipline committee evoked the law in this instance to 
enable other teachers to place limits on Yosef ’s use of force. Yosef, according 
to some teachers, had gone too far. He had decided on the exception inap-
propriately, and other teachers held him accountable for making the wrong 
decision.
Questions about the limits of the use of force not only challenged teach-
er sovereignty but also reflected different assumptions about student sub-
jectivity. Teachers who stood by their right to use unchecked force tended 
to believe that a moral, respectful student was one who would not question 
authority and would do whatever the teacher ordered. If they did not, they 
could be punished in as brutal a manner as the teacher chose. This stance 
was reflected in Weldeyesus’s claim that teachers should be “lions” and also 
in the incident where the student was beaten severely for not dancing like 
Michael Jackson. In contrast, teachers who believed that force had limits 
believed that students needed to be taught to be moral and respectful and 
that force was a key means to do so, but that students also had rights and 
that teachers had responsibilities to constrain their use of force. The per-
spective that emphasized law was, thus, less about enacting the law and 
more about evoking it as a stand-in for limits to teacher sovereignty.
Weldeyesus’s and Yosef ’s assertions that (1) teachers should be “lions” 
and (2) if they cared about education, they had to be willing to be bru-
tal gained purchase during this particular time period. At a time when 
all teachers perceived that students were increasingly out of control and in 
need of greater discipline and control, this argument was powerful. At the 
same time, teachers such as Yosef were increasingly frustrated with their 
own work and lives. Their frustration, combined with deep-seated beliefs 
about the efficacy of corporal punishment, made them far less amenable to 
alternate perspectives about the use of force in punishing students. Below, 
I complicate this even more by exploring another controversial instance of 
corporal punishment that was, in many respects, very similar, except that 
in this case teachers found themselves in solidarity with each other rather 
than challenging each other’s use of force.
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Teacher Rights
As we saw above, some teachers were often extremely defensive about their 
“right” to use force against student bodies even when other teachers sug-
gested that their use of force had extended the boundaries of what was 
commonly regarded as appropriate. In many ways, this perceived right to 
use force against student bodies was the epitome of teacher sovereignty. The 
following incident illustrates the interplay of these particular tensions.
This highly controversial disciplinary incident involved the school direc-
tor’s hitting a student for failing to obey him. The director warned the 
student not to leave his classroom and later found him outside the class. He 
took the student into his office to punish him by hitting him on the palm 
with a piece of rubber hose, but the student apparently flinched away from 
the swing, resulting in the director’s hitting the student in the stomach 
with the piece of hose. No one witnessed the incident. The student was 
later taken to the hospital, where the doctor considered surgery. Although 
ultimately it was decided that no surgery was necessary, there was much 
talk about the director’s facing charges for physically hurting the student. 
The director realized that he hit the student inappropriately and visited 
the family, which was the culturally appropriate action to take under the 
circumstances; the court decided several months later that he was required 
to make a monetary reparation of 1,000 nakfa (roughly $50, the equivalent 
of a bit less than one month’s salary) to the family.
Several factors were interesting about the conversations about this inci-
dent that occurred among teachers over the course of several months. First, 
the level of solidarity among teachers and the support they had for the direc-
tor were striking. Even teachers who never or seldom hit students advocated 
for the director in this case. In fact, no teacher in the school condemned or 
criticized the director’s actions. Unlike the case discussed earlier in which 
some teachers claimed that they were “lions” and other teachers stood by 
the “law,” here teachers were in agreement that the director had not behaved 
inappropriately. Second, many teachers commented that by attempting to 
run away from punishment, the student had brought a harsher punishment 
on himself. Running away from a punishment was thought of as a moral 
aberration. Blaming the student for running away indicated that teach-
ers thought of this incident as a reflection of the general “out-of-control” 
environment in the school—morally aberrant students were not accepting 
their punishments, leading to greater extremes of violence and problems for 
everyone.
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Other narratives that circulated around this event illuminated the larger 
issues at stake in Eritrea and reflected several imaginaries of the state. It 
was notable that at the time of the incident, teachers frequently complained 
about the ineffectiveness of the (government-run) hospital. A wide array of 
Junior Secondary School teachers engaged in this discourse of complaining 
about the hospital and together recounted many harrowing tales about the 
same hospital and doctor. When discussing the director’s case, one teacher 
described another teacher’s wife’s miscarriage, blaming it on the negligence 
of the hospital staff. Stories circulated that this doctor had a habit of per-
forming unnecessary surgeries. One teacher even said he had heard nurses 
complaining that this doctor seemed to perform surgery to “practice” on his 
patients. Another teacher noted that when his sister gave birth, this same 
doctor wanted to perform an unnecessary cesarean section on her. These 
tales of an inept hospital and doctor served to discredit the accounts that 
the school director had seriously injured the student by casting suspicion on 
another state institution—the hospital. Although many of the teachers did 
have a good deal of evidence to doubt the doctor and the hospital (which 
suffered from shortages of well-trained and educated manpower), the tim-
ing of these tales of hospital horrors was strategically placed to discredit the 
doctor and, thus, vindicate the director. At the same time, these stories of 
hospital incompetence also projected an imaginary of another state institu-
tion—and, by extension, the state itself—as incompetent.
Another narrative that emerged in response to this incident related to 
the lack of Ministry of Education support for teachers’ efforts to regain con-
trol over schools. When discussing the accusations against the school direc-
tor, teachers brought up the lack of ministry support for their reorganization 
of grade 8, for their broader efforts to better control students, and for their 
specific efforts to have certain older students removed from school. This 
was notable because the boy who was injured by the director was neither an 
older student nor a grade 8 student and thus had no direct connection to 
these complaints. However, teachers narrated the accusations against their 
director as evidence of the lack of support for their work by the Ministry 
of Education. The criticism that the director had behaved inappropriately 
was seen as further evidence of the lack of support by the ministry, thereby 
making teachers feel somewhat akin to vigilantes in working on their own 
to reclaim control over their schools.
It is interesting that there was widespread solidarity in support of the 
school director’s case while there was criticism in Yosef ’s case. One reason 
for solidarity was that the director was generally seen as a fair person, where-
as Yosef often was not. But, even more significantly, teachers saw these accu-
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sations against their director as an attack on the school and on their work as 
teachers. The narratives I discussed above—the narrative of the inept state 
and the narrative of being abandoned by the ministry—served to galvanize 
teachers in support of the director, but they also reflected imaginaries of the 
impotent, incompetent state, one that could not or would not support the 
work teachers were trying to do.
Being Seen as the State: Part II
Parents provide a different commentary on teachers’ use of force, and in 
these comments we find another way in which teachers are “seen as the 
state.” Two meetings were called for teachers and parents shortly after the 
start of the spring semester in February 2004. The semester was getting 
off to a late start, and students were still not showing up for school. At 
the first meeting, Ministry of Education officials responded to pressure 
by teachers to get parents to help send their students to school by telling 
parents that they would face “consequences” if they did not send their chil-
dren to school. This approach suggested that parents were complicit in the 
disordered and chaotic conditions of schooling. At the same meeting, the 
Ministry of Education told teachers to “be serious” about taking attendance 
and following other procedures, such as cleaning the classrooms, suggesting 
that a teacher’s failure to do his or her job properly also produced condi-
tions of disorder and chaos. While the “consequences” parents would face 
were not made clear, the threat to parents effectively functioned to remind 
them that it was their responsibility to send their children to school. This 
reminder, combined with the pressure on teachers to tighten mechanisms of 
controlling students, was enough to get the semester off to a start. Almost 
immediately following this meeting, students started showing up for school, 
and the semester was able to begin.
Although the school got started a few weeks later in mid-March, parents 
and teachers continued to be disturbed by the conditions in schools and the 
behavior of students, so another meeting was called for them—this time by 
the town’s administration, with the meeting itself run by the mayor. Unlike 
the previous meeting, which was intended to specifically address the issue 
of students not coming to school, there was no clear objective or outcome to 
the second meeting. Also, in contrast to the previous meeting, which placed 
the responsibility for student behavior on parents, this meeting seemed to 
give parents a chance to vent their feelings and the teachers a chance to 
reply. In this meeting, a debate ensued as to who was responsible for the 
failure to control the students. Parents blamed teachers’ lack of motivation 
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for the disorderly condition of schools, while teachers blamed parents’ fail-
ure to make their children come to school. Everyone, however, was generally 
anxious about students’ “immoral” behavior. What was in tension here was 
a perspective in which teachers were “seeing like a state” and being seen 
as the state. Teachers were aspiring to impose a system of regulatory, dis-
ciplinary order on students such that they could accomplish their goals of 
transforming them into educated citizens. In doing this, teachers believed 
it necessary to enforce regulations, to utilize technologies of categorization 
and containment, and to use force if need be.
Meanwhile, parents were “seeing the state” but seeing it in two ways—
as overly coercive, controlling, and punishing on the one hand, but also 
as inept, disorganized, and irresponsible on the other. Parents’ complaints 
suggested that teachers were too strict and unfair in their punishments at 
times, thereby depicting teachers as the punishing state. Specifically, several 
parents found it unjust that particular students had been dismissed from 
school for disciplinary infractions. They also found teachers’ reasons for 
suspending students from their classrooms unfair. Parents complained in 
particular about relatively new procedures in both the Junior Secondary 
School and Senior Secondary School whereby late students were locked out. 
At the same time, parents complained that teachers were not able to “con-
trol” the students and often questioned teachers’ motivation, or lack thereof, 
accusing them of not doing their jobs properly and suggesting that this 
failure was the reason for schools’ being out of control. Parents picked up on 
the tight controls that teachers tried to put in place, which I have described 
in this chapter, but also on the evasiveness and disorder that I discussed in 
the last chapter. In effect, their imaginaries of the teacher state reflected 
the condition of impotence. The teacher state, as imagined by parents, was 
simultaneously disorderly and coercive.
Conclusion
Teachers experienced these years as a time of moral crisis. Teacher sover-
eignty, which was enacted through practices of containment, categoriza-
tion, and corporal punishment, was a response to this condition of moral 
breakdown. I began this chapter with a discussion of encampment and the 
work of walls. Walls enabled control and categorization by demarcating 
good from bad spaces and good from bad people. Encampment enabled 
teacher sovereignty, because within walled-off spaces teachers could act with 
impunity on student bodies—they decided on the exception. Students were 
at the whims of teachers who could decide when force was appropriate and 
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inappropriate, but, significantly, teachers’ use of force was also framed and 
constrained by a number of factors, complicating our sense that just because 
state actors can use force, they will.
The state is imaginatively produced on the basis of everyday encounters 
between citizens and state actors, such as those I have described in this 
chapter. Teachers were imagined as the state, sometimes criticized as inept, 
and sometimes regarded as overly coercive. Interestingly, these are the same 
two poles that framed Eritreans’ imagination of their state more broadly. 
Recall in Chapter 2 that Eritreans complained that gifa was overly coercive 
but then also attempted to make sense of gifa by commenting that the state 
had to resort to these measures because it was too inept to catch those who 
legitimately deserved to be detained; on the one hand, the state is seen as 
punishing, but on the other hand, it is seen as unfortunately stumbling in 
its efforts to create order.
In closing, I suggest that we can draw many parallels between teacher 
sovereignty and the sovereignty of other state actors, including police, mili-
tary personnel, and bureaucrats. All of these state actors “see like the state” 
in the sense that they, by virtue of their own education and training and 
their appropriation of “high modernist” ideologies, have been disciplined 
and socialized into believing in the ordering of space, the clear organizing 
of categories, and the imposing of procedures to order and organize (Scott 
1998). Other state actors authorized to use force are similar in many respects 
to Eritrean teachers, although there are clearly differences between teachers, 
whose state function is to socialize and teach, and the police or military, 
whose state function is to use force. By its very nature, the state of excep-
tion authorizes state actors to use force with a good degree of impunity—to 
decide on the exception. But deciding on the exception also requires mak-
ing a decision that often is not constrained by law, regulation, or procedure. 
What I have shown here is how the confluence of political conditions, frus-
tration with the political and social climate, a sense of being criticized by 
other state actors and by “society,” and, most importantly, culturally specific 
notions of morality all help determine how decisions to use force are made. 
What constitutes morality and what constitutes an appropriate way to pro-
duce moral subjects is not constant but rather shifting, contested, debated, 
and negotiated. I suggest that this framework might illuminate the decisions 
to use force among all kinds of state actors in Eritrea and elsewhere. Hav-
ing said this, it might be tempting to read the school as a microcosm of the 
country, teachers as a microcosm of the state, and the use of force against 
students as an indication that they are being socialized as mindless, obedient 
automatons primed for authoritarian rule. Indeed, some work on school-
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ing for democracy has made the argument that students are pedagogically 
primed for authoritarian rule (Harber and Mncube 2012). My argument, 
however, is that teachers are not merely mirroring the state by using force 
but constituting the state. The teacher state, in Eritrea and elsewhere, is cer-
tainly reflective of the ongoing state of exception, which allows teachers to 
act with a good deal of impunity and strips students of any legal rights. But 
teachers are not merely mirroring the broader state, because they enact the 
state of exception on the basis of their own unique prejudices, assumptions, 
beliefs, stereotypes, and morality, all of which are contested and debated. 
The teacher state is, thus, a manifestation of the state of exception, but one 
that is demarcated by teachers’ own attitudes about education, morality, the 
future of the nation, and their students.
conclusion
Escape, Encampment, and  
the Alchemy of Nationalism
Escape
September 12, 2005, was the day after New Year’s in the Ge’ez (Ortho-dox) calendar. It had been a tense two months as we tried to get an exit visa for my husband. My fieldwork was finished, my funding was 
ending, and our nerves were growing frayed by the constant uncertainties 
of the coercive state—would my husband be sent to the desert, transferred 
to Asmara, or left indefinitely in Assab? Would we have enough money to 
live on with my funding ending? Would a war break out again, drawing 
everyone into the military? Would he be detained in another round of gifa? 
Would we be able to stand the constant stresses as our lives were incessantly 
controlled by the state? Would things worsen and become more repressive, 
or was this all temporary? Our long process to receive the exit visa was 
grueling and full of hopes and fears.1 Several days before the New Year’s 
holiday, miraculously, we had an exit visa in our hands, and on New Year’s 
Eve, we bought plane tickets. It is hard to describe the emotions of those 
days. We were eager because it finally looked like he was leaving after years 
of trying, but we could not feel excited because so many things were likely 
to go wrong. Few people had the power to let us leave, while many had the 
power to stop us. I slept little during those days, anticipating, hoping, but 
trying not to hope too much.
On New Year’s Eve, we had tea with a trusted family member who 
warned us in hushed tones not to tell anyone we were leaving. Common 
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wisdom was that a jealous person might tip off someone with the power to 
bar our departure. We knew this was a real possibility. It had happened to 
people we knew. For this reason, Eritreans often leave without telling even 
their closest relatives and friends of their plans, especially if they are leaving 
illegally and making a dangerous trek across borders, but even if they are 
leaving legally with an exit visa by plane. Departure is shrouded in secrecy 
for fear of the plethora of state actors who have the ability to block their 
escape.
We packed in a daze and ate a meal at my in-laws’ house in Asmara. 
My father-in-law worked for Eritrean Airlines, but when he departed for 
work that evening, we did not tell him we were leaving that night, fearful 
that, out of excitement, he would share our plans with someone at the air-
port who would then prevent us from getting on the plane. But aside from 
not telling my father-in-law, we did not do a very good job of taking our 
relative’s advice. We took two cars full of friends and relatives to the air-
port with us, probably making far more of a spectacle of ourselves than we 
should have. As we crammed our belongings and our friends into two small 
cars, our dog, which we would be leaving with my brother-in-law, ran in 
manic circles around us, yapping. She would not come to me. I hugged and 
kissed friends and relatives, including my mother-in-law, who would not be 
making the trip to the airport with us. She was a small, strong woman, and 
her hands engulfed mine as we kissed multiple times on each cheek. Greet-
ings and salutations in Eritrea are always full of restrained emotion and were 
particularly so that evening. I remember the calm, kind expression on my 
mother-in-law’s face, an expression that could, and often did, quickly break 
out into broad laughter and always reflected her faith that everything would 
work out, despite the fact that she had lived through multiple wars and mul-
tiple dictators. That night her expression only hinted at the combination of 
happiness and loss that she must have been feeling. I know she was worried 
that she would not see us again for a very long time, if ever.
It was a cold summer night in Asmara, foggy and drizzling slightly. We 
hugged everyone good-bye, thanked them all for coming, and entered the 
bright fluorescent haze of the airport. Walking up to the check-in counter 
was surreal. The mixed emotions of the past weeks crystalized. I could not 
help but become giddy as we inched toward the check-in counter and got 
closer to getting on the plane. I also could not believe we were really leav-
ing, not only because this was something we had dreamed of and longed 
for but also because we knew that it still might not happen. Hope, fear, and 
disbelief were inseparable. I felt like I was walking around in several bodies 
at the same time, each in its own emotional state.
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The airport was chaotic. A throng of passengers negotiated their wildly 
oversized bags, jostling and pushing each other, loading and unloading bags 
from the scales at the check-in counter. I felt distant from all of it. My hands 
shook as I handed our passports and tickets to the airline employee. As we 
passed through immigration, my husband was pulled into one of the small 
offices next to the immigration counter. “Go ahead. It’s OK,” he told me, 
but as the door shut behind him, I froze. I went on through security and up 
to the departures lounge, but I do not remember anything until he joined 
me a few minutes later. Then, as we waited for our flight, a man wearing 
civilian clothes with a badge dangling around his neck approached him and 
asked to see his passport. He flicked through the document while we tried 
not to look nervous. I felt cold and tried not to show that I was shivering. 
He handed the documents back without making eye contact, and we began 
boarding the plane shortly after.
As we climbed the staircase to the plane, we turned around and saw 
through the fog a group of Eritrean Airlines employees clustered together, 
wearing thick jackets to keep out the cold. I could make out the thin frame 
of my father-in-law, standing slightly to the side of the group. We know he 
saw us. We wanted to wave but were afraid of doing so. Staring at each other 
through the fog, across the tarmac—that was how we said good-bye.
Even once we were sitting on the plane, bound for Rome and then New 
York, we half expected that a government official would barge onto the 
plane, tell us they had made a mistake, and whisk my husband away, impris-
oning him (metaphorically and perhaps literally) in Eritrea forever. We did 
not start breathing until we stumbled out of the airport in Rome into the 
September sunlight, seeing the world differently, somehow changed, free.
This book ends, as it began, with a departure. The evacuation of Assab 
in 2000 profoundly and permanently changed the town. Many did not 
return. After that, the town came to feel like a military encampment, a place 
where people were forced to be. The border war and its failure to completely 
end set Eritrea on its current, securitized course. Its leaders became preoc-
cupied with the potential for renewed war and oriented the entire country 
toward being under a state of siege (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014). The 
evacuation of Assab, which led to mass conscription, was a threshold, an 
entry point into the limitless liminality of National Service. Teachers who 
returned to Assab after summer 2000 were changed and living in a changed 
country.
In the years since the conclusion of my fieldwork, departures such as 
ours, and other far more harrowing escapes, have become all too common 
in Eritrea. As this book goes to press, the United Nations has noted a vast 
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increase in the already enormous numbers of Eritreans fleeing the country 
(Al Jazeera 2014; Gedab News 2014c; UN News Centre 2014). When I first 
went to Eritrea in 1995, leaving the country was unheard of for most. “Why 
would anyone want to leave the country?” one teacher asked, incredulous. 
“There is nothing sweeter than living in one’s own country.” That particular 
teacher is now in the United States. Of the teachers who taught in the Junior 
and Senior Secondary Schools in Assab during the years of my fieldwork, 
I know of only one who remains in Assab and three, when I last checked, 
who remain in Eritrea. Of the educational administrators, civil servants, 
and teachers in other schools whom I know and am friends with, countless 
more have left. They have spread across the world now, living throughout 
western Europe, the United States, and East Africa. I know Eritreans in 
Australia, New Zealand, Mozambique, Angola, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and 
South Africa. Some left legally, with a much coveted exit visa, by plane. 
Others were not so fortunate and made the treacherous journey by land 
or sea to Yemen, Sudan, or Ethiopia. Some managed to make their way to 
South America and then traveled across the southern border to claim asylum 
in the United States. Others made their way north by land across Sudan, 
Egypt, and Libya, risking being kidnapped, tortured, and held for ransom 
in the Sinai Desert or dying at sea while crossing the Mediterranean. I know 
that at least one of the teachers who appears in this book has died making 
this journey.
For Eritreans, a life outside the country is much coveted, but leaving 
involves intensive sacrifices. For years after my husband and I left, we con-
stantly reminded ourselves how lucky we were. Life in Eritrea and leaving 
Eritrea was so difficult that freedom felt like a dream for a very long time. 
Over time our life there came to seem like the dream. Then the longing and 
the loss began to set in. Most who flee are not able to return. Some find 
that it is impossible to make enough money in their destination country 
to afford a trip back home. Some fear political repercussions upon return 
or worry they will not be given permission to leave again. Some take a 
principled stance in protest of the government’s policies and refuse to com-
ply with government requirements that would make their return safe and 
sanctioned (which I discuss below). In the ten years we have been gone, we 
have not believed that returning would be safe. During that time, both of 
my husband’s brothers have gotten married, as have countless cousins and 
friends. Children have been born, including my husband’s niece and neph-
ew. We have had two children who have never met their uncles, aunts, or 
cousins. My father-in-law and mother-in-law have both passed away without 
our seeing them again. Our children will never know their grandparents. 
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When we left Eritrea, we did not realize we were saying good-bye forever. 
We did not realize we were severing our lives. These losses born from escape 
have become integral to the experience of being Eritrean. We mourn long-
distance by Skype, Facebook, and phone with relatives and friends who are 
scattered around the world.
Many ethnographies end with an epilogue. The anthropologist revisits 
the village, chats with interlocutors, notes how the children have grown, and 
discusses how much has changed or not changed to bring the findings up to 
date. Instead, I end with departure, loss, and erasure—the literal hollowing 
out of the nation. The “village” of teachers and students that I studied no 
longer exists. The vast majority of the teachers who so generously shared 
with me their lives, their criticisms and insights into their country, town, 
school, and profession, are gone. Perhaps out of fear, perhaps frustrated with 
the inability to grow up, perhaps angry at a state that insists on militarizing 
them, they have left and now reside abroad, where they can recalibrate their 
lives and their relationship with the nation. They are no longer positioned 
to do the work of the state or to reproduce the nation by socializing a new 
generation of young people. What could be more emblematic of the impo-
tence of the state than a generation of teachers—the ones charged with 
reproducing the nation—who have fled?
In many ways, I neither chose to do fieldwork in Eritrea nor chose 
when to leave. Going to Eritrea, in my case, and leaving—for thousands of 
Eritreans and for my husband and me—was framed by the strictures of the 
coercive state and, more specifically, by the prisonlike nature of Eritrea. My 
husband was not allowed to leave, and so I went to Eritrea instead; he could 
not get out, but I could get in. Two years later, the imperative to leave and 
the timing of our departure were also a by-product of the intense, prison-
like nature of the Eritrean enclosure. Being enclosed and imprisoned means 
that when you have the chance to leave, you must take it. You do not wait 
and hope for another chance, because that chance might not come. The 
experience of being imprisoned drives Eritreans to escape into what is often 
exile, a condition from which they cannot return. Our leaving, like the 
departures of so many Eritreans, is an effect, a by-product, of the dynamics 
of encampment.
Encampment in Eritrea and Elsewhere
Throughout this book, I have suggested that Eritrea, with its prohibitions 
on leaving, its tight controls, and its biopolitical management, can be better 
understood through the logics of encampment. Enclosures—camps—are a 
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means of creating spaces that can be controlled, regulated, and managed. 
Governance through camps is the modus operandi of the Eritrean state. Not 
only is the whole country enclosed and regulated like a camp; a plethora 
of actual camps, such as military camps and work camps for students, also 
punctuate the national space and are visible throughout the country. The 
country is a series of literal camps within a larger figurative camp. Camps, 
both literal and figurative, are political spaces preoccupied with contain-
ing elements regarded as threatening and dangerous by keeping them in 
or out while also utilizing extremes of coercion and control and devolving 
sovereignty to state actors. Here I have also argued that schools are camps 
in their own right.
Processes of encampment, enclosure, and mass imprisonment are far 
from unique to Eritrea. It has been noted that nation-states in the late twen-
tieth and early twenty-first centuries face “waning sovereignty,” arguably 
giving rise to this preoccupation and near obsession with enclosure (Brown 
2010). A large number of nations are building walls, barriers, and secu-
rity fences along their borders, while other nations are building security 
barriers to protect communities within nations (for a discussion of both 
of these phenomena, see Brown 2010). Some of these forms of securitized 
enclosure—security barriers between national territories, gated communi-
ties, security gates around property—are intended to keep those who are 
unwanted out and, thereby, protect those who are in. In this sense, the 
enclosure is like a “gated community” (Brown 2010: 19). What is inside the 
walls is protected from the dangers outside. When communities or nations 
build security barriers around themselves, they simultaneously respond to 
perceived threats and produce a sense of identification with what is inside 
the enclosure.
Camps are intensely concerned with security and risk management in 
their myriad forms. Securitization leads to the utilization of the extremes of 
coercion, sometimes to keep people out, as in the case of walling off national 
borders with security barriers, and sometimes to keep dangerous elements 
in to protect society from their influence, such as in the case of prisons and 
detention centers. Eritrea is perhaps somewhat unique in that it has created 
a nationwide camp not to keep people out but to seal the nation and keep 
nationals in. Additionally, as I discuss below, this camp regulates the terms 
under which nationals who are able to get out may return. As with other 
countries that are anxious about waning sovereignty and concerned about 
security, enclosing the population within the national territory in Eritrea is 
a response to a sense of siege and security threats (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 
2014). The most pressing threat, of course, is the lingering border conflict, 
E SC A PE , ENC A MPM ENT, A ND T H E A LCH E M Y OF NAT IONA LISM  | 199
which produces the ongoing state of siege in Eritrea and, for some, justifies 
the mass militarization of the population. However, the logics of encamp-
ment in Eritrea are not just about protecting the nation from security threats 
but also about making Eritrean subjects who ascribe to the ruling People’s 
Front for Democracy and Justice’s (PFDJ’s) version of what it means to be 
Eritrean. The instinct to govern through enclosing, while rooted in the 
country’s military ethos, is about the party’s revolutionary project and its 
desire to produce a nation oriented around these revolutionary notions of 
progress, unity, and wholeness that would fuse together disparate ethnic, 
religious, and regional identifications. In this regard, Eritrea is, perhaps, 
similar to Cold War–era, revolutionary dictatorships, which sealed borders 
and prevented people from leaving to protect “fragile” societies, promulgate 
the ideologies of socialism, and reinvent “new” societies (Brown 2010: 40; 
see also Hinton 2005). Total social change was the ultimate goal of these 
powerfully moral Cold War–era projects, and encampment was the key 
strategy to bring about this goal. Thus, in seeking to protect its national 
community from polluting influences, Eritrea is a complex “gated com-
munity” seeking to protect itself from external threats and take care of its 
population.
In contrast to the gated community, other forms of enclosure, such as 
prisons, concentration camps, and detention centers, are intended to guard 
sovereignty by keeping those deemed to be dangerous or polluting away 
from those to be protected. Imprisonment, detention, and mass incarcera-
tion are arguably a product of the same concern about weakened sovereignty 
and the subsequent securitization that emerges from perceptions that the 
government cannot keep us safe without removing those deemed to be dan-
gerous. While the impetus to secure borders and communities looks to keep 
those deemed dangerous and unwanted out, prisons enclose those deemed 
a threat within a tightly controlled environment. They keep the danger-
ous elements in. The rationale for concentration camps, detention centers, 
and prisons is still to ward off security threats, but these camps do so by 
containing elements deemed to be threatening. They serve to imprison and 
punish those regarded as not fit to belong to the larger, protected whole. 
Because Eritrea protects itself by coercing and imprisoning its own nation-
als, it combines the two forms of encampment—the gated community that 
protects and purifies those inside and the prison that punishes those inside 
and deems them dangerous.
One of the core objectives of this book is to explore what happens to 
national identifications under these extremes of encampment. The large 
swathe of the population whose relationship with the state is mediated by 
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the biopolitical metrics of imprisonment and punishment fundamentally 
recalibrates its relationship with the nation. Arjun Appadurai (1996: 39) has 
noted that the hyphen that binds nation to state in most countries, if not all, 
is now more an “index of disjuncture” than an “icon of conjuncture.” He 
suggests that nations and states “have become one and another’s projects” 
(1996: 39). Even in a country like Eritrea, which initially appeared to be 
extremely adept at hyphenating its nation to its state, we can observe how 
the state has struggled and ultimately cannibalized its nation, its nationals, 
and its national project (Appadurai 1996: 39). At independence in Eritrea, 
the liberating and ruling party instituted an intensive, revolutionary nation-
making project. As I showed in Chapter 1, the party developed and dissemi-
nated an ideology based on the legacy of The Struggle, values of equality, 
the commonalities of all Eritrean peoples, and, above all, the willingness to 
sacrifice and die for the country. It also set in place a variety of technolo-
gies designed to produce this type of subject. However, because those tech-
nologies were coercive, particularly after the failure to demobilize when the 
border war ended, they unraveled the party’s version of nationalism, leaving 
Eritrean nationalism intact but fragmented. The party’s unitary and unified 
vision for the country coexists with multiple notions of what it means to 
be Eritrean. This turned the meaning of being Eritrean into a question, a 
debate, no longer defined by party hegemony based on the tropes of revolu-
tion and sacrifice. 
The party and the government it had put in place now struggled to 
reproduce the values of the struggle for independence. In the absence of 
effervescent buy-in from Eritreans, the government wound up forcing peo-
ple into National Service, leading Eritreans to imagine the party’s nation-
making project as emblematic of the punishing state. They thought of 
themselves as punished subjects, forced to serve rather than valiantly sac-
rificing for the good of the nation. Attempts by the leadership to stay true 
to its nation-building agenda, which tried to maintain the hyphen between 
nation and state, produced a vicious cycle of coercion and evasion. Once 
committed to forcing citizens to comply with its nation-building agenda 
(and to National Service in particular), the leadership had no choice but 
to continue to coerce. Meanwhile, the more coercive the state became, the 
more Eritreans evaded forms of coercion. This in turn led to more coercion 
and more evasion, ultimately leading to large numbers of people fleeing the 
country.
The vicious cycle of coercion and evasion is not simply a battle between 
a monolithic state with the will and capacity to force and a population intent 
on escape and evasion. Rather, it is also enacted between middle actors, 
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such as teachers and citizens. This vicious cycle plays out not between The 
State and The People, writ large, but through everyday encounters between 
people who have multiple commitments as people and as state employees. 
Thus, this cycle occurs within the state apparatus itself, leading to multiple 
contradictions, inconsistencies, and inefficiencies that reveal the impotence 
of the state. In other words, as state employees struggle to be the state, they 
embody the cycle of coercion and evasion.
Under a regime of encampment, state sovereignty devolves into a pleth-
ora of individual state actors. If the camp is the embodiment of the state of 
exception, which normalizes the use of force and abandons the rule of law, 
then there is little to stop state employees from utilizing coercion or violence 
with impunity (Agamben 1998, 2005). This is certainly the case in Eritrea 
and elsewhere; it is evident in the behavior of bureaucrats, who may deny 
people documentation that will give them the freedom to leave the country, 
change jobs, pursue higher education, or even take annual leave. Many in 
Eritrea, including my husband and me, experienced this when trying to 
acquire exit visas; we became aware of how many people have the power 
to deny, contain, and constrain. Impunity is also apparent in the many 
accounts of punishment, torture, and detention within military units as 
well as among the police, who commonly use force and generally make 
decisions about the use of violence outside any guidance of law.2 Impunity 
is present in schools, where teachers seal off school compounds, have stu-
dents arrested, sort students, and use violence liberally as a punishment. 
Under a state of exception, particular places—schools, military units, and 
even ministry offices—become their own sovereign spaces where power is 
diffused to those who act with impunity, making decisions about the use of 
force on behalf of the state, but not according to any coherent state mandate 
or policy.
State employees, including bureaucrats, military commanders, police, 
and teachers, may act coercively and even violently. Though they act with-
out the constraint of law, there is usually a complex logic to their use of 
violence and force, which may constrain violence or unleash it. Morality, 
beliefs, prejudices, and attitudes frame their decisions about the use of force 
and coercion, while debates about all of these complicate their decisions. 
Uncertainty about the future and a sense of moral crisis heighten the stakes 
of these debates, reframing these decisions about coercion and violence. 
Additionally, state actors’ own imaginaries of the state—in this case, imag-
inaries of the state as failing to maintain order—amplify their sense of 
responsibility for the morality of the nation. Thus, state actors may act with 
impunity under a devolved state of exception, but they do so in response to 
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a complex configuration of factors, including their own contested morality, 
the insecurity brought on by an uncertain future, and their own imaginaries 
of what the state is doing to rectify this insecurity.
To further complicate our understanding of the state, these same state 
actors, who produce coercive state effects within the sovereign space of their 
own encampment, are also subject to regimes of encampment and coercion 
within the larger nationwide camp. Middle actors respond to being evaded 
with coercion and respond to being coerced with evasion, thus embodying 
the vicious cycle of coercion and evasion. Due to the limitless liminality 
of National Service, teachers believed they could not help students “grow 
up.” Indeed, they could not grow up themselves. As a result, they gave up, 
slacked off, and joined the students in a kind of foot-dragging resistance 
that made the schools ineffective. Teachers showed up late and generally 
“did not act like teachers.” They mocked the national narrative and created 
opportunities, willingly or unwillingly, in which students could do so as 
well. Many sought ways to escape the teaching profession and, ultimately 
left the country, seeing few other options. At the same time, the ensuing 
disorder that teachers helped create gave rise to their resurging sense of 
moral crisis and an effort to retake control that was almost vigilante-like in 
its determination to do better than the government at governing students.
Coercion and evasion inevitably produce each other, particularly within 
the enclosed conditions of encampment. This was certainly apparent in 
schools, but also in Eritrea as a whole. Imprisoning the nation produces 
desires and, indeed, a sense of the necessity to escape, which in turn pro-
duces the necessity of more coercive measures to prevent people from escap-
ing. Containing people within enclosed military units, where violence is 
rampant, produces the need to evade National Service but also creates the 
state’s need to enact more coercive means to conscript. Gifa was one such 
method; utilizing schools as a technology of conscription was another. Stu-
dent attempts to use schooling to evade National Service led teachers to 
become more coercive by tightening the school enclosures and shoring up 
school walls, which, in turn, led students to slack off more in schools and 
led teachers to believe that they were justified in using even more force. 
Although the examples I provide are mostly from schools in Eritrea, the 
mutuality of coercion and evasion certainly has played out more broadly 
in Eritrea and also plays out elsewhere, particularly in light of the rising 
preoccupation with walled sovereignty and the logics of governance that 
accompany an increased preoccupation with encampment worldwide.
Ultimately, the cycle of coercion and evasion reveals the state as impo-
tent. Teachers were impotent, failing to either make schools into controlled 
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spaces or to provide students with an alternative to the broader imprison-
ment, punishment, and coercion of life as a subject of the Eritrean regime. 
More broadly, the government was impotent in several ways. It came to 
rely on coercion and violence to enact its nation-making project—specifi-
cally, National Service. Meanwhile, it lacked the capacity to regulate and 
control the use of force by its own employees. Thus, this use of force did 
not accomplish any desired ideological or imaginative effects. Instead, it 
made state subjects feel coerced and evasive. These coerced subjects came 
to imagine the state negatively, delegitimizing and mistrusting the govern-
ment’s national project but not abandoning the nation or their sense of 
belonging to it.
Eritrea, with its hearkening back to an earlier era of Cold War authori-
tarianism, is a notably difficult case to compare. It might, at first glance, 
look like an artifact of an earlier political era in which it was not unheard of 
for countries to seal their borders, lock in their citizens, and exert extreme 
controls over their people. But I suggest that it is also a harbinger of things 
yet to come, an extreme form of encampment that punishes the punishers, 
coerces those who coerce, imprisons its citizens, and thereby cannibalizes 
the nation and renders the state impotent. Eritrea illuminates rising, and 
often hidden, forms of authoritarianism worldwide. This apparently odd 
case of Eritrea can shed light on state struggles elsewhere.
Much of the literature on authoritarianism, most of which comes out of 
political science, has attempted to differentiate authoritarian from demo-
cratic regimes. Despite a growing literature on the hybrid regimes in the 
post–Cold War era, which makes the important point that there is a com-
plex politics within authoritarian regimes, most of the work in this area still 
distinguishes between distinct regime types (see, for example, Brownlee 
2007; Gandhi 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010; Svolik 2012). It also tends 
to focus on political elites rather than on everyday life, meaning that we 
know very little about microlevel politics under conditions of authoritarian-
ism. Anthropology would seem to be the field that might illuminate these 
dynamics; however, there has been little to no work in anthropology explic-
itly on authoritarianism. Several studies are incisive in this regard, but at 
present there is no readily identifiable anthropological literature on authori-
tarianism (see, for example, Mbembe 2001; Skidmore 2004; Wedeen 1999). 
This is a significant omission in the field given that forms of authoritarian 
governance are proliferating despite the widespread transition to formal 
democracy in many countries over the last two decades. Indeed, we might 
argue that so-called democracy and authoritarianism seem to be moving 
toward each other, with what are labeled authoritarian regimes holding elec-
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tions and what are categorized as democracies utilizing increasingly authori-
tarian tactics to manage their populations.
This is particularly apparent at the level of lived experiences of people 
who live under all regime types. This makes it all the more necessary for 
anthropology, and ethnography more generally, to examine the phenom-
enon of authoritarianism. From the vantage point of lived, everyday authori-
tarianism, I have focused on the effects of three facets of this experience: 
coercion, and particularly the use of force; encampment, including impris-
onment; and punishment, particularly as it frames a sense of subjectivity 
around being punished. As I have noted above, these facets of everyday 
authoritarianism are common in Eritrea and elsewhere. Indeed, a focus on 
these three elements makes Eritrea look much less like a unique case.
As I have written this book, I cannot help but be aware of how these 
three facets of authoritarianism play out in other, very different contexts 
where extremes of imprisonment are present, including neighborhoods fif-
teen minutes from where I live in Philadelphia. In the urban United States, 
a hugely disproportionate number of men of color come in contact with the 
carceral state through the police, the legal system, or prisons. The urban 
poor in the United States increasingly encounter the state predominantly 
through the auspices of being a suspect or a criminal—in short, being a 
punished subject. As this happens, not unlike in Eritrea, whole populations 
come to see the state as punishing and equate their status as citizens with 
being punished subjects (Lerman and Weaver 2014; Rios 2011). Ethnogra-
phies in these contexts suggest that as a guilty-until-proven-innocent men-
tality takes hold in these communities, subjects come to understand that 
there is no reliable rule of law, only a series of policing and legal practices 
that strip them of their humanity, constrain their everyday lives, and limit 
the way they think about their future (Goffman 2014; Rios 2011). A series 
of encounters with the force of law strip punished subjects of their human-
ity, rendering them “bare life” and repeatedly subjecting them to the state 
of exception.
Eritreans have responded to the inevitability of being punished by the 
state with evasiveness. This also resonates with accounts from the urban 
United States, where young men will go so far as to avoid signing up for 
government benefits that they are entitled to, avoid going to hospitals when 
injured or to see the birth of their children, and avoid attending public ser-
vices and public places out of the knowledge that they may be punished or 
imprisoned if they do so (Goffman 2014; Rios 2011). This is not so different 
from Eritreans’ learning to avoid public streets, the workplace and, at times, 
weddings and other events to avoid gifa. Ongoing attempts to avoid being 
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punished frame life in the urban American police state similar to the way 
they do in the prison state of Eritrea. As the vicious cycle of coercion and 
evasion plays out, Eritreans and members of urban, poor, American com-
munities master intricate strategies to live life “on the run” (Goffman 2014).
While there is an expanding understanding of what it is like to be a 
punished subject, little work helps us understand the symbolic and actual 
violence used by middle actors within these contexts. While my work has 
focused on teachers, I suggest that this complex configuration of coercion 
and evasion, morality and power, frames decisions to use force and coercion 
among other state actors in Eritrea and elsewhere. In the United States, 
public institutions, particularly schools, not only are aligned with the car-
ceral state and thereby positioned to punish citizens but are punished by the 
state as well. American schools increasingly have metal detectors, random 
police sweeps, no-tolerance policies, and other measures that make schools 
ever more like the larger carceral system (Kupchik 2010; Lyons and Drew 
2006). At the same time, American public schools are mandated to edu-
cate students but must do so amid intensive regulatory scrutiny and face 
increasing sanctions (punishments) if they do not perform well (Kupchik 
2010; Lyons and Drew 2006). Similarly stringent accountability measures 
regulate teachers’ work. Although there is no study that looks at American 
teachers as state actors in light of the overall climate of punishment, an 
examination of teachers—middle actors who are both punishers and pun-
ished—in this context would be fruitful. We know little about how teach-
ers respond to the mandate to punish when they themselves are punished; 
however, lessons from teachers in Eritrea might shed light on this paradox. 
It would seem logical that the same vicious cycle of coercion and evasion, 
tinged with morality, prejudices, and imaginaries of the state, would apply 
under conditions in the United States and elsewhere that teachers face the 
strictures of encampment. Understanding teachers, whose job it is to social-
ize citizens, under these types of conditions is important, because it allows 
us to understand nationalism at a historical juncture when identifications 
with nations are increasingly fragmented.
Imprisoned, punished subjects do not identify with national values or 
notions of citizenship in conventional or official ways. A growing literature 
on the punished and punishing culture of the carceral state in the United 
States (Goffman 2014; Kupchik 2010; Lerman and Weaver 2014; Lyons and 
Drew 2006; Rios 2011) and elsewhere in the democratic world (Waquant 
2009) shows that citizens in these communities have a fundamentally dif-
ferent relationship with the state. Again, there are important resonances 
between the way this plays out in Eritrea and in other punishing contexts. 
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As in Eritrea, populations susceptible to mass incarceration and state pun-
ishment in the United States recalibrate their understanding of citizenship 
and reimagine the nation. These populations in the United States, whom 
I would consider to be punished subjects, feel alienated from any sense of 
democratic citizenship or civic duty, arguably the cornerstones of Ameri-
can nationalism (Lerman and Weaver 2014). There are parallels between 
America’s punished subjects abandoning notions of democratic citizenship 
and Eritreans abandoning the ideals of party-sponsored nationalism in the 
face of mass punishment and coercion. In both cases, a large proportion of 
the population effectively opts out of any attempt to be good nationals, as 
per official definitions, and instead embraces and legitimates various forms 
of evasiveness and political subjectivity that are counter to those subject 
positions carved out by official state discourse.
Alchemical Nationalism
Escape and encampment demarcate the experience of being Eritrean and 
ascribe meaning to it; they are the two modalities through which citizens 
understand their relationship with the regime and vice versa. Eritreans can 
remain imprisoned and coerced subjects of the state, or they can flee from 
state repression. However, a third modality enables the state to recalibrate 
its relationship with citizens and citizens to reimagine the meaning of the 
nation and therefore recalibrate their relationship with the state. I call this 
third modality “alchemical nationalism.” If alchemy is the magic of taking 
something base, bare, and without value and turning it into something valu-
able and precious, then efforts of both the regime and opposition groups 
to transform unfortunate circumstances into something meaningful and 
sacred can be thought of as alchemical. Through bureaucratic procedures, 
the regime turns those who flee the country, and are therefore regarded as 
traitors and de facto criminals, into good citizens. Meanwhile, opposition 
groups discursively transform Eritreans’ experiences of suffering and bare 
life into meaningful narratives of opposition to the regime.
Over the past ten years, the number fleeing the Eritrean regime has 
exploded, leading diasporic citizenship to take two significantly different 
forms. Tricia Redeker Hepner (2009a) introduces this dynamic through her 
discussion of “generation asylum” and “generation nationalism.” Genera-
tion nationalism references the earlier generation of patriotic, government-
supporting diasporic citizens, while generation asylum references the more 
recent explosion of Eritreans fleeing the current regime.
The government, however, has more recently begun to recalibrate its 
E SC A PE , ENC A MPM ENT, A ND T H E A LCH E M Y OF NAT IONA LISM  | 207
relationship with generation asylum, seeking out ways to alchemically trans-
form generation asylum into citizens who perform as loyal citizens. Shortly 
after we left Eritrea, we learned that a teacher whom we knew well had man-
aged to leave the country around the same time we did. (In keeping with the 
secrecy that surrounds departures in Eritrea, to this day, I have no idea how 
that family managed to secure exit visas.) We have visited them periodically 
over the years and were quite surprised to learn that they planned a visit to 
Eritrea. Around the same time, after years of witnessing Eritreans’ struggles 
to flee the country and their anguish at being unable to return because 
the government regarded leaving as a crime, I suddenly became aware of 
many Eritreans, including those who had fled their National Service or 
left without permission, returning to the country to visit. I also started to 
hear more stories about those who fled, particularly those who arrived in 
Sudan, making the embassy one of their first stops so that they could receive 
documentation and identity papers. At some point in the last few years, the 
government began allowing Eritreans who left illegally to acquire consular 
services, including an ID card that would, in theory, allow them to travel 
back to Eritrea, provided they would sign a te’asa, a formal letter of apology 
that stated: “I regret having committed an offence by failing to fulfill my 
national obligation and I am willing to accept the appropriate measures 
when decided” (Hepner 2009a: 200). Signing the te’asa along with paying a 
mandatory 2 percent income tax and other additional fees effectively altered 
the relationship between Eritreans and the government (Hepner 2009a; 
Hepner and Tecle 2013). The te’asa is emblematic of the process of alchemi-
cal transformation of citizenship status and the reframing of the relation-
ship between citizens, the state, and the nation. With a signature on a letter 
that the government has formulated (and the payment of fees and taxes), 
these Eritreans are instantly altered from criminals—who if caught while 
trying to flee Eritrea would have been imprisoned, quite likely tortured, and 
possibly killed—to legal, diasporic citizens with the right to return home 
and leave again freely. Through the use of the te’asa, the government coer-
cively recalibrates notions of citizenship on a case-by-case basis, yet it still 
imprisons the broader population of Eritreans within the country.
As the diaspora is populated with larger and larger numbers of people 
who have fled the regime, opposition groups in the diaspora are involved in 
a national alchemy of their own. This becomes most clear in their appro-
priation and inversion of the language and symbolism of The Struggle to 
cast those who flee as the “sacrificial citizens” who are valiantly opposing 
the government (Bernal 2014). In October 2013, a boat that was carrying 
several hundred Eritreans capsized near the island of Lampedusa, off the 
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coast of Italy. These events pulled at the heartstrings of those around the 
world who are concerned for humanitarian issues, highlighting the plight 
of refugees and asylum seekers and Italy’s lack of preparedness to cope with 
the routine influx of immigrants. However, the way these events played out 
in Eritrean politics was quite different. While the world expressed concern 
about this grave humanitarian problem, the Eritrean government tried to 
distance itself from these events, initially pretending that these were not 
Eritreans who had died (Awate Team 2013). After some criticism for fail-
ing to mention the crash, on October 4, three days after these events, an 
announcement was made on Eritrean TV, referring to “illegal African 
immigrants” from “horn of Africa nationality” who had died, without speci-
fying where they were from (Awate Team 2013). The dead, officially for the 
Eritrean government, were alchemically transformed to country-less African 
immigrants. Later, the Eritrean government acknowledged that the losses 
were mainly Eritrean, offered condolences to the families of those who died, 
and offered to repatriate the bodies of the deceased (Clottey 2013).
Meanwhile, Eritrean diaspora opposition groups were nationalizing 
these subjects and depicting them with the most sacred language of the 
nation. For those opposed to the government, these were martyrs, equated 
with those who had fought and died for the country. Opposition websites 
posted pictures of long rows of coffins, some of them child-sized. The web-
sites juxtaposed these images with pictures of mourning Eritreans, critiques 
of government policies that drive people out of Eritrea, and declarations of 
anger at how the government was dealing with the boat crash. For these 
opposition groups, those who died in Lampedusa were martyrs who died 
fleeing, and therefore opposing, the policies of an oppressive regime. Fur-
thermore, for Eritreans in Eritrea and, particularly, in the diaspora, the trag-
edy in Lampedusa was deeply personal—many people knew or imagined 
they could have known people on that boat. Opposition groups yoked this 
affective climate of loss to a critique of the government. This was certainly 
not the first time that diaspora opposition groups appropriated the language 
of martyrdom. As Victoria Bernal (2014: 120) describes, in 2005, the oppo-
sition website Awate posted the “Martyrs Album,” a “virtual war memorial” 
to commemorate the lives of those who had died in the border war. This 
Martyrs Album, according to Bernal, was subversive not only because it 
enabled an opposition website to usurp the role of the state by publishing 
the names of the war dead but also because Awate claimed the power to 
“sacrilize” the dead, categorizing those who died in the border war as sacred 
“martyrs” along with those who died in the war for independence (2014: 
121). Opposition groups that have martyred those who died making the 
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dangerous escape from Eritrea take this one step further by labeling flight 
from the regime as the ultimate sacrifice.
Both the state and the people recalibrate nationalisms. Spaces of encamp-
ment produce and protect notions of national purity and pure belonging; 
they differentiate good citizens from bad and sort those who “really belong” 
from those who do not. The state may imprison or dispose of those who are 
deemed to be bad citizens. Indeed, the state in Eritrea has done so to a large 
number of people. But nationalism under conditions of encampment and 
exile also becomes alchemical. A symbol, image, person, or process that does 
not have value in one context can be transformed into someone or some-
thing that does. The state turns criminalized escapees into valued diasporic 
citizens. Opposition groups weave horrific tales of escape and suffering into 
valorous, brave acts of martyrdom for the nation. The government is intent 
on alchemically transforming citizenship status to bind these newly escaped 
diasporic citizens to the state. Meanwhile, opposition groups are intent on 
appropriating the sacred symbols of the nation and wresting the nation away 
from the ruling regime. While the country is enclosed and encamped—a 
space of coercion, evasion, and impotence—the places to which Eritreans 
are exiled become the spaces in which we can observe a multiplicity of actors 
and organizations, including the government, struggling over the meaning 
of the nation and the capacity to act as the state. In contrast to the enclosed 
space of the territorial nation, where the state cannibalizes its nation, weak-
ening the hyphen between nation and state, outside the national territory 
the nation and the state “become each other’s project” (Appadurai 1996: 
39), remaking the relationship between nation and state in new ways. Gov-
erning institutions redefine citizenship. People wrest the nation away from 
the state. And nationalism is constantly reimagined and remade by state, 




1. This is a point that has been made by a number of scholars, including Arjun Ap-
padurai (1996), Akhil Gupta (2012), Michael Herzfeld (1997), and Lisa Wedeen (2008).
2. This definition of the state is common in much of the anthropology of the state, but 
I am specifically influenced by Herzfeld’s (1997) and Gupta’s (2012) work in this regard. 
See also Jean-François Bayart’s work in the conclusion of The Politics of the Belly: The State 
in Africa (2009). 
3. The concept of collective effervescence comes from Emile Durkheim (1965) and is 
borrowed by Tricia Redeker Hepner (2009b) to describe the passionate sentiments of support 
and joy for independence around which Eritrean nationalism coalesced during these years. 
4. David O’Kane (2012) also uses the theme of struggle to illuminate the challenges 
of the regime to acquire legitimacy among its people. He identifies three struggles: a mili-
tary struggle (the border war), a developmental struggle, and a struggle to instill national 
identities. I emphasize the regime’s struggle to produce national identities, but I do so in 
a way that neither reifies nation or state nor equates the state with the regime, but rather 
illuminates the struggles of people to constitute nation and state and to fuse the two.
5. Achille Mbembe’s (2001) and Wedeen’s (1999) work draws on these frameworks 
but also attends to state violence specifically. Work on sovereignty that draws on Giorgio 
Agamben’s notion of devolved sovereignty also addresses the productive and unstructured 
nature of state violence (see, for example, Das and Poole 2004; Hansen and Stepputat 
2005). Finally, work on vigilantism has also used these frameworks to show how extra-state 
violence functions as the state (Buur 2003; Goldstein 2003; Lyons 2008; Smith 2004).
6. Imaginaries that emerged from state coercion reflect the maddening nature of the 
state. On the one hand, a sense that the country is under a state of siege and that therefore 
the government is legitimately taking exceptional measures to protect people may legitimate 
state coercion. Indeed, Eritrea galvanized its people, both during the war and after it ended, 
with this sense of being under siege and has often been described as “a siege state,” or a 
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“garrison state” (International Crisis Group 2010; Müller 2012a, 2012b; Tronvoll and Me-
konnen 2014). On the other hand, when the state of emergency extends beyond the point 
at which people legitimately sense that there is a threat, people interpret the emergency 
powers of coercion ascribed to state actors as the state turning against its people. However, 
in people’s imagination of the state, there is no clear delineation between when the state 
legitimately derives powers from being truly “under siege” and when it has illegitimately 
turned against its people. This uncertainty and the unevenness of imaginaries of the state 
that this uncertainty produces constitute the maddening condition.
7. Wedeen makes a similar point: that these types of perspectives that focus on dis-
cipline are important to look at even in authoritarian, coercive regimes. In her work on 
Syria, overall she is interested in looking at how the state enacts symbolic power as well as 
disciplinary power and how the two become fused, leading subjects into a situation where 
they have to behave “as if” they support the regime. I think the symbolic power in Eritrea 
was somewhat different. Because liberation was so recent and there still was a powerfully 
lingering sense of effervescent revolutionary nationalism, Eritrean nationalism was more 
conflicted than performative. This is why I think Begoña Aretxaga’s framing of the “mad-
dening state” works better to understand Eritrea than Wedeen’s notion of performing “as 
if” one is compliant with authoritarianism. 
8. For example, “the state” that is held accountable for human rights violations in 
instances of arbitrary detention, imprisonment, or torture is assumed to have malicious 
intent; it is imagined as an all-powerful state that decides to behave maliciously. However, 
what are often thought of as state violations of rights and liberties are the result of actions 
by individuals who may or may not have been incentivized or forced to engage in those 
actions by other state actors. 
9. In addition to Eritrean teachers, there were nine Indian teachers over the course of 
the two years I was in Assab, although only four stayed for the full two years. A complete 
examination of the role of these teachers and their role as “foreign” state actors is far beyond 
the scope of this book. Indian teachers were remarkably similar to Eritrean teachers in terms 
of pedagogy as well as in their understanding of their role as nation-builders. Thus, I have 
included the Indian teachers when their outlook and understanding of their role as teachers 
and “nation-builders” mirrored that of Eritrean teachers.
10. Historically, in eighteenth-century Europe, arguably the era in which the modern 
nation-state dawned, schools and the military worked together to create national identities, 
a sense of territoriality, and the mandate to protect that territory (Weber 1976). But while 
historical work tends to assert, quite rightly, that schools and the military have worked 
together to forge national attachments, the vast majority of more contemporary studies 
treat them separately, which does not allow for an exploration of the complex convergence 
and divergence of the two. There are some notable exceptions to the separation of studies 
of education and studies of militarization. Work on the relationship between militarization 
and schooling in Turkey (Altinay 2005; Kaplan 2006) makes similar observations. Addi-
tionally, there is historical work on this topic, most notably Eugene Weber’s Peasants into 
Frenchmen (1976), which treats schools and the military as key. But there is still a need for 
this relationship to be explored more fully.
11. This is similar to the bureaucratic pilgrimages that Benedict Anderson (1991) de-
scribes as being essential to forging national identifications in eighteenth-century America; 
the life trajectories of educated citizens and soldiers serve as a sort of pilgrimage that na-
tionalizes their everyday experience in local settings, such as schools or military training.
12. Militarism references not only a government’s orientation toward defense and war 
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readiness but also the infusion of military symbols and practices into citizens’ daily lives 
combined with a variety of symbolic and ritualized practices that valorize the nation’s mili-
tary past and present (Bickford 2011; O’Kane and Hepner 2009; see also Enloe 1988 and 
Lutz 2002). I understand militarization to be, as Andrew Bickford (2011: 24) notes, “an 
intentional process; something the state must set out to accomplish.” Militarism becomes 
a way of life promoted by the state, in service to the state, and, indeed, enabling citizens 
to imagine the state. Militarism becomes a way of understanding the past, present, and 
future of the nation. Additionally, in militarized societies, experiences and encounters with 
military personnel and institutions mediate social experiences. 
13. Exceptions to this include ethnographic studies conducted in Eritrea, which focus 
on various facets of everyday life in post-liberation Eritrea (see, for example, Bozzini 2011, 
2013; Mahrt 2009; O’Kane 2012; Poole 2009, 2013; Treiber 2009, 2010; Tronvoll 1999; 
Woldemikael 2009, 2013); however, with the exception of Tronvoll 1999, no other full-
length ethnographic monograph has been published until this book.
14. Eritrea has also provided fertile ground for scholars of transnationalism (Al-Ali, 
Black, and Koser 2001; Bernal 2004, 2005, 2014; Hepner 2009b). The ruling party’s exten-
sive organizational structure, which incorporates its diaspora into the national polity, has 
enabled Eritrean nationalism to remain strong among its citizens around the world (Hepner 
2009b). The government is one of few to effectively levy a mandatory tax (2 percent) on 
members of the diaspora, which is an important source of revenue for the government. 
Scholars historically have used Eritrea as a case in point to show that the nation-state was 
not, in fact, weakening or disappearing as a result of globalization, as many predicted it 
would, but that nations like Eritrea could learn to operate transnationally and actually 
strengthen the nation-state (Bernal 2004). 
CHAPTER 1
1. There is increasing and very interesting scholarship on the forms of nationalist con-
sciousness that emerged from the colonial era in Eritrea. Because my focus here is on Er-
itrean government–sponsored nationalism and the genesis of the ruling party itself, there 
is no space to delve into this very interesting form of Eritrean nationalism, but for more 
information, see Makki 2011a, 2011b and Taddia 1994.
2. Earlier thinking on identity in Africa suggested that these were diverse and varied 
populations that were not easily turned into national populations. Kwame Anthony Ap-
piah (1992) asserts that these were states seeking nations. Similarly, this is a central piece 
of Basil Davidson’s (1993) argument that the nation has been a “curse” and a “burden” for 
Africa. Complicating these earlier arguments, more recent work suggests that in an effort 
to lay legitimate claim to the state, the nation is co-opted by particular groups who seek 
to define national belonging more narrowly. Whereas earlier literature suggests that this is 
a process of rejecting the idea of the nation, more recent literature argues that because of 
the processes of democratization and the changing political field in Africa, nationalism is 
now an exclusionary process. This point is made in work on autochthony (Geschiere 2009; 
Geschiere and Ceuppens 2005; Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Jackson 2006, 2007). The 
principle of nationalism has taken hold, but it has become an exclusionary principle that 
allows groups to lay particular claims to the state rather than a unifying one that allows the 
government to spread its influence over “the people” (Young 2007). 
3. Family members may have feared that a loved one they had not heard from had died 
in the war, but absent an official announcement, they could still hold out hope. Because 
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many soldiers were given little or no leave to visit family, many wrote home infrequently, 
and letters were easily lost, there was room for hope that family members with whom they 
had not had contact were still alive and serving in the military.
CHAPTER 2
1. At the same time that the G-15 was arrested, several Eritrean U.S. Embassy employ-
ees were also arrested. 
2. Officially, Eritreans are considered of military age until they reach forty-five, but 
there are accounts of people being conscripted up to age fifty. 
3. It is important to remind the reader that my definition of “the state” assumes that we 
understand that “the state” is not a material thing or a totality. Throughout this chapter, it is 
necessary for me to use language that may appear to be reifying the state, but all references 
of the state are to how the state is imagined and conceptualized. 
4. Michel Foucault shows that the modern military was a disciplinary institution ex-
traordinarily adept at producing the modern, disciplined state subject. Indeed, Foucault 
(1995: 136) singles out the soldier in his discussion of seventeenth-century technologies of 
power that “discovered the body as an object and target of power” that could be “manipu-
lated, shaped, trained.” Soldier bodies are intensely disciplined. The experience of being in 
the military requires extensive temporal, spatial, and bodily control. Military training thus 
produces “isolation effects,” which lead individuals to think of themselves as disciplined 
subjects (Mitchell 1991, 2006).
5. Foucault’s (1995: 1) depiction of the seventeenth-century soldier emphasizes the 
“recognizability” of external attributes of the corps of soldiers. Their posture, coordinated 
movements, uniforms, and uniformity produce a collective, singular, uniform entity—the 
military. Extending Foucault’s argument, Timothy Mitchell (2006) argues that military 
discipline creates not only a disciplined state subject/soldier but also the very concept of 
“the military” as a whole.
6. Although initially there was widespread support for these various forms of service 
and Eritreans reflected a sense of pride in seeing televised images of National Service cadres, 
even in those early years, prior to the border war, there were complaints about the overly 
coercive and punitive nature of National Service, which belied docility while producing 
obedience. But despite these early complaints about National Service, it was largely an ac-
ceptable practice as long as the government honored its part of the agreement. Until 2001, 
few questioned National Service and the moral authority of the government to conscript. 
Indeed, when the war broke out, many, including those who had been critical of the insti-
tution, were thankful that the country had a ready fighting force to defend the country. 
7. Katherine Verdery (1996) notes that the etatization of time could occur both when 
people have to engage in daily activities, such as waiting in food lines, and more coercively, 
when people are compelled to participate in lengthy parades and state performances.
8. Lisa Wedeen (1999) makes a very similar point. As I noted in the introduction, she 
refers to subjects of authoritarian leaders performing “as if” they supported the regime but 
transgressing in subtle ways. 
9. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there 
were currently 252,000 Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers as of 2011, a number that 
steadily increased from 124,121 in 2003 (UNHCR 2000, 2002, 2005, 2011). The num-
ber continues to rise. As of December 2014, UNHCR estimates that there are 363,077 
Eritrean refugees and 53,662 asylum seekers (UNHCR 2015). In the first ten months of 
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2014, 36,678 Eritreans requested asylum in Europe, compared to 12,960 in the previous 
year (UNHCR 2014). 
10. In January 2013, a group of soldiers briefly occupied the Ministry of Information 
and read a statement on Eritrean television, demanding the implementation of the con-
stitution and the release of political prisoners. There has been no further open opposition 
or protest since this event, which has come to be known as “Forto 2013,” although many 
opposition groups in the diaspora protested at Eritrean embassies around the world. Forto 
2013 was the first open protest since students protested the arrest of their student union 
leader in 2001.
CHAPTER 3
1. Standards-based curricula have become prominent in the United States and are 
usually about integrating state curriculum with state standards and state tests. The Texas 
curriculum was notable for its early efforts to match statewide standards to statewide ex-
aminations, thereby holding schools and students to these standards. 
2. This is a commonly understood assertion in a variety of literatures in the field of edu-
cation. That schools reproduce class structures, particularly in the industrialized world, has 
been well asserted statistically and ethnographically (Althusser 1971; Anyon 1981; Bowles 
and Gintis 1976). Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron (1990) have taken up this 
argument and thoroughly theorized it, showing the ways in which schooling cultivates 
particular tastes, habitus, and therefore cultural capital. This assertion about the reproduc-
tive qualities of education is also at the core of work on social reproduction (Levinson and 
Holland 1996). Building on this, one of the core tenets of theories of cultural production is 
that schools reproduce broader social locations and positions, but in contrast to social repro-
duction theories, cultural production theories allow more agency and more understanding 
of the shifting, mutable nature of these structures. The vast majority of these studies explore 
the industrialized north, and, in general, much more work needs to be done in places where 
schools, and class structures themselves, function somewhat differently.
3. A robust literature on cultural production and social reproduction has illustrated 
the ways in which the subjectivity of an educated person is produced. This particular sub-
jectivity maps onto racial, ethnic, or class privilege, thereby reinforcing broader societal 
inequalities, but it can also alter social structures and identities in meaningful ways. For an 
overview of this literature, see Levinson, Foley, and Holland 1996. For a discussion about 
how this literature applies to national identities, see, for example, Benei 2008, Hall 2002, 
and Levinson 2001.
4. The old system included clear written guidelines for what constituted failing a grade. 
In contrast, the new system never made clear to teachers what constituted “failure” for the 
year. Previously, under the old system, what constituted “failure” for the year was quite 
complex but was written in policy. For example, under the old system, in the Senior Sec-
ondary School, students “failed” their grade if they failed several different combinations 
of classes: (1) if they failed English or math and one other subject or (2) if they failed any 
other combination of three subjects out of the remaining five to seven subjects offered 
in Senior Secondary Schools (biology, chemistry, physics, history, geography, and sports 
were always offered, and sometimes Arabic and civics). The new system had no such clear 
policy regarding what constituted failure. One of the problems when the “new curriculum” 
was implemented was that the standard, academic courses were weighted differently; for 
example, students no longer took all three natural sciences every semester, as they had previ-
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ously. Other “enrichment” courses were added, including “Family and Consumer Science,” 
“IT,” and “Health Science.” No policy ever clearly stated which courses would be included 
when calculating whether students would fail for the year.
5. These comments, made the same year that the new policies were implemented, might 
suggest that Eritrea’s choice of reforms were informed by (or resulted from) direct pressure 
from foreign donors. However, while it has been noted in many other countries that devel-
oping nations may have to succumb to pressures from international donors to fund their 
education systems (Berman 1992), Eritrea has long shown itself to be highly resistant to 
any type of coercive relationship with international donors and has been willing to reject 
aid to reject that which does not allow the government significant autonomy over its own 
policies. The director general of General Education described relationships with donors in 
the following way: “We share with our partners as long as they believe that we have the 
ownership and we have the program. They focus on what we are interested in and what 
we want to focus on.” Another interviewed curriculum writer went into more detail about 
what he thought the process of international influence might be, concluding that it was 
ultimately a national process: “I am quite sure there must be some kind of influence [from 
donors]. They have some ideas. But the good thing about our educational transformation is 
it has been initiated exclusively internally.”
CHAPTER 4
1. Ethnographies that show how schooling produces identities, including national 
identities, have focused a great deal on the use of school-based rituals to instill a sense of 
the meaning of being an educated person (Levinson, Foley, and Holland 1996; McLaren 
1986; Quantz 2011). 
2. Victor Turner (1969) discusses millenarian movements and hippies as examples of 
groups in a stage of extended liminality. Liisa Malkki’s (1995) work suggests that certain 
groups of people, such as refugees, are liminally located between categories produced by the 
nation-state system or “national order of things.”
3. In addition to the two roughly defined categories of Eritrean teachers, there were also 
Indian teachers, but for reasons outlined in the Introduction (because they were cultural 
outsiders), they do not figure into my discussion in this particular chapter.
4. Teachers who had already fully completed military training and National Service 
were called to the front lines during the third offensive and then were allowed to return to 
their teaching posts when the fighting stopped. University students and teachers who had 
not yet received training were called to training and after that began their National Service.
5. Indeed, historically the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s (EPLF’s) egalitarian ide-
ology attempted to break down “traditional” hierarchies and empower youth. The People’s 
Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and its predecessor during the war for liberation, 
the EPLF, specifically targeted youth as a vulnerable and disenfranchised category of the 
population and has had a long history of organizing youth and breaking down earlier align-
ments of power (Hepner 2009b; Pool 2001). 
6. According to Peter McLaren (1986: 82), the macrorituals refer to the “overall passage 
of students through the school system,” while the microrituals are the smaller, everyday 
rituals. 
7. Control, as teachers described it, referred to managing the students and holding 
them accountable for their behavior by taking attendance, administering tests, and impos-
ing consequences for lateness. 
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8. In Eritrean schools, students remain in their classroom throughout the school day, 
while teachers rotate from room to room; thus, the room belongs to the students.
9. Teacher lateness was not only a product of wanting to extend summer vacations and 
avoid returning to work. Some teachers worked during the summer, and their summer work 
encroached on the school year. Others experienced problems with finding transportation 
to Assab. New National Service teachers fresh from the university, who, depending on the 
year, composed a good percentage of school staff, had always been assigned to their posts 
belatedly and generally arrived once the semester was well underway. 
10. It was common for teachers to leave the class a few minutes early if they had com-
pleted their lessons or to stay a few minutes late if their lessons ran over. However, it is pos-
sible that Aron felt self-conscious about leaving the class early because I was present. This 
was a problem, particularly in some of my observations of younger teachers. Despite my 
efforts to assure them that I wanted to see what they did normally in their classes, I often 
had the sense that, in contrast to the older teachers, they believed they had to perform in 
a particular way for me. 
11. Perhaps surprisingly, students did not seem to make much of my presence in the 
room. In some classes when I first observed, when the teacher left the room, some students 
would glance at me and tell the others to be quiet, gesturing at me. But as soon as I in-
dicated to them that I was not a teacher and they should carry on, they did so with little 
hesitation. In other classes, the students figured out on their own that I was not in a teacher 
role and paid no attention to me. This speaks to the fact that how the teacher behaved, in 
a particular ritualized manner, cued to the students how they were supposed to act. I was 
doing nothing that indicated to students that I was an authority figure. I sat in the back or 
the middle of the room, quietly taking notes as they were. I typically did not leave when 
the teacher left. I did nothing to command or require their obedience and docility. In some 
classes, the students tried to draw me into their conversations, sometimes even when the 
teacher was teaching. But mostly, they ignored me. 
CHAPTER 5
1. Notions of sovereignty discussed by Giorgio Agamben (1998) and introduced by 
Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005) are deeply entwined with notions of containment or “enclosure” 
(Brown 2010), which for Agamben is epitomized by the concentration camp. Law blurs 
with what is outside the law but enforced by state actors. State actors who are charged with 
upholding or following laws and policies find themselves positioned, and often expected, 
to behave in ways that are technically illegal but are considered necessary in times of crisis 
or emergency. In the state of exception, the force of law acts with violence on citizens, es-
pecially those categorized as dangerous or impure, stripping them of the rights that would 
be guaranteed to them by law. Those who encounter the full force of the law without the 
rights guaranteed by that law exist in a condition that Agamben refers to as “bare life,” 
not necessarily denied rights by the law but existing outside the law itself and effectively 
invisible to the law.
2. The lack of rights applies to a greater extent to those evading military service, who 
may be arrested at any moment, detained indefinitely, gravely mistreated, and perhaps 
killed with impunity. It applies to a lesser extent to civil servants, who also have minimal 
rights, but a few more than conscripts and many more than those evading service. In Chap-
ter 2, I noted the absolute level of bodily control that conscripts experience. Additionally, 
no one has the right to own property or leave the country until National Service has been 
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completed. Furthermore, no written policies allocate when, how often, or under which 
conditions soldiers in National Service are awarded leave or under which conditions they 
may return home. Reports from those who have fled National Service suggest that consid-
erations such as when a soldier may visit his or her family are made on a highly personal 
basis by commanding officers and that they may be denied for equally personal reasons. 
3. Caroline Humphrey (2007) notes that Agamben’s notion of sovereignty is tremen-
dously useful for anthropologists to work with, as it allows for an exploration of very specific 
forms of state regulation and control of populations outside the traditional centralized no-
tion of the state. However, she cautions that while we need to consider seriously the ways in 
which sovereignty devolves from the state, we need not treat Agamben as too prescriptive.
4. My thinking about morality and violence is illuminated by recent work on the 
anthropology of vigilantism, which shows that much vigilante violence is an attempt to 
rectify perceived or real weaknesses of the state. Like vigilantes, teachers behaved in ways 
that they saw as holding the state accountable to its moral obligations (Goldstein 2003). 
This work on vigilantism draws on a reinterpretation of Agamben’s (1998) notion (which in 
itself is adopted from Schmitt [1922] 2005) to show the ways in which sovereignty becomes 
devolved and decentralized (see also Das and Poole 2004; Hansen and Stepputat 2005).
5. Not surprisingly, teachers described these memories of well-ordered schools when I 
asked them directly what they thought was wrong with schools at the time of my fieldwork. 
But during life history interviews, when asked to recount their own education, they also 
spontaneously drew comparisons between well-ordered schools and respectful students of 
the past and the disorder of the present. Only a couple of teachers who grew up in Eritrea 
during the war noted that their schools were not as disciplined. One of these two teachers 
attributed this to their being taught by Ethiopian teachers who did not care about Eritreans. 
Another noted that there were many fights between Eritrean and Ethiopian students in the 
school. In both cases, the ongoing conditions and Ethiopian rule were implicated in the lack 
of order in schools. But, in general, most teachers noted that until the border war, schools 
in Assab were more disciplined. 
6. When I spoke with teachers and directors in the highlands, they were experienc-
ing similar or more serious behavior problems with their students, so the perception that 
students in Assab behaved worse than students in the highlands was more an expression of 
teacher frustration than a reality related to Assab.
7. It should be noted that because my research focused on teachers, my own knowledge 
of Afar culture is also very cursory and superficial. For this reason, I do not comment on 
these cultural differences in depth. The point here is that what were likely differences in 
cultural habits and practices were often coded by teachers as evidence of Afar students’ 
being more “backward” and less “modern.” 
8. In practice, because of the dearth of Junior Secondary Schools throughout the coun-
try, relatively few students actually attended school up to grade 8, though according to edu-
cational policy, anyone could attend. Furthermore, the government was rapidly expanding 
access to grade 8 education by building more schools. 
9. Parallels with the measures teachers took and the work of vigilantes can be seen 
here. If vigilantism is an attempt to retain order, justice, and morality when the state is 
not capable of doing so (Buur 2003; Goldstein 2003; Lyons 2008; Smith 2004), vigilante 
violence comes from a crisis of state legitimacy, such as existed in Eritrea, and challenges the 
state’s capacity to maintain control and enforce justice but simultaneously reinforces these 
same ideals of justice and an ordered society (Buur 2003; Goldstein 2003). Its purpose is 
not to “overturn the state” but to “recall it to its legal obligations, its social contract with its 
citizens” (Goldstein 2003: 25). In times of moral anxiety, vigilante justice can be seen as an 
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attempt to restore a sense of morality: “It is through the constant enactment and embodi-
ment of violence that the moral community is performed” (Buur 2003: 25).
10. Even adult married couples typically did not tend to overtly express romance, emo-
tion, or affection for each other in public. There were very certain bars where more liberal 
men and women could go on a date; usually they were dimly lit with secluded areas where 
one would not be seen. In more public areas, women typically sat with their backs to the 
room to avoid being seen. 
11. Generally students were not given ID cards. An exception was made for grade 8 
and Senior Secondary School students, many of whom looked old enough to be of military 
age and were therefore at risk of being detained and forced into military training by the 
authorities.
CONCLUSION
1. I have detailed this process in Riggan 2014. 
2. Although a systematic examination of the police was well beyond the scope of my 
research, anecdotally, I know of enough examples of police deciding how long to detain 
people and using violence liberally as an interrogation technique or punishment to make 
the claim that police officers in Eritrea, even more so than teachers, were generally at liberty 
to decide on the exception. 
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